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Abstract 
This thesis investigates language acquisition and evolution, using the methodologies of 
Bayesian inference and expression-induction modelling, making specific reference to 
colour term typology, and syntactic acquisition. In order to test Berlin and Kay’s (1969) 
hypothesis that the typological patterns observed in basic colour term systems are 
produced by a process of cultural evolution under the influence of universal aspects of 
human neurophysiology, an expression-induction model was created. Ten artificial people 
were simulated, each of which was a computational agent. These people could learn 
colour term denotations by generalizing from examples using Bayesian inference, and the 
resulting denotations had the prototype properties characteristic of basic colour terms. 
Conversations between these people, in which they learned from one-another, were 
simulated over several generations, and the languages emerging at the end of each 
simulation were investigated. The proportion of colour terms of each type correlated 
closely with the equivalent frequencies found in the World Colour Survey, and most of the 
emergent languages could be placed on one of the evolutionary trajectories proposed by 
Kay and Maffi (1999). The simulation therefore demonstrates how typological patterns 
can emerge as a result of learning biases acting over a period of time. 
Further work applied the minimum description length form of Bayesian inference to 
modelling syntactic acquisition. The particular problem investigated was the acquisition of 
 the dative alternation in English. This alternation presents a learnability paradox, because 
only some verbs alternate, but children typically do not receive reliable evidence 
indicating which verbs do not participate in the alternation (Pinker, 1989). The model 
presented in this thesis took note of the frequency with which each verb occurred in each 
subcategorization, and so was able to infer which subcategorizations were conspicuously 
absent, and so presumably ungrammatical. Crucially, it also incorporated a measure of 
grammar complexity, and a preference for simpler grammars, so that more general 
grammars would be learned unless there was sufficient evidence to support the 
incorporation of some restriction. The model was able to learn the correct 
subcategorizations for both alternating and non-alternating verbs, and could generalise to 
allow novel verbs to appear in both constructions. When less data was observed, it also 
overgeneralized the alternation, which is a behaviour characteristic of children when they 
are learning verb subcategorizations. These results demonstrate that the dative 
alternation is learnable, and therefore that universal grammar may not be necessary to 
account for syntactic acquisition. Overall, these results suggest that the forms of 
languages may be determined to a much greater extent by learning, and by cumulative 
historical changes, than would be expected if the universal grammar hypothesis were 
correct. 
 Preface 
The aim of this thesis is to show how linguistic phenomena which have been 
identified by other researchers can be explained. The results reported in this thesis 
were obtained by running simulations on computers, and comparing the outputs of 
these simulations to data reported in published sources. Therefore, the research 
involved no empirical data collection. This thesis attempts to provide explanations of 
a number of phenomena which have been identified as a result of empirical 
investigations, and subsequently reported in the literature. However, while this thesis 
contains discussions of many empirical findings, and of analyses of empirical data, it 
is not concerned with these analyses in themselves, or with the correctness of the data 
on which they are based. For example, much of this thesis relies heavily on Kay and 
Maffi’s (1999) analysis of the data of the World Colour Survey, which is discussed in 
detail in section 2.1. Kay and Maffi’s analysis remains controversial (Levinson, 
2001), but I do not attempt to analyse the primary data myself. That would go beyond 
the scope of this thesis, so instead I simply tried to create a computer model which 
would account for the emergence of colour term systems corresponding to those 
which Kay and Maffi reported were attested in the World Colour Survey.  
While criticisms have been made of Kay and Maffi’s work (many of which are 
discussed in section 2.1 below), a wealth of empirical data supports their general 
conclusions. The basis of most of the criticisms seems to be that Kay and Maffi’s 
 analysis does not take account of the full complexity of colour term systems, 
especially in that it excludes non-basic colour terms, and that it ignores the secondary 
connotations of basic colour terms. However, neither of those factors would seem to 
in any way invalidate the results which Kay and Maffi did report. Hence it would 
seem that, even if some of the details of Kay and Maffi’s analyses turn out to be 
incorrect, that is unlikely to greatly affect the validity of the work presented in this 
thesis. Many other issues relating to this thesis remain controversial, such as exactly 
what neurophysiological mechanisms underlie colour vision, and whether the dative 
alternation can be explained in terms of semantic regularities. However, like with the 
controversies surrounding colour term typology, resolving these issues concerning 
empirical findings goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Further empirical findings 
may necessitate a revision of this work, but at present it is only possible to work on 
the basis of the results which have been published up to this point. 
While the research for this thesis relied entirely on computer modelling, its actual 
subject matter lies within linguistics, and to some extent related disciplines such as 
psychology. Hence the thesis has been written so that it should be, as far as possible, 
understandable by a general linguistic audience. At the same time, I have tried to 
explicate linguistic terminology whenever possible, for the benefit of non-linguists. In 
general, where specific technical issues arise, I have tried to make them as accessible 
as possible, but a description of some aspects of the research necessitates the use of 
mathematical concepts and related notation which are likely to be unfamiliar to many 
readers interested in the subject matter of the thesis. This thesis makes considerable 
use of techniques from statistics and machine learning, in particular Bayesian 
inference and minimum description length. However, while some attempt is made to 
justify why these techniques were chosen, actually demonstrating why they are 
 effective machine learning techniques, or why, for example, Bayes’ rule is correct, 
goes beyond the scope of this thesis. It can be said that, while this thesis uses machine 
learning, it is not about machine learning itself, and hence I have tried to restrict 
discussion of the machine learning literature to the minimum necessary. 
All of the thesis is my own original work, except where explicit reference is made to 
other work. However, portions of the thesis have been published, and I have presented 
results at a number of conferences, and given some other talks. A full list of this 
research activity appears below (on all of which I am the sole author, except where 
noted otherwise). In general, the publications do not correspond exactly to particular 
parts of this thesis, but Chapter 9 is essentially an expanded version of the 2000 
Cognitive Science Society conference paper, while parts of the other five papers are 
reproduced in Chapters 1 to 8. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This thesis aims to increase our understanding of language. Perhaps the most 
important aspect of this process is concerned with understanding exactly what 
language is, and hence exactly what kind of explanation we need in order to 
understand it. Many researchers, notably de Saussure (1959/1916) and Chomsky 
(1986), have noted that the word language can mean several different things. Often 
researchers have focussed on one particular concept of language, and they have 
sometimes argued that the concept they use is the single correct one for use in 
linguistics. For example, Chomsky (1986) stressed the importance of viewing 
languages as psychological phenomena, while other researchers (for example 
Halliday, 1985) have preferred to highlight the fact that language is a communicative 
system. If we accept Chomsky’s position, linguistics becomes concerned with 
identifying psychological mechanisms, but if we accept Halliday’s, then linguistics is 
concerned with investigating how language can be used to achieve particular 
communicative functions. Many researchers, however, have simply focussed on the 
systems of rules which seem to underlie the examples of language which we can hear 
and read, and have tried to describe languages in terms of formal systems, without 
making explicit reference to the people who produce and listen to them, or the 
2 
purposes for which they are used. Still other researchers have argued that languages 
are built up and change over many generations, and so if we want to understand 
languages we should understand the factors which have caused them to evolve1 in 
particular ways. These are just a few of the different perspectives on language which 
are common in linguistics. In practice, most linguists seem to draw upon aspects of a 
number of different concepts of language, and often they do not make it explicit 
exactly which concept of language their analysis relates to. 
There is clear justification for using each of the above concepts of language, so it does 
not seem appropriate to claim that there is a correct approach which should be used in 
all linguistic investigations. This thesis integrates multiple concepts of language, and 
shows how quite different approaches can be coherently used to account for a variety 
of linguistic phenomena. It is shown that, if languages are to be fully understood, it is 
necessary to consider more than one concept of language. Many of the phenomena 
which have attracted the attention of linguists, can probably not be understood by 
considering only one specific concept of language. Much of the work presented in this 
thesis is based on Hurford’s (1987, 1990) conceptualisation of language, which 
integrates individual and social concepts of language into a single unified theory. 
However, as well as investigating which general paradigms are most suitable for 
explaining linguistic phenomena, this thesis also tests some more specific hypotheses. 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that throughout this thesis, except where I explicitly note otherwise, when I refer to 
evolution, I mean cultural evolution, that is a process whereby individual languages change over time. 
This should not be confused with the phylogenetic (biological) evolution of human’s linguistic 
capabilities. 
3 
Most importantly, the thesis tries to understand how children learn language. This 
issue has been central to linguistic theory, at least since Chomsky (1965). We should 
note that the primary justification for the Universal Grammar hypothesis (the claim 
that children are born with an innate knowledge of much of the structure of language), 
is that it has been argued that children need Universal Grammar to learn language. 
Hence all research into Universal Grammar can be seen as work aimed at developing 
a theory of language acquisition. 
The key methodology of this thesis involves the construction of computer models. 
These aim to explain language acquisition by demonstrating how the structure of 
some aspects of a language can be determined. These models learn based on examples 
of utterances in the language, sometimes together with a representation of the non-
linguistic context in which those utterances were made. These models hence specify a 
particular computation, which it is hypothesized is either the same, or in some way 
parallels, a computation that people perform in order to learn language. Clearly here I 
am not referring to some process or algorithm which people consciously carry out in a 
step by step fashion. The computer models instead aim to recreate a process which is 
hypothesized to match or in some way parallel that occurring in the brain, but about 
which people have no conscious awareness. Therefore, while this thesis is not 
concerned with computers themselves, it is concerned with computation. 
More specifically, the thesis investigates the hypothesis that children learn language 
using Bayesian inference, or at least that Bayesian inference can accurately model 
children’s learning. Bayesian inference is a method of learning which can be applied 
to almost any situation in which we want to make inferences based on empirical 
evidence. It is usually an implicit assumption of work in linguistic theory that 
4 
languages are not statistical, and this is occasionally argued for explicitly (for 
example, Chomsky, 1957). In this thesis, I suggest that language is statistical, by 
which I mean that the frequency with which particular words, constructions, or other 
aspects of language, occur, forms a part of our internalised knowledge of language. 
Bayesian inference is a statistical procedure, so employing it as a theory of language 
acquisition necessitates the adoption of the view that people make probabilistic (and 
hence statistical) inferences. They can only do this by taking account of the frequency 
with which particular types of construction are used, or the frequency with which 
words are used to denote particular meanings. Bayesian inference is a very general 
method, and so Bayesian modelling can encompass a wide range of very diverse 
approaches. The models used for explaining language acquisition in this thesis 
employ two different types of Bayesian inference, firstly Bayes’ optimal 
classification, and secondly minimum description length, but we can see both of these 
as being motivated by a single hypothesis, which is that people learn language using 
Bayesian inference. 
Most of this thesis is concerned with colour terms: with how they are acquired, how 
they change over time, how we should explain their typology, and what sort of 
representation is needed to account for their meanings. Chapter 2 outlines the relevant 
literature concerning colour terms, and reviews the kinds of approach which have 
been proposed for explaining linguistic phenomena. It then goes on to review research 
which has employed the methodology of expression-induction modelling, which I use 
to explain empirical data concerning colour terms. 
Chapter 3 describes a model which was implemented in an attempt to account for 
colour term acquisition, and then goes on to demonstrate that it can account for how 
5 
colour terms are learned. However, in Chapter 4, the model is evaluated in terms of 
alternative approaches to linguistic theory, and it is shown how the model can only 
really account for the data concerning colour terms when it is placed in an 
evolutionary context.  
Chapter 5 introduces a new model of the acquisition of colour term systems, which 
takes account of findings concerning colour vision and colour language, which were 
neglected in the design of the previous model. In Chapter 6, it is shown how the new 
model could account for typological data when it was used to simulate the evolution 
of colour term systems, something which was not possible with the previous model. 
In Chapter 7, attempts are made to make the simulations more realistic, by 
investigating whether the model is robust in the face of noisy data, and Chapter 8 
evaluates the findings of the models, and discusses how the present models relate to 
previous attempts to explain the same data. It also discusses the shortcomings of the 
models, and makes suggestions as to how further work could improve on them.  
Chapter 9 shows how Bayesian inference can also solve learnability problems in 
syntactic acquisition, and discusses the relevance of this to contemporary linguistic 
theory. Finally, Chapter 10 discusses the relevance of the results to a number of 
theoretical debates, concerning the nature of language, and what kind of concept is 
needed to explain linguistic phenomena. Overall, the thesis develops proposals which 
show how data which has been of interest to linguistic theorists, but which has 
resisted a coherent explanation in other frameworks, can be explained. 
6 
Chapter 2  
Background 
This first part of this thesis describes computational modelling experiments performed 
to explain empirical data concerning basic colour terms. Colour terms are simply 
words in natural languages which are used to denote the property of colour. In most, if 
not all, languages, a special subset of such words can be identified, which Berlin and 
Kay (1969) named basic colour terms.  
Berlin and Kay (1969, p6) listed a number of criteria which they used to distinguish 
basic colour terms from other words used to denote colour. They considered colour 
terms to be basic only if they were known by all speakers of the language and were 
highly salient psychologically, and if they did not just name a subset of the colours 
denoted by another colour word and their meanings were not predictable from the 
meanings of their component parts. They also provided some further criteria to deal 
with any doubtful cases. Application of these criteria seems to distinguish clearly 
between basic and non-basic colour terms in most languages, although there can still 
remain some questionable cases2. The application of these criteria to English, results 
                                                 
2
 These include the Russian term goluboy ‘light blue’, which seems to be less salient than the other 
Russian blue term siniy, but for some speakers it seems that this term names a range of colours disjunct 
7 
in the set of 11 basic colour words, red, yellow, green, blue, orange, purple, pink, 
brown, grey, black and white, excluding terms such as crimson, blonde and royal 
blue 3  (Berlin and Kay, 1969). It is possible that some other words should be 
considered basic for some speakers (for example turquoise, cream or beige), but all of 
these terms could be excluded on grounds of salience, each of them being much less 
frequent than any of the words usually considered to be basic colour terms in 
English4. 
                                                                                                                                           
from goluboy, at least in some contexts, which is evidence that it should be considered basic. Another 
problematic case concerns the Hungarian red terms piros and vörös. MacLaury (1999) discusses these 
terms, both of which seem to be highly salient. Vörös, however, names a much smaller range of colour 
than piros does, so it could be seen as a non-basic red term. This is similar to the situation seen in 
Japanese, where ao names both green and blue hues, while midori names a narrower range of blue 
colours, which might suggest that midori is a non-basic colour term. However, midori is more 
commonly used to name blue colours than ao is, and is also highly salient (Conlan, 2002), so perhaps 
both terms should be considered basic, which is how they were treated by Berlin and Kay (1969). Some 
linguists have even gone so far as to question the validity of the distinction between basic and non-
basic colour terms (Levinson, 2001; Saunders, 1992), but it seems that the consensus of opinion is that 
the distinction is valid, at least in the majority of cases. The case of Hungarian piros and vörös is 
discussed further in Chapter 8. 
3
 It should be noted that the following convention is used concerning linguistic examples: whenever 
they appear in the text they are italicized. This is especially important when English colour terms are 
discussed, because it makes it clear whether I am talking about an English word, such as red, or a 
particular colour, such as red. 
4
 This is supported by evidence derived from the 100 million word British National Corpus (of which 
about 90% is written language, and 10% spoken). The least frequent basic colour term in this corpus is 
orange, with only 607 occurrences, but this was much more frequent than all of beige (174 
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There has been a considerable amount of research into the properties of basic terms, 
but perhaps the most important study was that of Berlin and Kay (1969). They 
examined a sample of 98 languages, and found that there was very wide variation 
between the colour terms of different languages, in that the actual ranges of colour 
denoted by each term differed between languages. However, they found that this 
variation was certainly not without limit, as had been presumed by earlier researchers 
(for example Gleason, 1961). While the number of colour terms varied between 
languages, which combination of colour terms exist in any given language seems to 
be at least partly predictable. 
This thesis attempts to address the issue of why there are such regularities. Berlin and 
Kay suggested that the regularities were the product of an evolutionary process in 
which languages gradually evolved from an initial state in which they had only two 
basic colour terms, and in which more terms were added in predictable orders. One of 
the goals of this thesis is to investigate whether this hypothesis could explain the 
typological patterns seen in colour term systems. However, while Berlin and Kay 
claimed that the patterns were due to an evolutionary process, they left the details of 
                                                                                                                                           
occurrences), turquoise (64 occurrences), and cream (22 occurrences). Terms were only counted when 
they had been tagged as adjectives, which would, for instance, exclude orange when it was used to 
name the fruit, but it is possible that these figures where somewhat distorted by use of words to denote 
properties other than colour (for example the use of red to mean radical). However the general finding 
seems clear, which is that the eleven basic colour terms are much more frequent than other colour 
words, so even if some other colour words appear to satisfy some of the criteria for basic colour term 
status, we can exclude them on grounds of salience in the language as a whole. The British National 
Corpus is available on-line at http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/  
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this process unspecified. Clearly cultural evolution of language5 is realized through a 
process in which language is passed from speaker to speaker over a number of 
generations (although this is not to suggest that a person does not change the way they 
speak during their own lifetimes; that kind of change could also form part of such an 
evolutionary process). Any complete theory of the evolution of colour terms should 
                                                 
5
 It should be acknowledged that ‘evolution of language’ can also refer to real phylogenetic (biological) 
evolution, but this is clearly not the sense in which Berlin and Kay (1969) intended to use the term 
evolution. It seems that the differences between the colour term systems used by speakers of different 
languages are due primarily to the language to which those speakers are exposed, not to any difference 
in their genetic makeup as compared to speakers of other languages. Hence it would seem that the only 
evolutionary process through which the colour term systems of individual languages evolve is a 
cultural one, not a phylogenetic one. It is interesting to note, however, that many early studies did in 
fact presume a non-linguistic explanation of at least some of the differences between colour term 
systems, in that it was assumed that colour vision had only recently evolved, and that speakers of 
languages with fewer colour terms were in fact able to distinguish fewer colours (Gladstone 1858 and 
Geiger, 1880, both cited in Berlin and Kay, 1969).  
Also, Bornstein (1973) argued that the presence of green-blue composites is, at least in part, due to 
a difficulty that speakers of languages with such terms have in distinguishing green and blue, but Maffi 
and Hardin (1997) have argued that such an interpretation is unlikely to be correct, because there is a 
consensus that the visual apparatus of all peoples is essentially the same. One exception to this 
generalisation, however, is that in some localities of the world, it is apparent that the incidence of 
colour blindness is much higher than the norm (Sacks, 1996), so in such communities we might well 
expect that this would have a significant impact on the languages spoken in those communities. If a 
relationship between incidence of colour blindness and colour term systems could be demonstrated, it 
would show a difference between languages due to genetic differences between the speakers of those 
languages, and so the explanation of the differences between those languages would partly be in terms 
of phylogenetic evolution.  
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specify exactly how colour term systems are transmitted between generations, and 
what properties of either people or their environment are responsible for creating the 
attested typological patterns. 
The methodology which was used here in an attempt to provide a fully explicit and 
rigorous theory concerning the evolution of colour terms involved the construction of 
a computer model. This model aimed to implement the most essential elements of the 
processes through which colour terms evolve over a number of generations, including 
specifying how their denotations could be learned. This required making a number of 
assumptions to compensate for areas where Berlin and Kay, and subsequent 
researchers, have not made sufficiently precise claims6. It would be surprising if every 
                                                 
6
 I do not intend my assertion that Berlin and Kay’s theory is in many aspects vague to be in any way a 
criticism of it. Clearly, if we are unsure of the details of some process then it might well be best to 
simply leave them unspecified, and instead to state only the general properties of the process. It is often 
said that one of the advantages of computer modelling is that it forces researchers to make their 
theories more explicit (Latimer, 1995). However, consideration of actual computer models would show 
that only certain aspects of the processes under investigation are ever made explicit. For example, in 
the models presented in this thesis, processes concerning how colour terms are articulated and 
perceived, as well as the phonological form of colour terms, are completely neglected. This is of course 
not in any way a claim that such processes do not exist, but these matters have simply been left 
unspecified, because it was felt that they were not essential to an explanation of colour term typology. 
Hence, in the computer models, colour words were simply represented by strings of letters, which 
models the fact that different colour words have to be phonologically distinguishable, but leaves vague 
the details of how this is achieved in practice in any particular language. We might find justification for 
this approach in term’s of Occam’s razor, which is stated by Heylighen (1997) as ‘one should not 
increase, beyond what is necessary, the number of entities required to explain anything’. We might 
argue that this would provide support for a principle that theories should be left vague unless there is 
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detail of the implementation corresponded exactly to how colour term systems evolve 
in the real world, so it would be incorrect to suggest that the model replicates colour 
term evolution precisely. Instead, the aim of this thesis is to validate the evolutionary 
hypothesis, and to provide a simple and plausible theory which is able to account for 
the available typological evidence.  
As will be shown below, the evolutionary model can account for much of the data 
concerning colour term typology, and this could be taken as evidence that the model, 
at least in broad outline, does reflect how colour term systems evolve. However, 
perhaps more importantly, it demonstrates that colour term typology could be the 
product of languages evolving under the influence of the human visual system, and so 
no other factors, for example innate knowledge or relativistic influences, are 
necessary in order to explain colour term typology. This is not to say that the present 
model proves that such factors do not play a role in shaping colour term systems, for 
it certainly does not do so, but if colour term typology can be explained without 
reference to such factors, then it would seem that we should not presume that they 
play a part in forming colour term systems unless further evidence can be found to 
support such a view. 
                                                                                                                                           
evidence favouring one set of specifics over other possible ones. The assumptions made in the 
construction of the computer model of colour terms, and the justifications for them, are made explicit 
below, primarily in section 3.2. 
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2.1 Colour Terms across Languages 
Before going on to consider how colour term typology can be explained, it is first 
necessary to obtain a clear understanding of the data concerning the properties of 
basic colour terms, both within individual languages and cross-linguistically. One of 
the properties which this thesis aims to explain is that, in all languages, basic colour 
terms have prototype properties. The central function of a colour term is clearly to 
identify a range of colours, so that the word can be used to distinguish these colours 
from those which the word does not denote. However, colour terms do not simply 
denote a uniform range of colours, but instead some colours are members of the 
colour category corresponding to the colour term to a greater extent than are other 
colours.  
Typically, for each colour term, there will be a single colour which speakers of the 
language consider to be the best example of that colour term, and this colour is called 
the prototypical colour. Moving away from the prototype, colours become 
increasingly less good examples of the colour category as they become more 
dissimilar from the prototype. At a certain level of dissimilarity from the prototype, 
we will find colours for which it is difficult to determine whether they come within 
the colour category, or outside of it. Hence for these colours it is not clear whether the 
word can be used to denote them or not. This part of the colour space is known as a 
category’s fuzzy boundary, where the exact limit of the category is unclear (Taylor, 
1989).  
There is considerable inconsistency between people as to where they place the limits 
of a colour category, because, if different speakers of the same language are asked to 
outline the boundaries of a colour term on an array of colour chips, then they are 
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likely to place the boundary in slightly different places. Furthermore, if the same 
person is asked to perform the task a second time, they are unlikely to place the 
boundary in exactly the same place, which shows that even for individual speakers 
there exists considerable inconsistency concerning category boundaries (Berlin and 
Kay, 1969). The existence of the prototype phenomena is also clearly demonstrated 
by expressions such as 'a good red', 'sort of red' and 'slightly red', none of which 
would make sense if all red colours were equally good examples of the colour term 
red (Kay and McDaniel, 1978). While colour terms are perhaps one of the best 
examples of prototype categories, Taylor noted that the meanings of many words, 
including most nouns, verbs and prepositions, also have prototype properties, and that 
prototype properties can be observed in many other aspects of language, including in 
syntax, morphology and phonology.  
Taylor (1989) claimed that prototype categories have prototype structures because the 
extent of the category is determined by contrasting individual members of the 
category to the central prototype. However, this account seems somewhat 
problematic, because there is variation between colour terms as to how similar a 
colour must be to the prototype for it to be a member of the category. This clearly has 
to be the case, as some colour terms denote much larger parts of the colour space than 
others do. A further, and perhaps more important objection, is that the prototypical 
colour is not always in the centre of the region denoted by the colour term (as can be 
seen in the colour charts of Berlin and Kay (1969)), so in such cases knowledge of the 
prototype would not be sufficient to determine the range of the colour term, even if 
the size of the colour category was also known. In the Bayesian model used in the 
simulations reported here, the prototype is not used to define the extent of the 
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category, but instead arises as a by product of the acquisition mechanism, as will be 
shown below in section 3.6. 
Berlin and Kay (1969) investigated the range of colour term systems in a wide range 
of languages. Their study gathered data from speakers of twenty different languages, 
using arrays of Munsell7 chips. Firstly the basic colour terms of each language were 
determined, in terms of the criteria discussed above. This produced the first finding of 
Berlin and Kay’s study, which was that all languages appear to have between 2 and 11 
basic colour terms8. Berlin and Kay also used data from published sources such as 
                                                 
7
 Munsell chips are small pieces of cardboard which are painted in carefully controlled pigments, so 
that the colours of the chips are systematically spaced over the range of all possible colours, at least in 
as far as it is possible to create the appropriate pigments. While Munsell chips, and the Munsell system 
of ordering colours (Cleland, 1937), seem to be the only colour apparatus and colour order system used 
in linguistic research, it should be noted that there are many other colour systems available, some of 
which, such as the natural colour system (Hård, Sivik and Tonnquist, 1996), vary considerably in the 
structure they give to the colour space in terms of how far apart particular colours are placed. It is 
important to bear in mind that, while attempts have been made to standardize the Munsell system so 
that the distances between colours reflect psychological data concerning colour dissimilarity (Indow, 
1988), it should be noted that there are many such methods for standardizing colour spaces, and no 
consensus has been reached amongst colour theorists as to establishing a single correct colour space. 
8
 Although note the discussion above concerning the definition of a basic colour term. If the Russian 
term goluboy and the Hungarian term vörös were considered to be basic, then these languages would 
both have 12 basic colour terms. However, there does not appear to be any example of a language 
which has 12 colour terms which are all clearly and uncontroversially basic, despite there being a 
considerable number of languages with 11 basic terms. Hence there does seem to be a need for an 
explanation of why there is a limit of 11 terms, at least in most cases. It is possible that this 
phenomenon could be due, at least in part, to languages becoming increasingly similar due to contact 
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dictionaries and grammars to bring the total number of languages in their study to 98, 
and that data appeared to confirm the finding. 
The next stage of the research involved asking each person to map both the outer 
boundary of each of the basic colour terms in their language on an array of Munsell 
chips, and to identify the best or most typical examples (the prototype) of each term. 
They discovered that the boundaries of the areas of colour denoted by colour terms 
varied greatly between languages, which was consistent with earlier findings. Clearly 
where a language has fewer basic colour terms then each colour term must denote a 
wider range of colours, at least if the language is to allow each part of the colour 
space to be named by one of the terms. However, even in languages which had the 
same number of colour terms, and in which each colour term in one language was 
roughly equivalent to a colour term in another, the locations of the boundaries of the 
colour term’s denotations varied considerably. 
This finding might have led to the view that there were few constraints on the kinds of 
colour term systems which could emerge in languages, but a quite different picture 
emerged when Berlin and Kay looked at the distribution of the prototypes of the 
colour terms. They found that most of these were placed in just a few areas of the 
colour space, either clustering on single Munsell chips, or a small number of nearby 
chips, leaving over 70% of the surface of the Munsell array clear of any prototypes at 
all. They showed that there were in fact 11 clusters of prototypes, corresponding to 
                                                                                                                                           
with one another, as many of the languages with 11 basic colour terms are major languages not 
restricted to a small locality (although there remain many fairly widely used languages with large 
numbers of speakers which have less than 11 basic colour terms). 
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the locations in which English speakers would place the best examples of each of the 
basic colour terms in English. This clearly showed that the lexicalization of the colour 
space in unrelated languages was certainly not random or completely arbitrary, but 
appeared to conform closely to universal restrictions. 
A further finding emerged when Berlin and Kay investigated the combination of 
colour terms existing in any particular language. They found that when terms were 
classified based on their prototypes, it was largely predictable which colour terms 
would exist in a language, if the number of basic colour terms in the language was 
known. Berlin and Kay expressed these regularities using the implicational hierarchy 
shown in Figure 2.1. This hierarchy was constructed partly using evidence derived 
from participants using Munsell arrays, though evidence for most of the languages 
used to construct this hierarchy came only from published sources such as 
dictionaries. All languages appeared to have a term with its prototype at white, and a 
term with its prototype at black, shown at the left of the hierarchy, but some 
languages had no other basic colour terms but these. However, if a language had a 
term for any of the colours further right in the hierarchy, it always had terms for all 
the colours further left in the hierarchy. For example, if a language had a term with its 
prototype at yellow, then it would also have terms with their prototypes at white, 
black and red. 
 
Figure 2.1. Berlin and Kay’s (1969) Implicational Hierarchy. 
white 
black 
  
red green yellow blue 
 
brown 
purple 
pink 
orange 
grey 
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It should be noted that while Berlin and Kay proposed that this hierarchy described 
the general patterns seen in colour term systems cross-linguistically, they did 
acknowledge the existence of some exceptions and problematic cases. Some of these 
problems revolved around cases where it was unclear which terms should have been 
classified as basic. For example the Catalan speaking informant considered negre 
‘black’ to be a kind of gris ‘grey’, while acknowledging that English black was not a 
kind of grey. This indicated that negre might not be a basic colour term, and so that 
Catalan might lack a basic term for black, hence violating the hierarchy. Another 
problem concerned Cantonese, which had terms for white, black, red, green, yellow, 
blue, pink and grey, but which lacked a term for brown, again contravening the 
hierarchy. However, Berlin and Kay suggested the terms for pink and grey appeared 
to be recent additions to the language, and that they might not be basic terms at all. 
Other languages which were problematic with respect to the hierarchy were 
Vietnamese, Western Apache, Hopi, Samal and Papago, all because they either lacked 
a basic colour term which the hierarchy predicted they should have, or because they 
had acquired a basic colour term before they had reached the stage in the hierarchy 
where it would normally be expected to emerge. However, given that only six out of 
the 98 languages in the study appeared to be seriously problematic, Berlin and Kay 
did not modify their theory, but instead simply decided to treat these languages as 
exceptions. 
A number of criticisms can be made of Berlin and Kay’s methodology, perhaps the 
most important of which is that most of their data concerning colour terms came from 
published sources or communication with other linguists, rather than directly from 
native speakers of the languages concerned. Furthermore, out of the twenty languages 
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for which interviews were conducted using arrays of Munsell chips, in all but one 
case the informants were living in America, and were bilingual in English, so it could 
have been the case that the results were partly a product of the influence of English 
colour categorization on the other languages. Also, for most of the languages, data 
was obtained from only a single informant, so it was not possible to be sure whether 
the results reflected the language as a whole, or simply the idiolect of one individual 
speaker. 
Since Berlin and Kay published their original study, however, there has been a great 
deal of interest in basic colour terms, and much more data has been collected, 
generally using methods which addressed the deficiencies of Berlin and Kay’s 
original study. These studies have in large part confirmed Berlin and Kay’s original 
findings, though several modifications have been made to their hierarchy (including, 
for example, Kay, 1975 and Kay, Berlin and Merrifield, 1991), to accommodate some 
language types which were not attested in their original study, or which were 
originally treated as exceptional aberrations.  
A very large survey of the colour term systems of 110 minor languages, the World 
Colour Survey (Kay, Berlin, Maffi and Merrifield, 1997), has now produced a wealth 
of high quality data, allowing us to get a much more complete picture of colour term 
systems worldwide. Using this new data, Kay and Maffi (1999) produced a new 
classification of colour term systems, which has modified the original hierarchy of 
Berlin and Kay (1969) considerably, but which still shows that the attested colour 
term systems are only a small subset of those which are logically possible. Kay et al 
(1997) noted that it appears that there are six fundamental colours, corresponding to 
the colours which would typically be the prototypes of red, yellow, green, blue, black 
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and white colour terms, and that the order of appearance of basic colour terms which 
do not include one of these colours in their denotations, such as the English terms 
purple, orange, turquoise, brown and grey, is less predictable. Their classification of 
colour term systems was made primarily by considering only terms whose denotation 
included at least one of the fundamental colours. These classifications were then 
simply augmented with a list of which other basic colour terms existed in the 
language.  
However, Kay Berlin and Merrifield (1991) did note that while purple or brown terms 
may be seen in languages which do not have separate terms for both green and blue, 
contrary to Berlin and Kay’s hierarchy, it seems that orange or pink terms do not 
normally appear unless a language has separate terms for both green and blue. Kay 
(1975) had already noted that grey terms sometimes appear in languages even when 
those languages have not developed terms for some of the other colours which Berlin 
and Kay predicted would normally appear before grey. The general conclusion that 
we can draw from these findings is that the order in which such terms emerge in a 
language does not seem to be completely predictable, though there appear to be 
general trends concerning the order in which these terms emerge. We can note that 
orange terms tend to be seen only in languages which have already developed purple 
terms, but that this is not always the case (MacLaury, 1997a), and that purple terms 
tend to emerge once a language has acquired separate terms for green and blue, but 
that this rule does not apply to all languages. These specific findings are among the 
data which the evolutionary computer model described here is able to explain. 
Another important difference between the analysis of Berlin and Kay (1969) and that 
of Kay and Maffi (1999) is that, while Berlin and Kay classified terms simply in terms 
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of the locations of their prototypes, Kay and Maffi have paid more attention to terms’ 
full denotational ranges. They classified colour terms depending on which 
fundamental colours they contained, rather than just in terms of which fundamental 
colour corresponded to the term’s prototype, so that, for example, two terms which 
both had red prototypes, would be classified differently if one also named a range 
which included yellow, but the other did not. 
Berlin and Kay had noted the existence of languages which had only two basic colour 
terms, and they assumed that such systems would cleanly divide the colour space up 
into light and dark colours, though they did not investigate any such language 
experimentally. However, when Heider and Olivier (1972) investigated the 
Indonesian language Dani, using Munsell chips, they found that the two colour words 
divided up the colour space so that one, mola denoted light colours, but also yellow 
and red hues of medium lightness, while the other, mili, denoted dark colours, but also 
blue and green hues of medium lightness, so that their denotations were 
complementary, essentially covering the whole colour space. (So, for example, mili 
would denote dark yellow hues, although, in English, we would call dark colours of 
the same hue as yellow brown or khaki.) Further research has shown that all 
languages with two colours, whilst being extremely rare, are either of this type, 
dividing the colour space up into a white-red-yellow category and a black-blue-green 
one, or else they simply make a dark light split, as was originally presumed by Berlin 
and Kay (MacLaury, 1997a). Initially it was presumed that in such systems, one term 
would have its prototype at white, and the other at black, but Kay et al (1997) noted 
that this was not always the case, and that such three way composite terms can have 
their focus on another of the fundamental colours, so, for example a white-yellow-red 
category might have its prototype at red, rather than at white. 
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In the colour charts published by Berlin and Kay (1969) which showed the colour 
names given to each colour chip on a Munsell array in each of the 20 languages 
investigated experimentally, many of the colour chips were left unlabeled, so it 
appeared that, in languages such as Mandarin Chinese, most colours could not be 
named by any colour term. This appeared to contrast with languages such as English, 
in which most people are able to specify a basic colour term which can describe every 
Munsell chip, although even in English it is difficult to decide on a name for some 
Munsell chips which are near the boundaries of the denotations of two or more basic 
colour terms. However, it seems that such situations were probably a product of the 
way in which some of the linguists involved in the study elicited their results, and that 
in almost all languages there are no areas of the colour space which cannot be named 
by a basic colour term. 
Kay et al (1997) mapped out the areas of the colour space which could be named by 
each colour term, based on the reports of a number of informants. They showed that if 
several speakers of the same language were interviewed, and if only those colour 
chips which all of the informants think can be named by a colour term are mapped on 
a Munsell array, then there would typically be large gaps between the areas of colour 
denoted by each word, because not all speakers of the language agree on which word 
should be used to name the more marginal members of each colour category. 
However, if instead the criteria for considering a colour to be within the denotation of 
a colour term are reduced to 30% agreement between speakers, and the colour terms’ 
denotations are again mapped on an array of Munsell chips, then the gaps between the 
colour terms largely disappear.  
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MacLaury (1997a) also noted that how widely an informant draws the boundary of a 
colour term can depend on exactly what instructions they are given. While initially 
informants may include only a fairly small number of chips within a colour term’s 
denotation, if they are subsequently asked if any other colour chips could also be 
named by the colour term, they are likely to include many more colour chips within 
the word’s denotation. So it seems that together all the basic colour terms in a 
language typically cover the full range of possible colours, but because some colours 
are only marginal examples of any basic colour term, people may be reluctant to 
include them within any word’s denotation. 
Kay and Maffi (1999) did not find any language in the World Colour Survey which 
left any region of the colour space unnamed, although in some languages naming of 
parts of the colour space is very inconsistent across speakers, and it is possible that in 
some such cases the colour terms for some parts of the colour space do not fulfil 
Berlin and Kay’s (1969) criteria for basic colour term status. However, Kay and Maffi 
do acknowledge the existence of one well documented language which does appear to 
leave parts of the colour space unnamed, Yélî Dnye (Papua New Guinea), which was 
reported by Levinson (2001). This language appears to have only three basic colour 
terms, kpêdekpêde ‘black’, kpaapîkpaapî ‘white’ and mtyemtye or taataa ‘red’9. There 
also appears to be one other colour term in the language, wuluwulu ‘dark red’, but 
Kay and Maffi analyzed this as a non basic term. What is really interesting about this 
language is that the denotations of the three basic colour terms do not extend to cover 
                                                 
9
 The two forms for red appear to be due to dialectal variation, although many speakers used both 
terms, and a few put the prototype of each in a different part of the colour space (Levinson, 2001). 
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the whole of the colour space, so that large areas of the colour space are left without 
any colour term which can name them10. However, what is very clear from Kay and 
Maffi, is that the language studied by Levinson is exceptional, and that almost all 
languages do partition the colour space so that there is a colour term which can name 
every colour. Hence any theory concerning colour terms must explain why partition is 
the norm, while still allowing for the existence of languages which are exceptions to 
this rule11. 
It now remains to specify exactly which types of colour term systems Kay and Maffi 
(1999) found to be attested in the World Colour Survey. They have proposed that 
languages evolve from a state in which they have only two colour terms, and that they 
then gradually add more terms over time, never losing colour terms once they have 
gained them. Their classification of languages therefore takes the form of an 
evolutionary sequence, which begins with two colour terms, and then progressively 
subdivides the areas of the colour space named by each of these terms until each of 
the fundamental colours is named by a separate colour term. They found that 83% of 
the languages in the World Colour Survey lie somewhere along the trajectory shown 
in Figure 2.2, where early stage languages with only two colour terms are at the top of 
the diagram, in which case one term names light colours together with yellow and red, 
                                                 
10
 It should be noted, however, that Levinson (2001) clearly shows that it is possible to form 
expressions which describe other colours, so it is not the case that speakers of Yélî Dnye cannot refer to 
particular colours simply because they do not have actual colour terms denoting those colours. 
11
 We should note, however, that Levinson (2001) suggests that languages which do not partition the 
colour space are much more common than Kay and Maffi (1999) acknowledge. 
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and the other dark colours together with blue and green12. Languages in which each of 
the fundamental colours is represented with a separate term are at the bottom of the 
diagram, and intermediate languages lie somewhere in between. Languages were 
considered to lie on this trajectory if they appeared to be best classified either as being 
at one of the five stages, or as being in transition between stages.  
 
Figure 2.2 The Main Line of Kay and Maffi’s Evolutionary Trajectory 
In a language in transition, there would typically be disagreement between speakers as 
to how many basic colour terms the language possessed, usually because older 
speakers would not use a colour term which had entered the language during their 
lifetimes. In this case a language might best be classified as being at one stage for 
some speakers who did not use the extra colour term, and at a subsequent stage for 
those speakers who did use the term. For some speakers one of the colour words 
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 This trajectory appears to ignore languages with two basic colour terms, which simply make a split 
into dark and light colours, rather than grouping red and yellow with white and green and blue with 
black. This could be because such words may not be considered to be true colour terms, as the 
light/dark distinction on its own could be considered to be outside of the domain of colour. 
white-red-yellow    +    black-green-blue 
white   +    red-yellow    +    black-green-blue 
white    +    red-yellow    +    black    +    green-blue 
white    +    red    +    yellow    +    black    +    green-blue 
white    +    red    +    yellow    +    black    +    green    +    blue 
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might be only very weakly established, and so it could be unclear whether that term 
should be considered to be a basic colour term, leading to ambiguity as to at which 
stage the language should be placed. Out of 91 languages which Kay and Maffi 
(1999) placed on this trajectory, 18 were considered to be in transition. 
Kay and Maffi (1999) acknowledged that not all languages seem to follow the above 
trajectory, at least not for the whole of their development. They placed seven 
languages either on a side branch of the main trajectory, or in transition into or out of 
the side branch. Once a language has reached the second stage of the trajectory shown 
in Figure 2.2, languages usually gain an extra colour term, so that a black term and a 
green-blue composite term come to replace the black-green-blue term. However, it 
seems that a few languages instead split apart the red-yellow composite and replace it 
with separate red and yellow terms, leaving the black-green-blue term intact. One 
language in the World Colour Survey seems to be in transition into this state, and two 
appear to be in transition out of it. 
Once a language has reached this stage, it seems that there are two routes it can take. 
Firstly, the black-green-blue composite can split into a black term and a green-blue 
composite, in which case the language will return to the main line of the trajectory 
with a five term system. However, another possibility is that the black-green-blue 
composite splits to produce a black-blue composite and a separate green term. Three 
languages in the World Colour Survey were given this classification, while one was 
analyzed as being in transition into this state, and one as being in transition out of it. 
Following this stage, the black-blue composite splits, returning the language to a state 
on the main line of the trajectory. 
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In order to explain the existence of three other languages, Kay and Maffi (1999) had 
to postulate another branch to the evolutionary trajectory, although in this case its 
origin was somewhat unclear, as it could not have developed straightforwardly from 
the main line of the trajectory. This branch was proposed because two languages in 
the World Colour Survey had yellow-green-blue composite terms, together with 
separate black, white and red terms. At the first stage of the main line of the 
evolutionary trajectory, the yellow and green fundamental colours appear in separate 
composites, so languages of this type could not emerge simply through progressive 
splitting of composite colour terms. There was also one language which contained a 
yellow-green composite, together with black, white, red and blue terms. This 
language could be derived from the earlier type if the yellow-green-blue term split 
into a yellow-green term and a separate blue term, but this does not provide an 
explanation of how the yellow-green-blue composite arose in the first place. 
I am aware of two hypotheses concerning the origin of yellow-green-blue composites. 
Kay and Maffi (1999) suggested that languages with these composite terms might be 
derived from languages such as Yélî Dnye, where there are black, white and red basic 
terms, but no basic term for the rest of the colour space. If the language then 
developed the principle of partition, so that the colour space was divided so that every 
colour could be named by a basic colour term, then it would seem that a yellow-
green-blue term might emerge to fill the space of colours previously without a basic 
colour term. Kay and Maffi proposed that this was how yellow-green-blue, and 
ultimately yellow-green terms, emerge, although they did acknowledge that this 
hypothesis was somewhat speculative. 
27 
An alternative theory concerning the origin of yellow-green-blue composites was 
proposed by MacLaury (1997a). He suggested that these terms develop from 
languages which originally had only two colour terms dividing the colour space into 
light and dark. If a third term were then to emerge, it is possible that this term would 
then correspond to a middle brightness colour, and if a red term were also to emerge 
then the middle brightness colour would be left denoting the other colours of middle 
brightness: yellow, green and blue. This is obviously a very different explanation 
from Kay and Maffi’s, but there does not appear to be really clear evidence favouring 
one over the other. The computer model which is the subject of this thesis does not 
propose that languages must always evolve by subdividing composite colour terms, so 
the existence of yellow-green and yellow-green-blue composites is not problematic. 
These colour terms could emerge simply as a product of random drift in the meanings 
of colour terms, so that a colour term which did not previously name both yellow and 
green might come to do so. 
There were a few languages in the World Colour Survey which did not seem to fit 
well into Kay and Maffi’s (1999) theory of a limited number of fixed evolutionary 
trajectories. Firstly there were three languages which appeared to be in transition 
directly from a state in which they had a black-green-blue composite term and 
separate white, red and yellow terms, to a state in which each of the fundamental 
colours was represented by a different colour term. This missed out the expected 
intermediate stages in which the black-green-blue term would be expected to split first 
into either black and green-blue or green and black-blue terms. It is quite possible that 
this phenomenon could be due to rapid change in the societies in which these 
languages were spoken, because in general there appears to be a positive correlation 
between level of technological development in a community, and the number of 
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colour terms present in the languages spoken in those communities. Therefore if the 
level of technological development in a community were to increase very rapidly, this 
might lead to a rapid increase in the number of colour terms in the community’s 
language, which could lead to it jumping one of the stages in Kay and Maffi’s 
trajectories. Of course, without further evidence, this proposal must remain 
speculative, but it does provide one possible explanation of what otherwise might 
appear to be fairly surprising data. 
Kay and Maffi (1999) also noted that there were four languages which they could not 
place anywhere on the evolutionary trajectories. Each of these languages contained 
colour terms with their prototypes at black, white and red, but the way in which they 
divided up the rest of the colour space was inconsistent. Generally there would be a 
considerable amount of idiosyncrasy in the colour terms used by speakers of these 
languages, with different speakers using different terms. Even where speakers used 
the same colour terms, the areas of colour which they named with each term tended to 
be extremely variable. One such language is Culina (Peru, Brazil), which has white 
and red terms, a yellow term which extends into green and blue, and a black-green-
blue composite. There are therefore two terms which seem to overlap in their 
denotations, both of which name green and blue colours. This language cannot be 
placed on the evolutionary trajectory, because it seems to be a mixture of a white, red, 
yellow and black-green-blue system with a white, red, yellow-green-blue one, and so 
there are two places on the trajectories where it could potentially be placed. 
Another problematic language was Kuku-Yalanji (Australian), which again has black 
white and red terms, with the black term showing some extension into blue. Some 
speakers also used another term, kayal, to denote either blue-green or just green, but 
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because it was not used by most speakers it was not considered basic. Most speakers 
did, however, use another term, burrkul (or burkul), usually to denote all colours 
which were not black, white or red, though speakers who had well established green-
blue or green terms did not used burrkul for those colours. Kay and Maffi (1999) did 
not classify burrkul as a basic colour term, and so this language did not correspond to 
any of the language types on Kay and Maffi’s trajectories. The existence of so much 
inconsistency in the use of colour words amongst speakers of a single language might 
seem surprising, but it is a widely attested phenomenon (MacLaury, 1997a). 
Some linguists have challenged the general findings of Berlin and Kay (1969) and 
Kay and Maffi (1999), suggesting that colour term systems do not conform to 
predictable rules to the extent that those researchers claimed. Saunders (1992) has 
gone so far as to suggest that some of Berlin and Kay’s findings were a product of 
their methodology. She noted that many languages lack true colour words, that is 
words which denote purely colour. Typically many words which are often considered 
to be basic colour words have other connotations, for example they may have 
religious significance. She has claimed that such words can only be understood in 
relation to other words in the language, and within the context of the belief systems of 
which they form a part. These criticisms do appear to have a reasonable foundation, 
but it seems that regardless of the connotations surrounding colour words, part of their 
meaning corresponds to the range of colours which they denote. Hence I do not see 
how Saunders’ criticisms invalidate Berlin and Kay’s findings. 
Levinson (2001) made similar criticisms of much of the work concerning colour 
terms. He has claimed that languages do not ‘universally treat colour as a unitary 
domain, to be exhaustively named.’ (p3). He suggested that the idea of colour as a 
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domain for linguistic categorization, in which we would expect to find a set of co-
hyponyms each denoting specific ranges of colour might not be applicable to all 
languages. He noted that some languages conflate other properties, such as texture or 
variegation, with colour. This contributes to difficulties in determining which colour 
terms in particular languages are basic, because it makes it more difficult to decide 
which words are colour terms at all. It is, in any regard, often difficult to determine 
objectively which colour terms are basic, as the properties of some terms appear to 
place them at an intermediate level, in between that of basic and non-basic terms. 
Levinson noted that sometimes even whole expressions might seem to fulfil some of 
the basic colour term criteria better than individual colour words.  
However, none of Levinson’s (2001) findings seem to be at odds with the basic 
conclusions of Kay and Maffi (1999). Their data still demonstrate regularities in the 
way in which informants name colour chips, regardless of how many other aspects of 
the colour words’ meanings or syntactic properties are disregarded. It may well be 
that Kay and Maffi’s decisions concerning which colour terms should be considered 
basic were influenced to some extent by a reluctance to make classifications which 
would be inconsistent with their hypothesized evolutionary trajectories. However, the 
distinction between basic and non-basic colour terms is clearly not completely 
arbitrary, and while it seems likely that whether a marginal term was classed as basic 
or not might in some cases have been determined partly by whether it supported or 
contradicted Kay and Maffi’s trajectories, such an issue can not be said to falsify Kay 
and Maffi’s theory. Clearly, when reasonable distinctions were made to differentiate 
between basic and non-basic colour terms, the patterns reported by Kay and Maffi 
were observed. We should remember that, ever since Berlin and Kay (1969), 
exceptions to the hypothesized evolutionary trajectories have been acknowledged, and 
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so, even if classifying a term regarded as non-basic as basic would result in a 
language no longer fitting on an evolutionary trajectory, this would not be a serious 
problem for Kay and Maffi’s theory of predictable trajectories. 
MacLaury (1997a) has described some other phenomena concerning colour terms that 
Kay and Maffi (1999) did not mention. Firstly, he has noted the presence in some 
languages of basic colour terms naming broad ranges of desaturated colours, 
especially terms which include some range of dull brownish, lavender, grey and/or 
beige colours. These categories tend to be observed in languages with relatively few 
colour terms, and MacLaury reports that they are common. It seems that as languages 
gain colour terms these words become restricted to narrower ranges of colour, perhaps 
becoming terms like English brown. These colour terms do not appear on Kay and 
Maffi’s (1999) evolutionary trajectories because they do not contain a fundamental 
hue, but any complete theory of colour term typology must explain how they could 
arise. 
MacLaury (1997a) also discusses a phenomenon which he terms coextension. 
Coextension describes situations in which two colour terms name approximately the 
same range of colours, so that it seems as though they are in free variation, and that 
both are associated with a single colour category. However, in such cases, one of the 
colour terms, the dominant term will have its prototype near to the centre colour 
category, while the other, the recessive term, will tend to have its prototype near to the 
edge. Initially, when asked to map out the extent of the colours named by the 
recessive term, informants usually include only a small range of colours. However, if 
they are prompted to include all the colours which the term could possibly name, then 
they will extend its range so that it covers almost as many colour chips as the 
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dominant term. The existence of coextension is not widely discussed, but MacLaury 
reports that it is common, especially for composites such as green-blue terms, so it is 
important that an explanation of colour term typology allows for the existence of 
coextensive colour terms. 
Overall we can characterize the empirical data concerning basic colour terms as firstly 
showing a great diversity of colour term systems across languages, but also revealing 
a lot of cross-linguistic regularities. All basic colour terms have prototype properties, 
usually with a single best example and fuzzy boundaries. The attested colour terms 
are all of types which make up only a small subset of those which are logically 
possible, and there are regularities in the observed combinations of types of colour 
terms that can exist in any language. Berlin and Kay (1969) and Kay and Maffi (1999) 
have explained this data by claiming that languages evolve along fixed evolutionary 
trajectories, and that they gradually add new basic colour terms over time. However, 
there appear to be some languages which are exceptions to the regular patterns, and 
not all researchers accept that there is a clear distinction between basic and non-basic 
colour terms. However, it seems that Kay and Maffi’s theory of trajectories is 
successful in accounting for most of the data concerning most languages, and so it 
was taken as the benchmark against which the evolutionary computer model of this 
thesis was tested. 
2.2 Modes of Explanation in Linguistics 
Given the typological data reviewed above, we need to consider just what kind of 
explanation is appropriate to account for it. In order to determine what sort of theory 
is appropriate, we need to consider the nature of languages, and exactly what we mean 
by the word language. Languages can exist physically as speech or writing, but they 
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cannot be understood simply by collecting example sentences, because languages are 
productive systems and so there is an infinite number of possible sentences in all 
languages. Languages are known by individual people, and so can be seen as mental 
phenomena, in which individual people know the rules which constitute the language. 
However, languages are clearly not known just by individuals, but by a number of 
people who all use the same conventions to communicate, so perhaps are best 
understood as social phenomena. The first issue to be discussed in deriving an 
explanation for colour term typology is therefore whether the theory should be 
concerned with psychological knowledge, an abstract system, or some other concept 
of language.  
Chomsky (1965, 1972, 1986) has emphasized that languages can be seen primarily as 
psychological phenomena, in that the ability to use and understand language is an 
ability which we have as individual people. Chomsky (1986) introduced the term 
I-language, meaning our psychological knowledge of language, and he argued that 
linguistics should be primarily concerned with the study of I-language, the form 
which language takes in the mind/brain. He considered E-language, actual examples 
of speech or writing, to be of only relatively peripheral interest, although of course 
acknowledging that the study of I-language is dependent on inferences made through 
observations of E-language. 
Furthermore, Chomsky (1965, 1972, 1986) emphasized the need for a linguistic 
theory to account not only for static knowledge of language, but also to explain how 
children come to acquire I-language. Perhaps the most important observation 
supporting this viewpoint is that children are born without the ability to speak any 
language, but after exposure to a language for several years they gain the ability to 
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speak it fluently, almost without exception. Furthermore, all children are equally able 
to learn any language, the language which they learn being determined simply by the 
language to which they are exposed during childhood13. Chomsky has argued that the 
central goal of linguistics must be to explain how children come to acquire knowledge 
of language based on observations of other people’s speech, a process which is 
represented in Figure 2.3. (Figure 2.3 is based on Chomsky, 1972, p119, but adapted 
in order to bring the terminology in line with modern usage.) 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Chomsky’s Conceptualization of Language Acquisition. 
The central component of Chomsky’s perspective on linguistics is what he has called 
a Language Acquisition Device, which is the part of the mind/brain that produces I-
language. It learns based primarily on observations of E-language, but also could use 
any other evidence which might be available to the child. Chomsky (1986) placed 
particular emphasis on the central importance of understanding the Language 
Acquisition Device to gaining an understanding of language in general. Given this 
perspective, regularities across languages are generally seen as products of the innate 
Language Acquisition Device. The possible human languages are those which the 
Language Acquisition Device is able to learn, and so, if a particular linguistic 
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 There are of course some exceptions to this generalization, in particular that deaf children have no 
problem learning sign languages, but they do have problems learning spoken ones, and some disorders 
such as autism can prevent or impair the acquisition of any language at all.  
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structure is not attested, then this is presumably because the Language Acquisition 
Device is not capable of acquiring it. 
The majority of Chomsky’s work has been extremely nativist, in that it has assumed 
that the Language Acquisition Device supplies most of the structure of language in 
the form of Universal Grammar, and that learning plays a relatively minor role in 
simply choosing which of a constrained range of parameterized possible structures are 
present in the language being learned. Examples of this kind of theory are 
Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky, 1984) and the Minimalist Program 
(Chomsky, 1995), in which Universal Grammar, which is genetically14  specified, 
consists of a limited number of innate grammatical categories and principles. 
Language universals and typological patterns can be explained as products of 
Universal Grammar. As all people share almost identical genotypes (there being only 
very limited genetic variation between individuals), they hence have almost identical 
Universal Grammars. We see similar structures in different languages, because these 
are part of Universal Grammar, and other possible, but unattested, structures are not 
seen, because they do not exist in Universal Grammar.  
                                                 
14
 It should be acknowledged that there is an increasing amount of evidence showing that the link 
between genes and neural structure is far from straightforward, and that development is often the 
product of interaction between genes and experience (Elman et al, 1996). However, while Chomsky 
does not go into the details of the mechanism, it is clear that the form of universal grammar is in some 
way determined genetically, and that Chomsky believes that all people develop essentially identical 
universal grammars (Chomsky, 1986, p25). Hence, for present purposes, it does not seem to be 
necessary to address the question of what form the mechanism through which universal grammars arise 
takes.  
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Kay and McDaniel (1978) came close to Chomsky’s position in proposing a limited 
set of universal colour categories, which were determined by the neural response 
functions of cells in the retina of the eye. They proposed that some of the universal 
properties of colour term systems were due to all the colour categories in the world’s 
language being chosen from this universal inventory. This was clearly an attempt to 
explain properties of the colour term system in terms of innate structure15, and so was 
in this way similar to Chomsky’s Universal Grammar. However it appears that on the 
one hand Kay and McDaniel’s proposal was too restrictive, because there is 
considerable variation in the exact denotations of similar colour terms in different 
languages, but also that it was not sufficiently constraining, in that it predicted the 
existence of types of colour categories which have never been observed16. 
While Chomsky has emphasized both a psychological perspective on language, and a 
strongly nativist approach, many approaches to linguistics retain the focus on 
psychology, but propose a much greater role for learning than is typical in Chomsky’s 
work. Examples of this can be found in many of the connectionist approaches to 
linguistics, such as that of Rumelhart and McClelland (1986), who modelled the 
acquisition of the past tense of English verbs. Their neural network, together with the 
                                                 
15
 From Kay and McDaniel (1978) it is not clear exactly whether the categories themselves should be 
considered innate, or whether they are simply derived from innate structures. However, it would seem 
that the nature of the categories is determined by neural structures which are common to all humans 
(with the exception of colour blind individuals), and so it seems reasonable to consider them to be 
innate, even if there is some input from experience in determining exactly which categories emerge in 
each individual person. 
16
 Kay and McDaniel (1978) is discussed again in section 2.3. 
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algorithm used to train it, can be seen as a Language Acquisition Device. At the end 
of the learning process, the final knowledge of language will correspond to the neural 
network and the learned connection strengths. (There is therefore no clear division in 
this theory between the acquired knowledge of language and the Language 
Acquisition Device, but that is also true of many strongly nativist theories.) Rumelhart 
and McClelland’s model reproduced many of the patterns observed when children 
learn English, and so it was argued that these patterns could be explained as resulting 
from properties of the children’s Language Acquisition Devices, which they have 
suggested may learn in a similar way to the neural network (Rumelhart and 
McClelland, 1986, p267). 
All of the above approaches to explaining language have placed little emphasis on the 
social contexts in which languages are used, focusing instead on language in 
individual people. In contrast, de Saussure (1959/1916) proposed that language must 
be understood as a phenomenon which is simultaneously psychological and social. 
While the ability to speak and understand language is undoubtedly psychological, 
language is used principally for communication between people. Successful 
communication can occur only when more than one person shares the same language, 
and in general languages are shared by whole communities of speakers. Individuals 
will only be able to communicate successfully if they use at least approximately the 
same conventions for expressing meaning as other members of the community. 
Changes in language will be initiated by an individual person making up a new word 
or expression, or using an existing word to mean something new, but such innovations 
will only become part of the language if they are adopted as conventions by other 
members of the speech community. Hence, we can see that language exists as a 
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system which is shared by all members of a community, and so it may not be possible 
to fully understand language simply from a psychological perspective. 
Hurford (1987, 1990) put concepts of language involving social dimensions on a more 
concrete footing, by placing Chomsky’s (1972) concept of a Language Acquisition 
Device within a social context. Chomsky’s conceptualization of language acquisition 
(Figure 2.3) neglects to specify how the primary linguistic data is produced. Hurford 
noted that this data is produced by other speakers of the language, and so Chomsky’s 
diagram can be extended to produce Figure 2.4. (Figure 2.4 is adapted from Hurford 
(1987), p22.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Hurford’s Diachronic Spiral 
The new component in Hurford’s concept of language, which is missing from 
Chomsky’s, is the arena of language use, through which language passes from one 
generation of speakers to the next. The arena of language use is partly psychological, 
but it also includes all those factors relating to the context in which we communicate, 
and the aspects of the world which determine what we talk about, and so what 
utterances (or written language) are produced to form the primary linguistic data for 
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the next generation of speakers. These factors all affect people’s I-languages, because 
they determine what input is available to the Language Acquisition Device.  
One way in which the arena of language use might influence a language, is related to 
the frequency with which particular aspects of language are used. If a construction is 
used frequently, then it is almost certain to be acquired by the next generation of 
speakers, but if it is used rarely (perhaps because there is little demand for its meaning 
to be expressed) then it is likely that that construction will be lost from the language. 
One example which might be a possible instance of this phenomenon is the loss of the 
irregular past tense form of geld in English. In Middle English this was gelt, but while 
other similar irregular past tense forms have been retained (such as dwelt, though 
some speakers might prefer dwelled), gelt is no longer a part of the English language. 
This is presumably because most present day speakers of English have little cause to 
refer to gelding, and so the past tense form has at some stage not been used frequently 
enough for it to be included in the language of the next generation of speakers 
(Pinker, 1994). Factors such as this will shape language, and will determine the range 
of human languages which exist in the world, but they are certainly not properties of 
the Language Acquisition Device.  
Hurford’s model makes explicit the route through which diachronic 17  change in 
languages must occur. Clearly, a new construction (or lexical item) must initially be 
                                                 
17
 Diachronic is used within linguistics to mean ‘development through time’, and usually refers to 
changes which affect a language (or a variety of a language) as a whole. (Changes to the languages of 
individual people, such as those which take place when a child learns a language, are not considered to 
be diachronic, even though language acquisition is a from of development over time.) Diachronic is the 
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used by one particular person, and it will then form part of the primary linguistic data 
from which other speakers learn language. However, it will only become part of the 
language if it is then incorporated into at least some of those people’s I-languages, a 
process which would involve the Language Acquisition Device. Hurford’s diagram 
most obviously corresponds to the situation where one generation of speakers is 
passing on language to a following generation, but that need not necessarily be the 
case. While the major change in a person’s I-language clearly happens during 
acquisition, adults may modify their languages in response to the speech of other 
people, and children probably learn much of their language from their peers. Hence 
the linguistic data from which any one person acquires, and subsequently modifies, 
their language, is likely to be produced by people of a variety of ages, and in some 
cases two people will each learn from linguistic data produced by the other. However, 
all of these situations can still be considered to be part of the process depicted by 
Hurford’s spiral. 
Hurford’s spiral retains Chomsky’s I-language concept, but it allows for more factors 
to influence languages, and gives a wider definition of the scope of linguistic inquiry. 
Instead of simply studying the process of language acquisition, and the resulting I-
languages, we can now extend the study of language to explain how language evolves 
under the influence of not only the mechanisms which individual people use for 
perceiving and producing E-language, and learning I-language, but also under the 
influence of non-linguistic factors, which will also affect the evolution of language. 
                                                                                                                                           
opposite of synchronic, which is used to refer to linguistic approaches which do not consider language 
change, but simply study languages as they are at one point in time. 
41 
Explanations of linguistic phenomena under Chomsky’s model are limited to a single 
generation, but Hurford’s spiral allows for the possibility of explaining language 
universals and language typology in terms of diachronic processes. Hurford’s 
diachronic spiral suggests that it may not be possible to understand language simply 
in terms of E-language or I-language, but that both concepts may be needed. Below I 
discuss a computational model, Hurford (2000), which shows that compositional 
regularities (and by analogy many other kinds of linguistic phenomena), may be 
apparent in E-language, even if they do not exist as part of the I-language of the 
person who produced that language. 
Kirby (1999) discussed some aspects of linguistic typology which seem to be better 
explained within Hurford’s diachronic model of language than in Chomsky’s purely 
ontogenetic approach. Kirby sought to explain a number of typological implicational 
universals as the result of evolutionary processes. One such implicational universal, 
observed by Keenan and Comrie (1977), noted that there exists a hierarchy 
concerning which positions in a sentence structure are available for relativization in 
particular languages. This is shown in (2.1), where the syntactic positions most often 
available to relativization appear on the left, and where there exist increasingly fewer 
languages which allow relativization in each subsequent position in the hierarchy. In 
fact, all languages appear to allow relativization of subjects, and if they allow 
relativization of noun phrases in any other syntactic position, then they also allow 
relativization of all the syntactic positions left of that position in the hierarchy. 
(2.1) Subject > Direct Object > Indirect Object > Oblique > Genitive > Object of Comparison 
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(2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), all of which are derived from (2.2), exemplify subject, direct 
object and oblique relatives respectively, demonstrating that English allows 
relativization in all of these positions. (The position from which the relativized noun 
phrase has been extracted is marked t.) English in fact allows relativization of noun 
phrases in any of the syntactic positions in the hierarchy.  
(2.2) The linguist wrote the book about the language. 
(2.3) The linguist who [t wrote the book about the language] 
(2.4) The book which [the linguist wrote t about the language] 
(2.5) The language which [the linguist wrote the book about t] 
Keenan and Hawkins (1987) conducted a psycholinguistic study which suggested that 
people find it easier to parse sentences containing relative phrases when the relative 
phrase is further left in the hierarchy, rather than further right. In languages which do 
not allow relativization of noun phrases in some of the positions in the hierarchy, 
other mechanisms may be available which would allow equivalent meanings to be 
expressed. This might involve the use of syntactic processes such as passivization, 
which can promote noun phrases to positions in which they are relativizable, or 
speakers might resort to using circumlocutions. However, there is presumably some 
cost for the speaker in applying these extra operations when generating sentences, if 
only because they normally require the addition of extra morphemes such as passive 
markers. The actual cost of such processes could be expected to vary from language 
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to language, depending, for example, on how morphologically complex passives are 
in particular languages. Hence, whether the cost of such a transformation was greater 
than the added cost of relativizing a noun phrase in a syntactic position further right in 
the hierarchy, would vary from language to language.  
We might expect that factors affecting the cost to speakers of forming particular kinds 
of relative clauses would influence which positions would most often be relativizable. 
Whichever position has the least cost for the speaker when it is relativized, could be 
expected to be relativizable in the greatest number of languages. However, there 
remains a need for an explanation of how an option which had a lower cost for 
speakers could come to be selected as the only permissible option in a language. It 
does not seem likely that people would not be able to learn languages of types 
unattested on the hierarchy, simply because those languages included constructions 
with a higher cost to speakers, when alternative constructions with lower costs were 
not permitted. For example it would seem to be unlikely that people would be unable 
to learn a language which permitted relativization of obliques, but not of subjects. 
This language might seem perverse, because it allows a construction with a high 
parsing cost (oblique relatives), while blocking one with a lower cost (subject 
relatives), but there does not seem to be a reason why such a language should be 
unlearnable18.  
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 If we considered the hierarchy from the perspective of universal grammar, then we could hypothesize 
that the hierarchy was unlearnable because some innate principle of grammar did not permit it. It is 
quite possible that this is indeed the correct explanation for the hierarchy, but this is not an explanation 
in terms of cost to speakers of constructions, which is the kind of mechanism on which I wish to focus 
here. Of course, it is possible that an explanation of the phylogenetic evolution of universal grammar 
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Kirby proposed that the implicational hierarchy is the product of a cultural 
evolutionary process. He suggested that people are more likely to acquire 
constructions which have a lower cost, either in terms of parsing, or complexity of 
utterances. If this were the case, then we would expect there to be an evolutionary 
pressure which would influence those types of relative construction to the left of the 
hierarchy to occur more often than those further right. The types of relative 
constructions further right in the hierarchy would be included only if that method of 
expressing the required meanings had a lower cost than the alternative of using other 
syntactic structures to express the same meaning. Kirby implemented a computer 
model which incorporated the competing pressures regarding ease of parsing and 
morphological complexity, and showed that languages with subject relatives only, and 
languages with both subject and object relatives, tended to emerge, as did languages 
with no relative clauses at all, but that languages which had object relatives but not 
subject relatives tended not to occur. 
If languages do indeed evolve culturally under the kinds of pressure which have been 
identified by Kirby, then the languages actually occurring in the world will be a 
subset of the logically possible languages. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5, which is 
reproduced from Kirby (1999, p121), and in which the set of logically possible 
languages is represented by box E. All of the languages which actually exist in the 
world will fall within the intersection of the learnable languages, (L), and those 
                                                                                                                                           
would involve reference to the same kinds of costs which Kirby has used to explain the hierarchy as the 
product of cultural evolution. However, this thesis is concerned with cultural evolutionary processes, 
not phylogenetic ones, so I will not go into that issue here, though it is discussed in Kirby (1999). 
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languages which are preferred as a result of evolutionary pressures, (F). This 
illustrates clearly that both psychological and communicative processes can influence 
languages, and hence factors of both types can potentially explain aspects of language 
typology. The model of colour term evolution described in this thesis aims to explain 
colour term evolution from this kind of perspective. However, before constructing the 
model, it was necessary to determine what kind of psychological pressures might 
affect colour term evolution. The next section reviews research which gives some 
indication of likely psychological pressures. 
Figure 2.5 Interacting Constraints on Possible Languages 
2.3 Psycholinguistic and Neurophysiological Findings 
Attempts have been made to relate the findings concerning basic colour terms and 
their distribution across languages to more fundamental properties of the human mind 
and the human visual system. Hering (1964) noted that red and green appear to be 
opposite colours, and that the same is true for yellow and blue. This is because no 
colour can appear to be simultaneously red and green, or simultaneously yellow and 
blue. (For example, no colour can be described as reddish-green or yellowish-blue.) 
We can, however, perceive colours to be a mixture of two colours if those colours are 
not opposite, so we might describe orange as reddish-yellow, or lime as yellowish-
green. Hering’s observation established that the four colours, red, yellow, green and 
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blue, play a special role in the human visual system, and so we might expect them to 
have a special status in colour language. Hering proposed that the opponency of red 
and green, and of yellow and blue, was due to the physiology of the human visual 
system, although he did not have any direct evidence of this. 
De Valois and Jacobs (1968) provided direct neurophysiological evidence to support 
Hering’s proposal, by conducting experiments on Macaque monkeys. Macaque 
monkeys have visual systems very similar to those of humans. In the retina, both 
humans and macaque monkeys have three different types of light sensitive ‘cone’ cell, 
each of which responds maximally to light of one particular wavelength (Thompson, 
1995). De Valois and Jacobs measured the outputs of cells in the presence of light of 
various wavelengths, and from these measurements they were able to infer the 
existence of two types of cell which processed the outputs from the cones. Firstly, 
they proposed that there existed nonopponent cells, which added together the outputs 
of the three types of cones, to indicate the blackness or whiteness of a light. Secondly, 
they proposed that other cells, which they termed opponent cells, subtracted the 
output of one type of cone from that of another. They proposed that there were four 
varieties of these opponent cells. The cells could either oppose red and green or 
yellow and blue, and each cell responded maximally in the presence of one of the 
colours which it opposed, and minimally in the presence of the other, so that for each 
opposition there were two polarities.  
De Valois and Jacob (1968) hence identified six colours which would result in 
maximal or minimal firing rates for one type of opponent or nonopponent cell, and 
these colours appeared to correspond to the colours on which the prototypes of most 
colour terms are clustered (see section 2.1). This showed a correspondence between 
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neurophysiology and language, but it did not explain completely how the visual 
system affects language.  
It was noted above that Kay and McDaniel (1978) attempted to make a direct link 
between the outputs of cells in the retina and the denotations of colour terms. They 
proposed that the output of the opponent cells would map directly to fuzzy set 
membership in colour term categories, but this suggested that, for example, all red 
terms in every language would have identical denotations, which is clearly not the 
case. It seems that it is only the prototypes of colour term categories which are 
consistent across languages, while category boundaries are much more variable. 
Hence most theories have simply assumed that neurophysiological processes give a 
special status only to the colours which produce maximal firing rates in opponent and 
nonopponent cells. The four such chromatic colours, red, yellow, green and blue, are 
generally referred to as unique hues, and the points in the colour space at which they 
occur as unique hue points. 
The typological literature had already established the existence of unique hues, 
because it was noted that there are certain colours on which the prototypes of colour 
terms tend to be clustered. However, this does not necessarily entail that the 
prototypes occur in those places due to the influence of maximal firing rates in the 
retina. Indeed, it would seem that such an explanation is missing a number of steps 
which would be needed to explain exactly how a low level physiological response 
comes to influence language. A further problem arises because some researchers, 
including Kay and Maffi (1999), have stated that the locations for unique hue points 
which are predicted by the neurophysiological evidence are not consistent with those 
points at which the prototypes of colour terms tend to be clustered. However, Hardin 
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(1988) seems confident that colour term typology ultimately has its explanation in 
neurophysiology, and he discusses evidence which appears to show that the 
neurophysiological evidence does correctly predict the location of the unique hues. 
Saunders and van Brakel (1997) have questioned the claim that there are exactly two 
types of opponent cells, suggesting that the evidence for yellow-green opponents in 
particular is not clear, and that there also exist cells focused on other hues such as 
orange. Both Kay and Maffi and Saunders and van Brakel’s arguments suggest that 
the clustering of colour term prototypes in certain parts of the colour space might in 
fact not be due to neurophysiological effects. In this thesis I leave open the question 
of exactly what causes unique hues to have a special status. Regardless of whether or 
not the location of unique hues is determined by opponent cells, there is plenty of 
evidence to support their existence, coming not only from the typological literature 
discussed above, but also from a wide body of psychological research, which I briefly 
review below. 
Firstly, some simple psychophysical experiments appear to demonstrate the existence 
of unique hues, and the opponency of red and green and blue and yellow. De Valois 
and De Valois (2001) report that if a unique red and a unique green light are added 
together in equal proportions, they will cancel each-other out, so that a neutral grey 
colour is perceived. Furthermore, after staring at a red surface, a green after image 
will be seen. Similar effects are observed for yellow-blue opponency.  
More recent evidence has come from work aimed specifically at explaining properties 
of colour language. A number of psychological experiments have been conducted 
which have demonstrated the special status of the unique hues, especially those 
studies conducted by Rosch (some published under her earlier name of Heider), 
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including Heider (1971, 1972) and Rosch (1973). Heider (1971) investigated whether 
the colours which were consistently chosen as the prototypes of colour categories in 
Berlin and Kay’s (1969) study were more salient than other colours. She did this by 
showing three year-old children rows of colour chips, which were all either of the 
same lightness or saturation, and asking them to pick out any chip. She found that the 
prototype colours were picked out much more often than would be expected just by 
chance, so she argued that those colours were more salient because they attracted the 
children’s attention. In a further study, this time using mainly four year old children, a 
child would be shown colour chips one at a time, and asked to point each one out on 
an array of Munsell chips. The children pointed out the correct chip on the array most 
often when the colour they were trying to match was a prototype colour, which again 
demonstrated the special properties of those colours. 
Heider (1972) was concerned that some of the effects showing the special status of 
prototype colours, might be due to their status as the prototypes of linguistic 
categories, and hence be a product of colour terminology, rather than a cause of 
typological restrictions on colour term systems. She sought to investigate whether this 
was the case, by performing experiments testing the memorability of colours with 
mono-lingual speakers of Dani, which, as noted in section 2.1, has only two basic 
colour terms19. Each subject was shown a test chip for five seconds, and then that chip 
was removed. After an interval of 30 seconds, subjects were asked to pick out the 
                                                 
19
 A problem with this approach is that, while Dani has only two basic colour terms, it also has non-
basic colour terms, and so these terms could well interfere with the results of the experiments. 
However, probably no language really has only two colour terms, so it is likely that linguists will never 
investigate a language which approximates a two colour term language better than Dani does. 
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same colour from an array of Munsell chips. Heider found that the subjects were most 
accurate at choosing the correct colour when they had been shown a prototype colour 
chip, which replicates the results obtained for American children in the similar 
experiment described above. This was taken as evidence confirming the hypothesis 
that these colours are more memorable for all people, regardless of what language 
they speak. 
Heider (1972) also investigated whether Dani speakers would find it easier to learn 
names for prototype colours than for other colours, by conducting an experiment in 
which they were taught to associate words with both prototype and non-prototype 
colour chips. Subjects were shown 16 colour chips, eight of which corresponded to 
the eight chromatic prototype colours, while the other eight were from parts of the 
colour space which generally did not form the prototypes of colour terms. The 
experimenter gave a name to each chip, which the subject was asked to repeat. The 
chips were then presented to the subject in a random order, and he or she was then 
asked to name each chip. If they gave the wrong name for a chip, then they would be 
told the correct one. The subjects were tested in this way five times a day until they 
got all of the colour names correct. The mean number of errors made by subjects was 
significantly greater for non-prototype than for prototype colours, showing that people 
do find it easier to learn words for prototype rather than non-prototype colours. Heider 
suggested that this showed that these colours were more easily kept in long term 
memory, which is presumably why they come to form the prototypes of colour terms. 
In the studies, Heider looked at the red, yellow, green, blue, purple, orange, brown 
and pink prototypes, but she suggested that the prototypes corresponding to unique 
hues were more memorable than the other ones, which seemed to suggest that their 
special status was due to the influence of the neurophysiology of colour vision. 
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Rosch (1973) investigated people’s ability to learn artificial colour categories made 
up of five adjacent chips in the Munsell array. In some categories, prototype colours 
were central, but in others they were either more peripheral, or the categories did not 
include any prototype colour at all. In order to avoid interference from other colour 
terms, Rosch again performed her experiments with mono-lingual Dani speakers, 
using the same procedure as for the task of learning names for single colour chips 
reported in Heider (1972), but presenting each chip in a category separately during the 
repeated testing phase. It was found that the subjects learned categories in which 
prototypes were central with the fewest errors, and those which did not contain a 
prototype worst. Learning of sets in which the prototype was peripheral was 
intermediate. Again Rosch found that there were fewer errors made in learning when 
the prototype colour corresponded to a unique hue than for the other four prototypes 
which she investigated, demonstrating the primacy of those four hues. 
Roberson, Davies and Davidoff (2000) sought to replicate some of Rosch’s work, but 
this time using speakers of Berinmo, a language with just five basic colour terms, as 
well as British English speakers, as participants. Firstly, they repeated an experiment 
from Heider and Olivier (1972), in which desaturated colour chips (which generally 
would not be expected to contain category prototypes), were shown for five seconds, 
and 30 seconds later participants were asked to pick out the same colour from a 
Munsell array. Roberson et al found that when subjects made errors they chose 
adjacent chips with the same linguistic label significantly more often than adjacent 
chips with a different linguistic label, which showed that the language spoken by the 
participants was having an influence on their responses. 
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Roberson et al then sought to replicate the memory task of Heider (1972), by again 
showing test chips for five seconds, and 30 seconds later asking participants to pick 
out the chip from a Munsell array of maximally saturated colour chips. They found 
that both English and Berinmo speakers chose the correct chip more often for 
prototype colours than for other colours. However, it was shown that Berinmo 
speakers had a tendency to choose prototype chips, regardless of whether the test chip 
was a prototype one. When the bias towards choosing prototype chips was taken into 
account, it was shown that Berinmo speakers did not remember prototype colours 
more accurately than any other ones; it just seemed that they did because they tended 
to pick out prototype colours from the array, regardless of whether the test chip was a 
prototype one or not. 
Roberson et al then conducted a further study to test the discriminability of prototype 
colours. The study was similar to Heider’s (1972) experiment with four year old 
children. Participants were shown colour chips, and, while they could still see the 
chip, they were asked to point them out on the array. Both English and Berinmo 
speakers performed better at this task for prototype colours than for other colours, 
suggesting that these chips were more discriminable in the array. This suggests that all 
of the colour chips were not equally perceptually spaced in the Munsell array, and 
hence that many of the effects reported by Rosch might have been produced by 
properties of the array, rather than for any more fundamental reason.  
Lucy (1992) reported that, if a different Munsell array was used, which had been 
corrected so that all chips were equally discriminable, then in most cases prototype 
colours were not remembered better than other colours. However, even with the 
corrected array, some groups of subjects did still perform better for the prototype 
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chips in memory tests, so the hypothesis concerning the special memorability of these 
chips still receives some support. Roberson et al found that when the discriminability 
advantage for focal colours was removed, neither English nor Berinmo speakers 
performed better in the memory task. However, it seems difficult to conclude that any 
one of these colour arrays is the correct one to use, as there are many ways of 
measuring distances between colours (MacLaury, 1997a), and there is no obvious 
reason why one of these should be the single correct method. Hence it would seem 
that we can produce or remove effects concerning the special status of the prototype 
colours simply by changing the colour array used in experiments. 
The problems resulting from the relative discriminability of different colours could be 
avoided by performing experiments in which it was not necessary to discriminate 
between colours. Roberson et al repeated Heider’s (1972) experiment in which 
participants were taught names for individual colour chips, but found, contrary to 
Heider, that Berinmo speakers did not perform better at learning names for prototype 
colours than for other colours. However, this result may have been obtained simply 
because most of the participants performed very poorly at the task. In a variation of 
the experiment, in which Berinmo speakers were taught to associate colours with 
pictures of nuts, the red prototype was consistently learned better than the non-
prototype colours. This could be taken as evidence supporting the hypothesis that it is 
a neurophysiological factor which gives unique hues their special salience, if it was 
not the case that the red term was the Berinmo colour term with the most consistent 
prototype, and that this prototype corresponds to the universal red prototype. Hence, 
this suggests that this result was a product of colour vocabulary, and not of any pre-
linguistic property of prototypical red. 
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Roberson et al’s study has cast doubt on much of the evidence concerning the 
universal special status of prototype colours. However, while the results of the 
psychological experiments may be inconsistent, and the neurophysiological evidence 
only suggestive of a special status for certain colours, the cross linguistic evidence 
clearly demonstrates the universal properties of the prototype colours, because, cross-
linguistically, most people place the prototypes of their basic colour terms on the 
universal prototype colour chips, or else chips immediately adjacent to them. The 
evolutionary computer model described in this thesis aims to give an explanation of 
colour term typology, suggesting that it is the product of evolutionary processes 
occurring under the influence of neurophysiological biases. The model rests on the 
assumption that the red, yellow, green and blue unique hues are especially salient, 
which is supported by some neurophysiological, psychological, and linguistic 
evidence, even though not all of the studies are in complete agreement. 
2.4 Expression-Induction Models of Language 
The evolutionary computer model is, to use a term introduced by Hurford (2002), a 
kind of expression-induction model. These models aim to simulate the process of 
language change, usually over a number of generations. They contain a number of 
artificial people20, each of whom is capable both of learning some aspect of language, 
and also of using the language which they have learned to express themselves, hence 
                                                 
20
 Artificial people are more commonly referred to as agents. However, I believe that the term artificial 
people is preferable, partly because its meaning is more transparent, but also because agents is a much 
less specific term, being used to refer to quasi-autonomous parts of computer programs, most of which 
are not supposed to simulate real people at all. 
55 
creating some example utterances from which other artificial people can learn. 
Usually expression-induction models are run several times, so that the general 
properties of the languages which emerge in them can be observed. If all the emergent 
languages have a particular property which is also a universal in real languages, or if 
the emergent languages show a limited range of variation, reflecting typological 
patterns seen in real languages, then the models can be said to explain why these 
universals or typological restrictions exist21. 
Probably the first computer model which could be classified as an expression-
induction model is that of Hurford (1987). In this model, there were ten individual 
people, and the meanings which they tried to express were the numbers between 11 
and 20. At the start of the simulation each person knew the numerals for 1 to 10, so 
the aim of the simulation was to investigate in what way the language would develop 
to allow larger values to be communicated. Numbers were expressed by combining 
two individual digits to make a phrase, the meaning of which would be the values of 
each digit added together. So, for example, 15 could be expressed as ‘seven-eight’ or 
as ‘six-nine’. 
                                                 
21
 An interesting exception to this generalization is the work of Harrison, Dras and Kapicioglu (2002), 
who created an expression-induction model that simulated the evolution of vowel harmony in Turkic 
languages. The aim was to initialize the model with the artificial people knowing a harmony system 
similar to that of an early form of Uzbek, and then to investigate what factors could have led to the 
growth and then subsequent decay of a vowel harmony system in this language. (Such changes are 
attested by modern and historical texts showing present day and early forms of Uzbek.) This simulation 
was therefore concerned with changes in one specific language, as opposed to most (if not all) other 
expression-induction models, which are concerned with the generic case of human language in general. 
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The simulation proceeded in a number of stages. In each stage one person would be 
chosen to be the speaker, and another the hearer. A number between 11 and 20 would 
then be chosen, and the speaker would communicate this number to the hearer. 
Initially the speaker would be equally likely to use any combination of numbers 
which express the right value, but if they had heard a numeral being used to form such 
expressions more frequently than other numerals, then they would use that numeral 
whenever possible. It was discovered that, after a short period of time, all speakers in 
the community would express all the numbers between 11 and 20 using the numeral 
‘ten’ and one other numeral. This is exactly the system which is found in real 
languages, where these values are typically expressed with a morpheme which 
appears to be derived from the word ten, together with one other digit. (English 
displays this pattern for the ‘teen’ numbers, such as ‘fourteen’, which appears to be 
derived from ‘four’ and ‘ten’.) 
Hurford’s model (Hurford, 1987) is important because it shows how a universal rule 
could evolve as a result of a diachronic process, even though individual speakers have 
no obligation to follow the rule. By the end of the simulations, a standard language 
had emerged which was shared by all speakers, simply due to each person listening to 
the language of the other people, and trying to express himself in the same way. The 
induction part of Hurford’s model was extremely simple, as the artificial people 
learned simply by keeping count of how often they had heard each numeral. More 
recent expression-induction models, including the model of colour term evolution 
described here, have begun to use much more sophisticated learning techniques, and I 
will briefly review some of the most important of those models. However, first I will 
mention another approach to modelling the evolution of languages over time, one that 
does not simulate evolution at the level of individual conversations between speakers, 
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but which can in some circumstances produce more rigorous results than those 
achieved with the expression induction methodology. 
Nowak, Komarova and Niyogi (2002) describe work in which they try to determine 
some of the general properties that languages, and the mechanisms that humans use to 
learn them, must have, in order for coherent languages to emerge. They created a 
formalism to specify the scope of possible human languages, and created a measure 
that could calculate the communicative payoff when speakers of any two languages 
communicated. (If the languages were more similar, successful communication was 
more likely, and so communicative payoff would be higher.) They then introduced, a 
measure of how likely it would be that each learner would acquire each particular 
language, given the language spoken by the learner’s parents. How likely a learner 
would be to acquire the same language as its parents would depend on the acquisition 
mechanism that he or she used. Nowak et al considered the case of a very poor 
learner, who was worse at learning than people are, and a very good learner, who 
learned, in some sense, perfectly. They then argued that people’s ability to learn 
languages must come somewhere in between these two extremes, and so considering 
these cases allows us to place bounds on the actual mechanism that people use to 
learn languages. Using this technique, Nowak et al were able to show how restrictive 
universal grammar needs to be in order for coherent languages to emerge, and to 
demonstrate that this is related to the number of example sentences to which learners 
are exposed. 
Perhaps the main criticisms that I would make of Nowak et al’s work, is that the 
learning mechanisms that they consider are non-statistical, and hence they do not 
make use of any of statistical information in the input data. It would be surprising if 
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people learned languages in this way, as statistical patterns can provide a rich source 
of information about the target language, and so any person who ignored them could 
be disadvantaged. However, some other assumptions made by Nowak et al are also 
somewhat problematic. For example they assume the differences between languages 
can all be reduced to a series of binary parameters, but it seems difficult to see how 
some aspects of languages, such as lexical entries or phonetics, can be represented in 
this form. Furthermore, they assume that, in terms of a similarity measure that they 
define, all distinct languages are equally dissimilar, something that in reality is 
certainly false. Such mathematical models allow some bounds to be placed on the 
properties that languages can have, and on the learning mechanisms that people use to 
learn them, but the validity of any such findings is dependent on the assumptions 
made when constructing the model. Furthermore, the range of problems that can be 
addressed with such models is probably smaller than that which expression-induction 
models, more of which are reviewed below, can address. In particular, it would 
probably not be possible to construct such a model to explain the data concerning 
colour term typology that is the subject of much of this thesis. 
Kirby (2002) created an expression-induction model to investigate compositionality. 
In all languages, the meaning of an utterance as a whole can be derived from the 
meanings of its individual parts, and Kirby sought an explanation of how languages 
having this property arise. Most of his simulations contained only two artificial people 
at any one time. One of these would be an adult, who had completed the process of 
language acquisition, and the other would be a child, who would try to learn the 
language spoken by the adult. In the initial state of the simulation, neither the adult 
nor the child knows any language, so when the adult first speaks he will have to begin 
by making up some new words. The meanings to be expressed take the form of simple 
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first order predicate logic formulae, such as eats(tiger, sausages), which would 
correspond to the meaning ‘the tiger eats sausages’, or slightly more complex 
formulae such as thinks(gavin, loves(gavin, mary)) which would mean ‘Gavin thinks 
he loves Mary’.  
The simulation would begin with the adult expressing random meanings. Whenever 
the adult did not know how to express a meaning, they made up a random string of 
letters, and simply used that. (They also remembered the correspondence between the 
letter string and the meaning for later use). The child would observe all these letter 
strings together with the corresponding meanings, and would then derive a grammar 
from them. A child’s grammar consisted simply of a long list of all the meanings 
which he had observed, together with the strings of letters which were used to express 
the meanings, except that, where possible, he would try to form more general rules. If 
two strings with similar meanings both contained repeated letter sequences, then it 
could be possible to replace each of these with a variable, and add two new rules to 
expand this variable in such a way that it could express either of the two meanings. 
Initially, such similarities in any two such strings would appear simply by chance, but 
the creation of such a rule begins to add hierarchical phrase structure into the 
language, so such regularities would be likely to be preserved in future grammars. 
After the process of induction was complete, the child then became an adult, and 
began the process of talking to a new child, who would similarly start from the point 
of not knowing any language at all. Eventually small compositional grammars 
emerged which were able to express an infinite number of meanings through 
recursion. Kirby (2002) suggested that this could explain why languages show 
compositionality. We should note that there is nothing in the model which prevents 
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non-compositional languages from being learned, and that neither adults nor speakers 
ever receive any reward for successful communication. Compositionality emerges not 
because the Language Acquisition Device constrains the learnable languages in such a 
way that only this kind of language can be learned, but because these languages are 
passed on more easily. Because each child hears only a finite number of example 
sentences, compact compositional languages are more likely to be passed on 
accurately to the next generation than larger non-compositional ones. 
Hurford (2000) developed a similar model, but his model had one key difference. 
Instead of the artificial people always forming general rules whenever they 
encountered utterances supporting the formation of such generalizations, they would 
only do so on 25% of such occasions. This created an inbuilt bias to conservativeness, 
as the people did not always generalize as much as they potentially could. Hurford’s 
simulations contained four adults and one child at any one time, and periodically the 
child would be promoted to be an adult, the oldest adult removed, and a new child 
added. This meant that each child would learn its language based on input from four 
different adults. We might expect that if there was only a weak bias towards forming 
general rules, then idiosyncratic lexicalizations would tend to emerge, where instead 
of complex meanings being expressed by general rules, they would be expressed 
using a single lexical item, in which the complex meaning had been paired with a 
phonological form. 
Whether we find such non-systematic sound-meaning pairings in the emergent 
languages depends on whether we look at emergent E-languages or I-languages. If the 
utterances produced in the community (after a sufficient number of generations had 
elapsed), were examined, then it was clear that the language had a compositional 
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structure without any redundant lexicalizations, so that complex meanings always 
conformed to rules, and the meanings were a function of the meanings of their 
component parts.  
However, these regularities were not always mirrored in the I-languages of the 
individual speakers. Typically I-languages contained some general productive rules, 
but they also contained many rote learned lexical items pairing whole utterances with 
their meanings. If the I-languages of each of the adults were compared, then 
presumably each adult would have learned a somewhat different I-language, because 
which constructions had been analyzed, and which simply memorized, was 
determined randomly. However, these people all spoke the same E-language, and 
these E-languages were compositional, because compositional rules were internalized 
by the speakers sufficiently often for the compositional structure of the languages to 
be maintained. I believe that these simulations are extremely important, because they 
demonstrate very clearly divergence between E-language and I-language, and show 
that rules apparent in E-language may not have any psychological reality for the 
speakers who produce that E-language. They hence demonstrate the importance of 
conceptualizing language within a framework which acknowledges both E-language 
and I-language, and they show that some aspects of language cannot be understood if 
either only E-language or only I-language is considered. 
Another recent expression-induction model is that of de Boer (1999). This model is, 
in many ways, similar to the one presented in this thesis, in that it aims to explain 
cross-linguistic typological patterns as a product of a cultural evolutionary process. 
However, de Boer’s model is concerned with the typology of a very different domain, 
namely that of vowel systems. Instead of simulating evolution over several 
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generations, as Kirby (2002) did, de Boer created 20 artificial people who were 
present for the whole of the simulation. At the beginning of the simulation, each of 
these people would know several random vowels. The initial vowels would be 
different for each person, but each person always knew the same number of vowels, 
usually between three and nine 22 . The vowels were represented in terms of the 
positions of the first and second formants23 which reflects the most important acoustic 
properties by which the vowels of real languages are distinguishable. However, this 
representation is somewhat simplified, especially because it does not take account of 
lip rounding, which forms another dimension in the vowel systems of many 
languages. 
The basic assumption behind the simulations was that, if the artificial people were 
made to imitate each other, then, as a result of this process, coherent vowel systems 
would emerge. Imitation proceeded by first choosing one person to be the initiator, 
and choosing one of the vowels which he knew. That person would then try to express 
a vowel similar to this, but altered slightly, to another person. That person would then 
find the vowel in their language which was most similar to the vowel which they 
perceived, and then express that same vowel back to the initiating person. In each 
case, the presence of random noise in the environment, which might distort the speech 
                                                 
22
 I should note that de Boer (1999) describes several versions of his simulations, in some of which the 
number of vowels was not fixed beforehand. 
23
 Formants are frequencies at which the voice resonates, and so which are characteristic of the overall 
sound of the vowel. The first and second formants correspond to the two lowest such resonant 
frequencies (Ladefoged, 1975). 
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signal, was simulated by slightly altering the vowel being expressed. If the vowel 
which was most similar to that now perceived by the initiator was the same as that 
which the initiator initially expressed, then the process of imitation would be judged 
to be successful. This imitation game would be played with every other simulated 
person, and from this an overall score would be obtained for how successful the 
people were at imitating that vowel. If the actual vowel expressed was more 
successful than the one on which it had been based had been in the past, then the 
initial vowel would be altered to be a bit more similar to the expressed vowel. In any 
case, the scores for how successful the vowel had been were updated. 
This imitation process was repeated many times, typically about 25000 times, at 
which point the vowel systems know by each person tended to be very similar. Most 
of the vowel systems also appeared to conform to most of the typological patterns 
reported in the literature, especially in that they tended to be symmetrical (with there 
being a corresponding back vowel for each front vowel24), and the vowels tended to 
be evenly distributed in the vowel space, in such a way as to be maximally 
acoustically distinct. De Boer concluded that his model showed that cross-linguistic 
typological patterns, which it had been previously argued were the product of innate 
properties of the human language faculty, actually emerged through a process of self-
organization within a population. 
                                                 
24
 The terms front and back refer to the relative position in which the tongue is placed in the mouth in 
order to pronounce the vowel. Front vowels are pronounced with the tongue further forwards than 
when back vowels are pronounced . 
64 
While both de Boer’s model, and the evolutionary model of colour terms described in 
this thesis, aim to explain language typology using same kind of computer modelling 
methodology, the expression-induction model which is most relevant to the model of 
colour term evolution presented in this thesis is that of Belpaeme (2002). Belpaeme’s 
model also looks at the cultural evolution of colour term systems over time 25 , 
although the details of the model are somewhat different from the model presented 
here, as are the aspects of colour term systems for which it is able to account. 
Belpaeme’s simulations typically contained ten artificial people, each of whom was 
able to represent colour categories using adaptive networks, a kind of neural network. 
Colour in the model was represented in terms of the CIE-LAB space, which 
represents colour in terms of three dimensions, one of which corresponds to its degree 
of redness or greenness, one to the degree of yellowness or blueness, and the third to 
the lightness or darkness of the colour26. The networks acted as fuzzy membership 
functions, allowing colour categories corresponding to a volume of the three 
dimensional CIE LAB space of almost any size or shape to be represented. Each 
artificial person could also remember a number of word forms, each of which could 
be paired with a particular colour category. 
                                                 
25
 Belpaeme also models the phylogenetic evolution of innate colour categories, but this work is less 
relevant, mainly because it is less similar to my model of colour term evolution. However, because 
there is considerable variation in the ranges of colours denoted by similar colour terms in different 
languages, it seems unlikely that all these colour terms could be innate. Hence, I will proceed on the 
assumption that colour categories are learned, and ignore Belpaeme’s work on innate colour categories. 
26
 This colour space was chosen because Lammens (1994) showed that his computer model of colour 
naming worked best in this space. 
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In the initial state of the simulation, the artificial people did not know any colour 
categories or colour words, so, the first time one of them spoke, he would have to 
create a new category and corresponding word. In general, communication proceeded 
by first choosing one colour to be a topic, and another to a context, and then choosing 
one person to be a speaker, and another to be a hearer. The speaker would then try to 
communicate to the hearer which of the words was the topic, and which was the 
context, by choosing a word which included the topic, but not the context, in its 
denotation. If the word that the speaker used was known by the hearer, and the colour 
category which the hearer had associated with that word included only one of the 
colours, then the hearer would understand that that colour was the topic. If this was 
correct, then communication would have been successful, and the association between 
the topic colour and the colour word would be strengthened. If communication was 
not successful, then the hearer would be shown the correct topic, and the word’s 
colour category would be adapted, so that it would be a better match for the topic 
colour. Categories and words which were persistently not useful in communication 
would eventually be forgotten.  
In some simulation runs, the same artificial people would exist for the whole of the 
simulation, though in others evolution over a number of generations would be 
simulated, by periodically replacing one of the people with a new one who had not 
learned any colour words. However, similar results were obtained in both these 
conditions. The most important result was that, over a period of time, coherent colour 
lexicons emerged which were shared by all the artificial people. The colour lexicons 
would divide the colour space into a number of colour regions, each of which would 
be associated with a particular colour word. The people never agreed completely 
about the exact meaning of each colour word, but their languages were consistent 
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enough for them to achieve rates of communicative success in excess of 85%. 
However, the colour categories emerging in Belpaeme’s model did not resemble the 
colour terms of real languages, as they did not conform to the typological restrictions 
observed in colour term systems cross-linguistically27.  
The model of colour term evolution presented in this thesis builds on the work of 
Belpaeme (2002). It uses a similar methodology, in that it is also a kind of expression-
induction model, but there are a number of key differences. The learning mechanism 
used is Bayesian inference, not adaptive networks, and there is no feedback 
mechanism which informs the artificial people whether communication has been 
successful. Instead they simply try to mimic each other’s language, though they 
receive no reward for successful imitation. Some of the findings of the psychological 
studies of colour perception and colour naming reviewed above were incorporated 
into the model, and this allowed it to account for much of the typological data 
concerning colour words, as will be shown below. 
                                                 
27
 Belpaeme (2002) did suggest that the split into light and dark colours seen in languages with only 
two colour terms might be explainable in terms of his model, because this might be the easiest way to 
divide up the colour space, but, in its present form, the model would not be able to account for any 
other aspects of colour term typology. 
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Chapter 3  
A Bayesian Model of Colour Term 
Acquisition 
The acquisitional part of the expression-induction model of colour term evolution 
shows how children can learn the denotations of colour words based on a number of 
examples of colours which those words have been used to denote. The model 
demonstrates that, if colour words were learned using Bayesian inference, then this 
would cause them to have prototype properties. When the model was designed, 
attention was paid to the psycholinguistic, neurophysiological and typological 
evidence, in the hope that this would enable it to account accurately for the empirical 
data concerning colour terms. 
3.1 Bayesian Inference 
The acquisitional model learns using Bayesian inference, which is a statistical 
procedure that allows empirical evidence to be used to determine how likely it is that 
hypotheses are correct. It derives its name from Bayes’ rule of Bayes (1763), given in 
(3.1) below, although Barnett (1982) notes that Bayesian inference itself is a more 
recent development, which cannot readily be attributed to any single person.  
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Bayesian inference has previously been used as the basis of psychological models of 
learning, including such works as Anderson and Matessa (1991), who modelled 
categorization, Griffiths and Tenenbaum (2000), who looked at how people can 
predict the frequency of periodic events, and Tenenbaum and Xu (2000), who 
modelled language acquisition. All of these models produced results that closely 
parallel human’s performance on the same tasks, suggesting that people use Bayesian 
inference to accomplish those tasks. Studies such as these are the primary reason for 
presuming that colour words are learned using Bayesian inference – if people use 
Bayesian learning in one domain, it seems likely that they will use it for learning in 
other domains as well. 
Bayes’ rule, (3.1), allows the probability that a hypothesis is correct with respect to 
some relevant data to be calculated. (This is called the a posteriori probability of the 
hypothesis, and is written as P(h | d)). However, Bayes’ rule can be applied only if we 
know the correct values for all the terms on the right hand side of the equation. Firstly 
we must know how likely the hypothesis was before we considered the data (its a 
priori probability, written P(h)), and how likely we would be to observe that data if 
the hypothesis were correct, (the probability of the data in terms of the hypothesis, 
written P(d | h)). We also need to know how likely the data was anyway, not with 
respect to just one particular hypothesis, but in terms of all possible hypotheses. (This 
is the probability of the data, written P(d).) In general we cannot really know for sure 
exactly what value we should assign to each of these probabilities, so instead we must 
make reasonable estimates.  
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We should note, however, that here the Bayesian model of colour term acquisition is 
being used not as an objective inference procedure, but as a psychological theory. 
Hence, when an assumption is made in the design of the Bayesian model, it is 
effectively a proposal that people implicitly make that assumption when they learn 
colour words. Clearly in some cases, given the totality of our knowledge of colour 
term systems cross-linguistically, more accurate assumptions could be made, but in 
the present context ‘more accurate’ does not necessarily correspond to ‘more correct’. 
In general, when assumptions are made, the aim is either to make the assumption 
which it seems most likely that children must make in order to learn colour words, or 
else just to make the simplest assumption which seems reasonable, in accordance with 
the principle that we should prefer simpler theories over more complex ones, unless 
there is evidence to the contrary28. 
Looking at equation (3.1) in more detail, we can see that the a posteriori probability 
of a hypothesis is directly proportional to both its a priori probability, and the 
probability of the data with respect to that hypothesis. In other words, hypotheses 
which are likely to be correct before we have observed any data, are still more likely 
to be correct once we have seen the data, all other things being equal, while 
hypotheses which predict the occurrence of the kind of data which has been seen, are 
more likely to be correct than those which predict that such data is unlikely to be 
observed. 
                                                 
28
 This principle, which is sometimes termed Occam’s Razor, is widely supported in the literature on 
philosophy of science, and was discussed above in Chapter 2. 
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The third term on the right hand side of the equation is the probability that the data 
has, before any particular hypothesis is considered. So long as the available data is 
constant, the value of this term does not change, even when we consider alternative 
hypotheses, and so, if we were only interested in the relative probabilities of two or 
more hypotheses, we could ignore this term. However, so long as we know the full 
range of possible hypotheses, and how the data can be assigned a probability with 
respect to each one, the value of this term can be calculated using a standard Bayesian 
procedure, allowing the exact a posteriori probabilities of hypotheses to be 
determined, not just their relative probabilities. Implementing Bayesian inference 
consists simply of performing the calculation specified by equation (3.1), but in order 
to be able to do that, we need to identify how the values of the terms on the right hand 
side of the equation can be determined. 
Perhaps Bayesian inference can be made somewhat clearer through the use of an 
example. Suppose I was to see a person in the street who had green skin and antennae 
growing out of his head. There are two possibilities which could explain his odd 
appearance, each of which is a hypothesis, and which I will term h1 and h2. Firstly the 
person might be an alien from outer space (hypothesis h1), or secondly the person 
might be a human (hypothesis h2). (Of course there could be other possibilities, but 
for reasons of simplicity, I will assume that there are only two possible hypotheses.) 
In general, I expect that most people I see on the street are not aliens, so I will 
estimate that the probability of someone I see on the street being an alien to be one in 
a billion, so P(h1)=0.000,000,001. Given that we are considering only two 
probabilities, this means that the chances that the person is really a human are 
999,999,999 in a billion, so P(h2)=0.999,999,999.  
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Now we have to consider the available data, which is that the person has green skin 
and antennae protruding from his head. Firstly, we need to consider the case of the 
person being an alien, and determine a probability for how likely we would have been 
to observe the data (the green skin and antennae), if he were an alien. I would guess 
that, if a person was an alien, it would be fairly unlikely, but not inconceivable, that 
he would have green skin and antennae growing out of his head. Hence, I will 
estimate that the probability of making these observations if we know the person to be 
an alien, is one in a thousand, so P(d|h1)=0.001. If the person is really a human and 
not an alien, then it would seem that he would be very unlikely to have green skin and 
antennae, but these are still possible, because he could simply be dressed up in an 
alien costume. Hence I will estimate the probability of a human I met on the street 
having green skin and antennae to be one in a million, so P(d|h2)=0.000,001. 
Now, if we want to determine how likely it is that the figure is an alien, we must start 
by determining the probability of the data, P(d). We do this by working out the 
probability of observing the data regardless of which of the two hypotheses is true, by 
calculating the probability of both the first hypothesis being true and of us observing 
the data if that hypothesis was true, and adding this probability to the equivalent one 
for the second hypothesis, as shown in (3.2).  
(3.2) P(d)=P(h1)P(d|h1)+P(h2)P(d|h2) 
Substituting the values identified above into (3.2), as in (3.3), produces a probability 
for the data which is approximately equal to one in a million. Such a very low 
probability should not be a surprise – after all it is not very often that we see people 
with green skin and antennae on the street. 
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(3.3) P(d)=0.000,000,001×0.001+0.999,999,999×0.000,001=0.000,001,000,000,999 
The final stage of the Bayesian inference procedure is to calculate the actual 
probabilities of each of the hypotheses, by substituting into equation (3.1), as in (3.4) 
and (3.5). 
(3.4) 001,000.0
9000,000,990.000,001,
0.0010010.000,000,
)(
)|()()|( 111 =×== dP
hdPhPdhP  
(3.5) 999,999.0
9000,000,990.000,001,
0.000,0019990.999,999,
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)|()()|( 222 =×== dP
hdPhPdhP  
We can see that we have inferred that it is much more likely that the person is in fact a 
human dressed up rather than an alien, even though humans very rarely dress up as 
aliens. This is because the a priori probability of seeing an alien on the street is so 
much lower than of seeing a human on the street. Even though it is much more likely 
for an alien than a human to have green skin and antennae, the calculations reveal that 
the probability of the person being an alien is only one in a million. We should note 
that as we assumed a priori that either h1 or h2 must be correct, the sum of the a 
posteriori probabilities of these hypotheses is one, indicating that one or the other one 
must be correct.  
We should perhaps consider what it would take to make me believe that what I had 
seen was in fact a real alien. Suppose that, after passing the person, a flying saucer 
landed in the street behind me and picked him up. This would provide more evidence 
concerning whether the person was really an alien or not. It would seem that the 
probability of a flying saucer landing in the street and picking up a human would be 
very low (let us say one in a billion), but if there is an alien in the street, the 
probability of him being picked up by a flying saucer would be much higher (say one 
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in a thousand (0.001)29). Using this new data, we can update the probabilities we 
earlier calculated for hypotheses h1 and h2, which will now be the a priori 
probabilities, because they were determined before consideration of the new data. 
Firstly the probability of the new data must be calculated using equation (3.2), as in 
(3.6), and then this value, can be used to calculate the a posteriori probabilities for 
each hypothesis, given both the data about the person’s appearance, and the data 
about the flying saucer. These calculations are shown in (3.7) and (3.8). 
(3.6) P(d)=0.000,001×0.001+0.999,999×0.000,000,001=0.000,000,001,999,999 
(3.7) 5.0
9001,999,990.000,000,
0.0010.000,001
)(
)|()()|( 111 =×== dP
hdPhPdhP  
(3.8) 5.0
9001,999,990.000,000,
0010.000,000,999,999.0
)(
)|()()|( 222 =×== dP
hdPhPdhP  
We can now see that it is equally likely that the person is a real alien as that he is just 
a human dressed up as an alien. This seems to be reasonably in accord with intuitive 
judgments. Of course we do not normally expect to pass aliens on the street, but then 
we do not normally expect to see flying saucers either. Having observed such a highly 
unlikely event, we might be prepared to consider the possibility that the person was in 
fact a real alien. More importantly, this example has illustrated how Bayesian 
inference can be applied in practice, and how the overall a posteriori probability that 
is assigned to a hypothesis is determined both by its a priori probability, and by the 
data which has been observed. While Bayesian inference may seem a very technical 
                                                 
29
 I have still assigned quite a low probability to this data because, assuming that aliens do exist and 
visit the Earth, I still think that it is quite unlikely that they travel by flying saucer. 
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and abstract procedure, people make inductive inferences all the time, so we must 
have some mechanism for doing this, even if we are not consciously aware of it, and 
in this thesis I am suggesting that this mechanism is Bayesian. While the alien 
example probably does not demonstrate clearly what advantage Bayesian inference 
would have over other, perhaps simpler, mechanisms which might be used to perform 
inference, we can understand some of the key benefits of Bayesian inference by 
looking more closely at the work of Tenenbaum and Xu (2000) and Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum (2000).  
Tenenbaum and Xu (2000), in common with the approach of this thesis, used 
Bayesian inference to model the acquisition of word meanings. Their model learned 
meanings from examples of objects which words were used to refer to, which is 
similar to how the Bayesian model of colour terms learns, though Tenenbaum and 
Xu’s model was concerned with concrete nouns. The model predicted that the 
meaning that people would attribute to a word would depend on the number and type 
of examples of its use which they had observed. If a person had observed only a small 
number of examples of a word, then they would be unsure of just how far beyond 
those examples the word’s denotation extended, but as a larger number of examples 
were seen, the learner would become more confident about the word's exact 
denotational range. Importantly, Tenenbaum and Xu were able to demonstrate, using 
psychological experiments, that the generalizations made by their model were very 
similar to those made by people when presented with the same evidence. This 
provides some of the clearest empirical support for the hypothesis that Bayesian 
inference is an important mechanism in language acquisition, and hence is very 
supportive of the potential of the Bayesian model of colour terms. 
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Griffiths and Tenenbaum's (2000) model is even more closely related to the work in 
this thesis, although their work is not itself concerned with language. Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum investigated how people can predict the frequency with which some event 
occurs, based on observations of the time since its last occurrence. Through 
psychological experiments, they found that if people are told that on arrival at a 
subway station it has been 103 seconds since the last train arrived, then they will 
guess that it is most likely that trains run every few minutes. However, if they are then 
told that on two subsequent visits to the subway station it has been 34 seconds, and 
then 72 seconds since the last train arrived, they are likely to believe that trains run 
with a frequency much closer to 103 seconds. Tenenbaum and Griffiths attempted to 
account for this data using a Bayesian model similar to the one presented in this 
thesis, but in which hypotheses correspond to how often trains arrive at the station. 
The single most likely hypothesis will be that which is large enough to include just 
the arrival times of all the trains, but, by averaging over all possible hypotheses, the 
model arrives at a best guess for the actual interval between train arrivals.  
The reason that the approach to colour term semantics presented here is similar to 
Griffiths and Tenenbaum’s approach to inferring the frequency of events, is that both 
colour and time can both have continuously varying values. Hence, it was possible to 
use numeric scales to represent dimensions in the colour space, in much the same way 
as Griffiths and Tenenbaum used such a scale to represent time. Griffiths and 
Tenenbaum found that their model accurately replicated the data obtained from 
human subjects, and so this again is strongly supportive of Bayesian models of 
learning, and hence of the Bayesian model of colour terms.  
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The model of colour term semantics also has many similarities with some of the 
models which Tenenbaum (1999) used to explain the acquisition of concepts, 
especially one of those models, which is described in Appendix C.2 of Tenenbaum 
(1999), and which was used to model the acquisition of ‘disjunctive concepts’ in a 
one dimensional space. Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2001) have proposed that these 
models might exemplify a universal principle which people may use whenever they 
generalise from examples.  
Their work has built on the work of Shepard, especially Shepard (1987), who sought 
to develop a universal law for generalisation. His models only applied to 
generalisation between a single exemplar and a novel stimulus, while the model of 
this paper, and the models of Tenenbaum (1999), Tenenbaum and Griffiths (2000) 
and Tenenbaum and Xu (2000) could all generalise based upon multiple exemplars. 
However, Shepard’s (1987) model was, as will be seen below, similar to the model of 
this thesis, in that it proposed that people make the a priori assumptions that 
categories are all of equal size, and are equally likely to occur anywhere in the 
conceptual space. Further discussion of the differences between the model of Shepard 
(1987) and the more recent Bayesian models can be found in Tenenbaum and 
Griffiths (2001). The examples of other models of Bayesian learning all provide 
evidence to support the Bayesian model of colour term semantics, but the primary 
motivation for that model is of course that it accounts well for the specific empirical 
data concerning colour terms themselves. 
3.2 Axioms of the Acquisitional Theory 
This section outlines the assumptions made in the construction of the Bayesian model 
of acquisition, which correspond to the axioms of a theory of how people learn the 
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meanings of colour terms. The first of these axioms has already been introduced, 
because that is simply that the meanings of colour words are learned using Bayesian 
inference30. However, this still leaves open the question of what knowledge children 
have pre-linguistically, what evidence is available to them from which to learn, and 
what implicit assumptions they make about the possible denotations of colour words. 
The assumptions (or axioms) made in the construction of the model, concerning each 
of these of these questions, are the topic of this section. These axioms are summarised 
in Table 3.1, and each of them is then discussed in turn in the subsequent subsections. 
                                                 
30
 We might also describe this ‘axiom’ as the hypothesis under test. However, it is not possible to test 
one component of the model in the absence of other parts of the model, as the results obtained are 
based on the output of the model as a whole. Hence, it is difficult to determine the effect of each axiom, 
and to predict how the results might have been different if an alternative assumption had been made. 
Therefore, it might be best to regard the hypothesis under test as the whole theory, including all of its 
axioms. Chapter 8 discusses how we should interpret the results of the model, and to what extent they 
can be taken as supportive of the axioms, and of the theory as a whole. 
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1 Children can see colour, and have available a conceptual colour space, before 
they begin learning colour terms. 
2 Children learn colour terms by observing other speakers use of these terms. 
3 The evidence from which children learn is unreliable. 
4 Unique hues are more salient to children than other colours. Hence children are 
most likely to remember examples of colours named by colour terms, when 
those colour terms are used to name unique hues. The unique hues are not 
evenly spaced in the colour space, with the green and blue unique hues being 
closest together, and the red and blue ones the furthest apart of any of the 
adjacent pairs. 
5 Children assume that colour terms denote contiguous regions of the colour 
space. 
6 Children learn colour term denotations using the Bayes’ optimal classification 
form of Bayesian inference. 
Table 3.1. Axioms of the Acquisitional Theory. 
3.2.1 A Conceptual Colour Space 
The first axiom of the model is that, before people begin to learn the meanings of 
colour terms, they must be able to see colours, and to understand the relationships 
between different colours. It seems that in order to accomplish this we must have 
some sort of conceptual colour space in which we can think about colour, and in 
which some colours will be closer to each other than are others. 
Whilst the colour of light, which is what ultimately gives rise to our experiences of 
colour, is dependent on the wavelength of the light, where red light has the longest 
wavelength and purple the shortest, this does not reflect how we experience colour, 
because perceptually red and purple are similar colours. Colour, as we experience it, 
is best understood as having a three-dimensional structure, where it can vary on any 
of the dimensions of hue, saturation or lightness (Thompson, 1995). Hue is a circular 
dimension, in which the colours vary from red to orange, yellow, green, blue, purple 
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and finally back to red again, as shown in Figure 3.1, which has been labelled with the 
basic colour terms of English. The other two dimensions are both orthogonal to hue. 
Lightness simply corresponds to how light or dark a colour is, while Saturation 
corresponds to the degree to which a colour is free from dilution by grey, so that very 
bright colours are high in saturation, while black, white and grey have a zero degree 
of saturation. The Bayesian model is not at present concerned with the dimensions of 
saturation or lightness, so the relevant colour space is the one dimensional circular 
hue space of Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. The Conceptual Colour Space.  
It is proposed that people have such a conceptual colour space before they begin the 
process of learning colour words. This proposal is supported by evidence from Xiao, 
Wang and Felleman (2003), who showed that there are parts of Macaque monkey’s 
brains in which cells responding maximally to different colours of light are spatially 
organized in the same order as in the conceptual colour space, starting at red, and 
finishing at purple, although is not clear that they demonstrated the existence of a 
circular colour space, in which purple was adjacent to red. The circularity of the hue 
dimension is, however, well supported by psychological evidence. Such a conceptual 
red 
orange 
purple 
blue 
green 
yellow 
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space would allow inferences to be made, such as that red is more similar to orange 
than it is to yellow, and that we can have an ‘orangey-red’, but not a ‘reddish-green’ 
(because orange and red are adjacent in the colour space, while red and green are not). 
Within this colour space, it is possible to model the meanings of the English basic 
colour terms red, orange, yellow, green, blue and purple, but not terms which are 
distinguished from these in terms of lightness or saturation, such as pink or brown, or 
the achromatic terms, black, grey and white. 
We should note, however, that the relationship between the physical properties of 
light entering the eye and perceived colour is not straightforward, but is moderated by 
a number of intervening processes. Much is known about the physiology of the colour 
vision system, and there is a number of theories to account for phenomena such as 
perceived colour constancy despite varying illumination31. However, consideration of 
                                                 
31
 One of the best known theories concerning colour constancy is that of Land (1977). Shepard (1994) 
has even suggested that humans may have developed a colour system in which colours can vary along 
three separate dimensions because such a system makes it easier to maintain colour constancy. Because 
natural illumination also varies primarily in three ways (strength of illumination, degree of redness as 
opposed to greenness, and degree of blueness as opposed to yellowness), it is easier to determine the 
colour of objects, despite seeing them in varying light conditions, if our vision system also measures 
light in terms of those same three dimensions. Therefore ‘such a three-dimensional representation of 
colour may have emerged as an adaptation to a pervasive and enduring feature of the world in which 
we have evolved’ (p20).  
Shepard (1992) describes experiments which investigated whether the colour space used by colour 
blind people who lacked the ability to distinguish between red and green was also three dimensional, or 
whether, as might be expected as they are unable to discriminate colours which differ on one of the 
three dimensions of colour, only two dimensional. Firstly he showed subjects sheets of coloured paper, 
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such issues is outside of the scope of this thesis, so here it is simply assumed that such 
processes exist, and that they are able to convert the physical rays of light entering the 
eye into an internal representation which can then be categorized linguistically. The 
details of these processes are not relevant to the issues surrounding colour vocabulary 
which are being considered here. 
A related problem concerns objects which are not composed of a single colour, but 
instead have varied colouration, or when different parts of the same object have 
different colours. Most objects in a child's environment probably have such 
characteristics, for example trees, houses and animals. However, basic colour terms 
                                                                                                                                           
two at a time, and asked them to rate the similarity of each pair. Then he repeated the experiments, but 
this time using the names of two colours, such as red and orange. Analysis of the subjects’ judgements 
as to how similar each pair of colours was, was then used to determine the shape of the colour space 
that the subjects were using. The first experiments, using coloured paper, produced evidence of a 
colour space, in which red and green were collapsed together. This is what would be expected, as the 
subjects lacked the perceptual apparatus necessary to distinguish red and green. In contrast, in the 
second experiments, the subjects appeared to be using a colour space in which red and green were 
distinct, and which had the same general properties as that used by non-colour blind people. Shepard 
took this as evidence that the full three dimensional colour space is innate, as the colour blind subjects 
presumably could not have learned it from perceptual input. However, I discuss in Chapter 8 work by 
Landau and Gleitman (1985) that appears to show that much knowledge of colour can be gained from 
linguistic context, so it could be the case that colour blind individuals are able to construct a three 
dimensional colour space using such evidence, and that the three dimensional colour space is not 
innate. 
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denote ranges of pure hues32, so a child trying to infer a term's denotation must be 
able to determine either which part of an object is being referred to, or to abstract an 
overall colour from a part of an object which has varied colouration. It would seem 
that such processes must be in place before a child can learn the meanings of colour 
terms, but this thesis does not seek to explain how those processes work, but again 
simply assumes that they are in place before the process of colour term acquisition 
begins33. 
3.2.2 Evidence from which Children Learn 
The next issue to be considered is what data is available from which people can learn 
colour words. It seems a reasonable assumption that children are not taught the full 
range of the denotations of each word they know explicitly, in terms of exactly what it 
can and cannot be used to denote. Instead, it seems more plausible that children learn 
the meanings of colour words primarily by observing other people’ uses of those 
words. If a person utters a phrase such as ‘that red chair’, and a child listening to this 
is able to determine the referent of the expression, then they will be able to tell that 
                                                 
32
 We should qualify this statement somewhat, because, as was noted above, authors, such as Levinson 
(2001) have noted that, in some languages, other properties are conflated with colour, so that words do 
not refer just to hue. This would appear to make the child’s learning task more difficult, because they 
must determine whether a word refers just to colour, to a mixture of colour and other properties, or 
perhaps not even to colour at all. 
33
 It should be noted that it is also possible that, to some extent, the colour vision system develops 
whilst colour terms are being acquired. 
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the colour of the chair is within the denotation of the colour term red34. From a 
number of such observations, it would be possible to obtain several examples of 
colours that the word red can be used to denote, and so the input to the process of 
acquiring the meaning of each word will consist of a number of example colours. 
Learning will then consist of generalizing from these examples to the full range of 
colours which come within the word’s denotation. 
This approach of using meaning-form pairs as input data has been followed by many 
other researchers when creating computer models of the acquisition of meaning. For 
example Morris, Cottrell and Elman (2000) trained a neural net to acquire 
grammatical relations by pairing sentences with representations of their meanings. 
The neural net was then able to learn to interpret novel sentences, by generalizing 
from the example sentences. Kobayashi, Furukawa, Ozaki and Imai (2002) used a 
very different learning mechanism, inductive logic programming, in a computational 
model of word meaning acquisition, but they also trained their model with form-
meaning pairs. Kobayashi et al assumed that as well as getting positive examples 
concerning what words mean, children also received negative examples, specifying 
what words do not mean. However, this assumption is problematic, because many 
researchers report that some children do not receive any such corrections, and yet they 
still acquire language successfully (Guasti, 2002). That is why the present model 
learns using only positive examples. 
                                                 
34 This ignores the problem of determining that the word red is a colour term at all, which might be as 
complex a problem as actually determining the word’s denotation, but this issue is outside of the scope 
of this thesis (though it is discussed further in Chapter 8). 
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3.2.3 Unreliability of Data 
We should note that there is a lot of potential for error in the procedure by which a 
child attempts to determine the colour which a colour term has been used to identify. 
For example, children might incorrectly infer the referent of a colour term, or the 
speaker who they were observing might use the wrong colour term to identify a 
particular colour. Hence, it would seem that if children are to be successful in their 
acquisition of colour words, they must assume that the data from which they learn is 
unreliable. This means that there will be a possibility that any particular example 
which they observe is erroneous. Hence another axiom of the acquisitional model is 
that children will believe that there is only a certain probability that each example 
they observe is accurate. 
3.2.4 Salience, Memorability and Location of Unique Hue Points 
It was noted above (in section 2.3) that there is a number of colours known as unique 
hues, which have a special status psychologically. These hues are at the points in the 
colour space corresponding to the best examples (prototypes) of the English words 
red, yellow, green and blue (and are commonly the prototypes of colour terms in other 
languages, as discussed in section 2.1). We should note that, in Figure 3.1, these 
colours are not evenly spaced in the conceptual colour space. This is because another 
axiom of the acquisitional theory is that the unique hues are not all equidistant. More 
precisely, it is proposed that pre-linguistically, the green and blue unique hue points 
are conceptually close together, whilst the red and blue unique hue points are the 
furthest apart of any two adjacent unique hue points, and that the red-yellow and 
yellow-green distances are intermediate. 
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The motivation for this proposal is primarily that it results in an explanation of the 
typological patterns, as will be shown below. MacLaury (1997a) reports that there is 
some evidence to suggest that the green and blue unique hues are in some way closer 
than any of the other hues are to each other, although evidence concerning the 
conceptual distances between the other unique hue points is less clear. This issue is 
problematic, because we are trying to measure distances in a subjective conceptual 
space, and there is no clear objective way to do this. MacLaury surveyed a range of 
literature, which attempted to address this issue, but from his survey it is clear that 
there is no generally agreed method for measuring distances in colour spaces.  
Furthermore, it is well established that, how people perform on some cognitive tasks 
related to colour, is affected by the way languages categorize colour. Roberson et al 
(2000, p394) state that distances within the conceptual colour space ‘are stretched or 
distorted by the influence of linguistic categories’. This indicates that relativistic 
effects might interfere with any attempt to establish the exact location of the unique 
hue points, because performance on any psychological task concerning colour 
cognition could be affected by the language spoken by the subject. Hence, the primary 
motivation for these conceptual distances is the typological evidence, because, as will 
be shown below, if these distances are incorporated into the model, the model is then 
able to explain the typological patterns.  
It is, however, worth noting that at least one measure of the distance between unique 
hues does provide some support for the locations implemented in the acquisitional 
model. Boynton and Olson (1987) gave values for the distances between the 
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centroids35 of the areas on the surface colour space named by each of the English 
basic colour terms red, yellow, green and blue. These were 6.5 between green and 
blue, 7.3 between yellow and green, 11.2 between blue and red, and 12.2 between red 
and yellow. The rank of these distances is identical to the rankings used in the model, 
except that, as noted above, in the model, blue and red are placed somewhat further 
apart than red and yellow. Boynton and Olson’s results might therefore be seen as 
providing support for the model, but we should be cautious about making such an 
interpretation, because there exist a number of different methods for measuring such 
distances, each of which produces somewhat different results (MacLaury, 1997a). 
Above it was noted that the unique hues have special properties, in that there is a 
considerable body of evidence to suggest that colours corresponding to the unique 
hues are especially salient, and are especially well remembered. This suggests that 
people would not be equally likely to remember examples of all colours when 
learning colour words, but would be more likely to remember colours when they were 
unique hues. This corresponds to another axiom of the acquisitional model, which is 
that people will forget, or will never remember, a certain proportion of example 
colours, and that the proportion of colours remembered will be greater for colours at 
unique hue points than for colours in other parts of the conceptual colour space. 
                                                 
35
 The centroids are measures of the central tendencies of all the colours which would be assigned a 
given name, so they do not correspond exactly to category prototypes, as the prototypes are not always 
in the centres of the ranges of colour named by each colour term. Boynton and Olson (1987) do not 
give equivalent figures concerning category prototypes, but the distance values for the centroids should 
give some indication of the approximate values for the distances between prototypes. 
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3.2.5 Possible Colour Term Denotations 
Finally, before we can apply the Bayesian procedure, we need to specify a range of 
possible hypotheses. In the case of learning colour words, a hypothesis will 
correspond to the range of colour that the word denotes. Such a hypothesis can vary in 
size from taking up almost none of colour space, to including the whole of the colour 
space, and can correspond to any contiguous range of colours. Gärdenfors (2000) has 
suggested that it is a general property of concepts used by humans that they do not 
denote disjoint sections of conceptual spaces, so the restriction that hypotheses must 
correspond to continuous ranges of the colour space seems reasonable 36 . It is 
                                                 
36
 This might appear to be problematic, as some researchers have claimed that colour terms exist which 
include yellow and blue but not red or green in their denotations, or which include red and green but 
not yellow or blue (McNeill, 1972; Saunders and van Brakel, 1997). The denotation of such a colour 
term would not correspond to a continuous section of the hue circle, because red and blue, and yellow 
and green, are not adjacent to each other. However, in a thorough review of the languages which 
McNeill and Saunders and van Brakel claimed contained such terms, Bailey (2001) shows that there 
are in fact no such terms in any of these languages. There is a number of different explanations as to 
why it was thought that these languages contained either yellow-blue or red-green terms. Firstly, some 
of the languages contained yellow-green-blue terms, which are not problematic because their inclusion 
of green means that the range of colours which they denote is not discontinuous. Secondly, a colour 
term might be applicable to more colours in an extended sense, but not in its basic sense. For example, 
white wine is yellow, but this does not mean that the English word white denotes both white and 
yellow, simply that it has been semantically extended so that it can be used to describe a type of wine. 
Also, colour terms may have undergone another type of semantic extension so that they have secondary 
connotations. For example, English green can mean ‘inexperienced’, and so could potentially be 
applied to both yellow and blue coloured objects, but that does not mean that its meaning has been 
extended to include both yellow and blue. Bailey noted that some of the supposed red-green or yellow-
blue terms, were simply words which had undergone one of these types of semantic extension, and so 
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proposed that children will consider all such hypotheses to be equally likely a priori, 
so that the model has no inbuilt bias to prefer colour terms corresponding to one part 
of the colour space as opposed to any another.  
This final assumption might seem problematic, because the typological evidence 
(reviewed in section 2.1) reveals that colour terms are not equally likely to denote all 
regions of the colour space. However, we should note that this axiom concerns an 
assumption which children make in order to learn colour term denotations. Children 
would not have available information concerning colour term typology, and so would 
not know which ranges of the colour space most often correspond to colour term 
denotations. In the absence of any relevant information, it seems most likely that 
children assume all denotations to be equally likely. 
3.2.6 Bayes’ Optimal Classification 
The final axiom of the theory is that people will decide which colours come within the 
denotation of a colour word using Bayes’ optimal classification (Mitchell, 1997). 
Bayesian inference was outlined above, but in order to achieve optimal performance, 
we should not just consider the single most likely hypothesis. If we want to calculate 
                                                                                                                                           
could be used to refer more widely than their core meaning would allow, giving the impression that 
they denoted discontinuous ranges of colour. Thirdly, the meanings of the terms could really be ‘pale’ 
or ‘faded’, so that they were not really basic colour terms at all. Finally, the Ainu (Japan) word hu, 
described by McNeill as a red-green term, is not a colour term at all, but in fact means ‘raw’, so this is 
a simple case of misanalysis of data. In general, the literature on colour term typology, reviewed above 
in section 2.1, does not report the existence of colour terms which have discontiguous denotations. 
Hence, there does not appear to be any clear evidence supporting the existence of colour terms 
denoting discontinuous regions of the colour space. 
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the probability that a colour term can be used to name one particular colour then we 
should add the probabilities of all the hypotheses which include that colour within the 
word’s denotation, which will determine the probability that that colour is within the 
denotation of the word. This is because the word will be able to denote that colour, no 
matter which one of the hypotheses which include the colour within their ranges is the 
correct one. So long as our assumptions are correct, this will determine the probability 
as accurately as is possible given the available data, which is why this procedure is 
termed Bayes’ optimal classification. 
3.3 The Bayesian Model 
In order to incorporate all of the above axioms into a Bayesian model, it was 
necessary to write equations for each of the terms on the right hand side of Bayes’ 
rule in equation (3.1) on page 68 above. In order to do this, it was first necessary to 
specify more precisely what form the conceptual colour space takes, and what 
properties it has. Two separate computer models were in fact implemented, both 
based on the above axioms. The key difference is that the first did not give any special 
status to the unique hue points, and so did not implement axiom four. This section 
completes the specification of this first model, leaving the details of the second 
model, which incorporates all of the axioms, until Chapter 5. 
3.3.1 Calculating Probabilities 
For the purposes of constructing the model, hues will be numbered using an arbitrary 
numbering scheme, which has its origin (zero) in the red space, and which increases 
through orange, yellow, green, blue and purple, up to 100, where we return to the 
origin, as shown in Figure 3.2. When a learner observes a colour term example, it can 
be represented simply as a point in this colour space, so in the implementation of the 
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model, colour examples will be represented simply as (possibly fractional) numbers 
between 0 (inclusive) and 100 (exclusive). 
 
Figure 3.2. Indexing Colours in the Colour Space. 
Using this coordinate system, hypotheses will be indexed as shown in Figure 3.3 
below. Each hypothesis will have a start point, s, and an end point, e. A hypothesis 
states that a colour is a correct label for all and only those colours which fall after the 
start point, and before the end point. Hence, the size of the colour space denoted by a 
colour term corresponding to a particular hypothesis will be given by (e-s). In the case 
where the range of the colour term encompasses the origin, then 100 (the size of the 
phenomenological colour space) must be added to e, as in this case the value of e 
would otherwise be less than s, resulting in a negative value for the size of the colour 
space denoted by that term. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.3. A Hypothesis as to the Denotation of a Colour Term. 
 
Figure 3.4. A Hypothesis which Crosses the Origin. 
Given the above specification of hypotheses, it is now necessary to specify how 
probable it is that the examples of the colour term would have been observed if a 
particular hypothesis were correct, or in other words how to calculate values for the 
term P(d | h) from equation (3.1) on page 68 above. Firstly we need to assume that 
  0 
extent of 
hypothesis 
  start 
end 
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92 
children make no a priori assumptions that some colours are named by colour words 
more often than other colours are, and that a colour word is equally likely to be used 
to identify colours anywhere within the range of colours corresponding to its 
meaning. Even though some colours might be better examples of a word like red than 
others, this does not mean that the colours which are the best exemplars of the word 
will be named most often, so the second of these assumptions seems reasonable. 
However, the assumption that all colours are named with equal frequency would seem 
to be somewhat more problematic, as certain colours are almost certainly more 
frequent in a person’s environment than others, and also linguistic reference to some 
colours is likely to fulfil greater purpose than reference to others. Children learning a 
language could compensate for such biases, by monitoring the abundance of particular 
colours in their environment, and so ideally the model would do so too, but the added 
complexity that this would entail seems unnecessary for present purposes. 
Given these assumptions, we can calculate how likely we would be to have observed 
each individual example. As the number of examples does not vary between 
hypotheses, we need not be concerned with considering how likely it is that we would 
have observed the actual number of examples which we did. Instead we can concern 
ourselves simply with calculating the probability that an example was observed at a 
particular point in the colour space. In order to calculate such values, we must divide 
the colour space into a finite number of sections, so that there is a non-zero 
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probability of an example being observed in each section37. Each section is of equal 
size, and the sections do not overlap (but neither is there any gap left between 
neighbouring sections). We will use q to represent the number of such sections into 
which the colour space is divided. 
If we can be sure that all the examples are accurate, then there is an equal probability 
of observing an example in any of the sections of the colour space within the range of 
the hypothesis. This probability, P(example | example is accurate), is given by 
equation (3.9). We should note that this assumes that each hypothesis begins and ends 
at the boundary between sections, rather than somewhere within a section, so that 
each section is either wholly within, or wholly outside of, the hypothesis. It will be 
shown below that the number of such sections can be made to tend to infinity, thus 
making the colour space continuous, and so this assumption is unproblematic. 
(3.9) P(example | example is accurate)=
qse )(
100
−
 
However, it would seem likely that some of the examples which a child observes 
might not be accurate, and so, if learning is to proceed successfully in the presence of 
such examples, children must have some degree of expectation that any particular 
example might not be accurate. If an example were not accurate, then a child would 
have no way of knowing whereabouts in the colour space it would be observed, and 
so it is assumed that such examples would be equally likely to occur anywhere in the 
                                                 
37
 If we regarded the colour space as continuous, then there would be a zero probability of observing an 
example at any particular point, because there is an infinite number of points at which examples could 
appear, if we measured with sufficient accuracy. 
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colour space, and this probability, P(example | example is not accurate), is given by 
equation (3.10). (We should note firstly, that, even if an example is erroneous, it could 
nevertheless come within the hypothesis simply by chance, and secondly, that 
equation (3.10) is independent of the hypothesis under consideration.) 
(3.10)
 
P(example | example is not accurate)
 
q
1
=
 
A child will not know which examples are accurate examples of the colour word, and 
which are simply random, so it is necessary to introduce a parameter, p, which 
corresponds to the degree to which a child believes an example to be accurate. This 
parameter can vary from 1, when the child will be completely certain that all 
examples are accurate, to 0, when the child believes that all examples are random. In 
the first of these situations, a single erroneous example could have a catastrophic 
effect on learning, because no matter how much it is at odds with the other examples, 
the model will never consider the possibility that it is erroneous. However, if p is set 
to zero, then no learning would occur at all, as the child would not believe that the 
examples gave any indication of the meaning of the colour word whatsoever. In this 
thesis, it is assumed that this parameter is always set to a value between these 
extremes, so that the model will believe that the examples are indicative of the 
meaning of the colour word, but it will still be able to learn even if some of the 
examples are misleading. 
Examples which fall outside of the hypothesis must be inaccurate, and so their 
probability, P(example outside of hypothesis), is given by multiplying together the 
probability that an example is not accurate, (1-p), by the probability of observing an 
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inaccurate example given in equation (3.10). The equation resulting from this 
operation is given in (3.11). 
(3.11) P(example outside of hypothesis) 
q
p)1( −
=  
If a colour example comes within the range of the hypothesis, then it may be accurate, 
in which case the equation for its probability could be derived from equation (3.9), but 
it could also be inaccurate, so that it is only within the hypothesis due to chance, in 
which case its probability could be derived from equation (3.10). However, when a 
child is learning, they will not be able to be sure which of these two situations applies, 
and so must consider each possibility according to its probability as defined by the 
parameter p. We must derive an equation for the overall probability of an example, 
based on the possibilities of it being either accurate or inaccurate, with both of these 
possibilities being weighted in accordance with their probabilities, which are p and 
(1-p) respectively. The total probability of such an example, P(example within range 
of hypothesis), will be found by adding its probability under each of these 
possibilities, which produces the equation given in (3.12). 
(3.12) P(example within range of hypothesis)
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The equations so far are all concerned with only a single example. The probability of 
all the observed examples given a particular hypothesis (P(d | h)) can be found by 
multiplying together the probabilities of each individual example. Where there are n 
examples which come within the scope of the hypothesis, and m examples which 
come outside of the hypothesis, this probability can be calculated using equation 
(3.13). 
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(3.13) 
mn
q
p
q
p
se
phdP 




 −














−+
−
=
)1(1)1()(
100)|(
 
We can extract q from the terms put to the power of n and the power of m, to create a 
new term of q to the power of n plus m. However, n plus m is always the total number 
of examples observed, and so this value will be constant across all hypotheses. 
Equation (3.13) is rewritten as (3.14) below, where r is used to represent the total 
number of examples. 
(3.14) ( )
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Before going any further, we should perhaps consider what effect the incorporation of 
the accuracy parameter will have. Consider the situation represented in Figure 3.5, 
where the purple dots represent example colours, and where each arrow corresponds 
to a hypothesis. The larger hypothesis might be expected to have a higher probability, 
because it accounts for the location of all the examples, although it does not do so 
very precisely, because it includes such a large part of the colour space. However, so 
long as the model has a reasonably high expectation that some of the examples will be 
erroneous, the other hypothesis would in fact have a higher probability. This is 
because, although it does not predict correctly the location of two of the examples, it 
predicts where the other three examples are accurately. Incorporating an accuracy 
parameter into the model means that hypotheses which are able to predict accurately 
the location of most of the examples will generally have the highest probabilities, 
even if there are a few examples outside of their range. 
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Figure 3.5. Hypothesis Probabilities with Erroneous Data. 
So far, we have specified how probabilities will be assigned to two of the three terms 
on the right hand side of Bayes' rule (equation (3.1)), but, in order to calculate the 
probability of a hypothesis, we must also be able to calculate the a priori probability 
of the data, P(d). We can do this by taking the product of the probability of the data 
given a hypothesis, and the a priori probability of the hypothesis, and finding the total 
of all these products for all the hypotheses. This is the same procedure as was applied 
in the alien example of section 3.1, though it is more complex, because we are 
considering more than two possible hypotheses. 
Ideally we do not want to divide up the colour space into a number of arbitrarily sized 
sections, as there does not appear to be any empirical motivation for doing so. Hence 
it would seem desirable that we increase the number of sections in the colour space, q, 
so that q tends to infinity, and the colour space effectively becomes continuous. P(d) 
can then be calculated using calculus, as in (3.15), where H is the set of all possible 
hypotheses. Equation (3.15) simply states that, for each hypothesis, we should 
multiply its probability by the probability of the data in terms of it, and add together 
high probability  
hypothesis 
low probability hypothesis 
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all the resulting values. However, we do this over an infinite number of hypotheses. 
(We will see below that the term q will cancel out of the equations, and so its exact 
value is unimportant.) 
(3.15) 
∈
=
Hh
dhhPhdPdP )()|()(  
We now have all the terms which we need in order to calculate the a posteriori 
probability of a hypothesis using Bayes' rule. Substituting equation (3.15) into Bayes' 
rule we obtain equation (3.16), where the hypothesis whose probability is being 
calculated is now labelled hi. All hypotheses have equal a priori probability, so the 
terms P(hi) and P(h) will cancel out. The terms P(d | hi) and P(d | h) also both contain 
the constant term qr, and so this term will also cancel, as was noted above. 
(3.16) 
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The aim of the model is not to determine the probability of any one hypothesis, but to 
determine how likely it is that any particular colour can be named with the colour 
word. We can express the probability that a particular colour, x, comes within the set 
of colours which can be named by the colour word, C, if the hypothesis hi is correct, 
using the expression P(x ∈ C | hi). However, this expression only applies when we are 
sure that hi is correct, in which case if x comes within C this expression will evaluate 
to one, and otherwise it will evaluate to zero. 
What is really needed is an expression for the probability that a colour can be named 
by the colour word which takes account of all the possible hypotheses. This can be 
achieved by using the procedure of hypothesis averaging, where the probability that a 
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colour can be named by the colour word if a particular hypothesis is correct, is 
multiplied by the probability of that hypothesis given all of the observed data. 
Equation (3.17) shows how the overall probability that the colour can be named by 
the colour word given all the data, )|( dCxP ∈ , can be found by summing over these 
products for all the hypotheses. 
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The summation can be performed using calculus, because the colour space is 
continuous. However, the number of examples which are within the hypotheses 
changes discretely at the locations of the colour space where the examples occur, and 
the value of P(x ∈ C | hi) changes discretely at the location of the colour under 
consideration. For these reasons, the value of the sum must be calculated separately 
for sections of the colour space between such points, and then these values added 
together. Integrating the equations is fairly straightforward, and the full derivations, 
together with a description of how they are applied are given in section 3.4. However, 
firstly some other issues concerning the design and application of the model are 
discussed. 
3.3.2 More than One Colour Term 
So far the model has been described with respect to only a single colour term. This is 
because the denotation of each colour term is considered independently of all the 
others. Every observation is remembered in exactly the same way. The information 
recorded is always the name of the colour term, and the colour which the term was 
used to name. In considering the denotation of each colour term, account will be taken 
only of those colour examples which the model has observed it being used to name. 
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For every possible colour, a probability can be obtained for how likely it is that it is 
within the denotation of each colour term encountered by the model. Hence, it is 
possible that the model will predict that a particular colour is very likely to come 
within the denotation of more than one colour term, or that it is very unlikely to come 
within the denotation of any colour terms at all.  
However, in most languages, basic colour terms have a property which might aid a 
child to acquire them, and that is that they partition38 the colour space. Hence a child 
might be able to learn the denotation of one colour term, helped by examples of the 
use of another colour term, as they could infer that, where the denotation of one 
colour term ended, the denotation of another would begin. However, a major problem 
with this account is that it requires children to know that the colour terms they are 
learning conform to the partition principle. Clearly once children have learned the 
basic colour terms of their language, they will be able to observe with a reasonable 
degree of confidence that they do partition the colour space, and so they may be able 
to use the partition principle to consolidate their knowledge of the denotations of 
basic colour terms, but only when the process of acquisition is nearing completion.  
If we were to propose that the partition principle played a more major role in the 
process of acquisition, then we would have to assume that children intuitively 
assumed it from the start of the acquisition process. This view would be consistent 
with the widely held belief that children are innately endowed with a Universal 
Grammar which specifies the general structure underlying all languages (Chomsky, 
                                                 
38
 By partition it is meant that the whole of the colour space is divided up so that each colour is denoted 
by one colour term. 
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1986). However, if children do have available innate knowledge of the partition 
principle, this raises a number of further problems. Firstly, while basic colour terms 
typically partition the colour space, non-basic colour terms certainly do not. Hence a 
child would not only have to determine which words were colour terms, but also 
which of those colour terms were basic before they could use the partition principle to 
help in learning their denotations39. We would also then need to provide a separate 
account of how non-basic colour terms were learned. While this thesis is concerned 
principally with basic colour terms, the Bayesian model could equally well be used as 
an explanation of how non-basic colour terms are acquired. As there does not seem to 
be any reason to believe that non-basic colour terms are learned in a fundamentally 
different way from basic ones, it would seem preferable to have a single model which 
could account for the acquisition of both types of colour term40.  
A further objection to the use of the partition principle is that, as was noted above, 
there exist a very few languages where the basic colour terms do not partition the 
colour space, and hence where some colours cannot be identified by any basic colour 
term (Kay and Maffi, 1999; MacLaury, 1997a; Levinson, 2001). Hence it would seem 
                                                 
39
 One of Berlin and Kay's (1969) original criteria for distinguishing basic colour terms from non-basic 
ones was that the denotation of a basic colour term was not included in the denotation of any other 
colour term. Hence, it might seem more likely that the partition principle is used to differentiate 
between basic and non-basic colour terms once the denotations of those terms has been learned, rather 
than that the partition principle is used to learn those denotations.  
40
 We could justify this using Occam’s Razor, which was discussed above in Chapter 2. There would 
seem to be no benefit in advocating two separate mechanisms to explain the acquisition of colour 
terms, if the acquisition of all types of colour terms could be satisfactorily explained with a mechanism. 
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that children who relied on the partition principle would simply be unable to learn 
such a language correctly, or at least that the use of the principle would have a 
detrimental effect on their performance in correctly acquiring the language. Given all 
of these arguments, it seems preferable to proceed with a model which treats each 
colour term independently. 
3.3.3 Deriving Fuzzy Sets 
As described up to the present point, the model simply determines the probability that 
a specific colour comes within the denotation of a particular colour term, but so far no 
consideration has been given to how a semantic representation of a colour term might 
be derived. However, the Bayesian model implicitly defines a fuzzy set representation 
(Zadeh, 1965) for the denotations of colour terms.  
Instead of considering the probability that individual colours are denoted by a 
particular colour term, we can consider, for each colour in the phenomenological 
colour space, the probability that it is within the denotation of the colour term. This 
will result in a probability for each colour corresponding to how likely it is that it can 
be denoted by the colour term of interest, and these values can be interpreted as 
specifying the degree of membership of the colour in the semantic category labelled 
by the colour term41. Hence these values may be used to define fuzzy membership in 
sets corresponding to the colour terms. The use of fuzzy sets as a theoretical tool in 
                                                 
41
 Kosko (1994) stresses that the degree of membership in a fuzzy set is not the same as the probability 
of membership in that set. Hence, we should, perhaps, add another axiom to the theory. This is that 
people determine how good an example of a colour word a particular colour is, by considering the 
probability that that colour can be denoted by the colour word.  
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psychology is now well established (Stelmach and Vroon, 1988), and Kay and 
McDaniel (1978) had already used them to model colour term denotations (see section 
2.3), both of which provide support for the proposal that colour terms denotations 
have fuzzy set representations. 
There is a number of interesting properties of these fuzzy sets, most obviously that for 
each set, and hence for each colour term, some colours will be members with a greater 
certainty than other colours. However, there will be a probability associated with the 
membership of every colour in every set, so that, while it will be considered that some 
colours are almost certainly not members of the set, there will always be a small 
probability associated with the possibility that they are members42. The implications 
of these properties of the colour term’s denotations are discussed in detail below, but 
now I move on to consider how the model may be practicably implemented on a 
computer. 
3.4 Implementing the Model 
While sections 3.2 and 3.3 specify the model in detail, they do not discuss how the 
model can be implemented in practice. In particular, equations (3.16) and (3.17) both 
                                                 
42
 We should note that this is a property of the fuzzy sets learned by this model, rather than a definitive 
property of fuzzy sets as such. Because the membership of the set is learned probabilistically, it is not 
possible to be entirely certain about whether any colour comes, or does not come, within the denotation 
of a particular colour term. However, in practice, people probably treat probabilities over a certain level 
as completely certain, and do not distinguish between being almost completely sure, and being 
completely sure. In reality, there is probably nothing of which we can be completely certain, as, for 
example, the whole world might be a hallucination, but this does not in practice seem to stop people 
from being ‘sure’ or ‘certain’ about many aspects of the world. 
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contain integrations, but it remains to be shown that the relevant parts of these 
equations can in fact be integrated in practice, and how these integrated equations 
may be used to determine how likely it is that each colour of interest comes within the 
denotation of each colour term. 
3.4.1 Calculating the Probability that a Colour is within the Denotation of a 
Colour Term 
If we substitute the right hand side of equation (3.16) for the term P(hi | d) in (3.17), 
we obtain the equation (3.18). 
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The value of the integral of P(d | h) with respect to dh is not dependent on the value 
of hi, and so is a constant term in the integration with respect to this variable. This 
allows equation (3.18) to be rewritten as (3.19). 
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As the term P(x ∈ C | hi) evaluates to one in the case where x comes within the 
denotation of the hypothesis hi, and to zero in other cases, the top half of the fraction 
in (3.19), is effectively a sum over P(d | h) for all ranges of the space of possible 
hypotheses in which x comes within the denotation of the hypothesis. In contrast, the 
term on the bottom of (3.19) is a sum over P(d | h) throughout the hypothesis space, 
regardless of whether x comes within the denotation of those hypotheses or not. 
Hence the equation may be written as in (3.20), where Px corresponds to the sum over 
P(d | h) for hypotheses including x in their denotations, and Pnotx corresponds to the 
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sum over this same term for hypotheses not including x in their denotations. The 
program will hence implement (3.18) by calculating Px and Pnotx, and substituting 
their values into (3.20). 
(3.20) 
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PxdCxP
+
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3.4.2 Derivation of the Integrals 
Now that the task of determining the probability that a colour comes within the 
denotation of a colour term has been reduced to determining values of sums of 
P(d | h) over specific ranges of hypotheses, and substituting these values into equation 
(3.20) above, it is necessary to consider how these sums can be calculated in practice. 
While the symbols used in this section are defined in the text, for convenience, their 
meanings are summarised in Table 3.2 below. Consider again equation (3.14) (from 
page 96), repeated here as (3.21), in which some constants have been factored out. We 
should note that above (on page 98), it was shown that any constant terms in this 
equation will cancel out, including the term q-r, and so throughout the rest of the 
derivations the term 
r
q 





100
 will simply be omitted. The formula contains the 
symbols p, n, m, s, and e. What it is important to determine for the process of 
integration, is whether these values are constant across different hypotheses, h, or, for 
those terms which are variables, in what way they will change. 
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Symbol Meaning 
n The number of examples which come within the hypothesis. 
m The number of examples which come outside of the hypothesis. 
r The total number of examples (equal to n+m).
 
d The data which is being learned from. (The set of all the examples.) 
P Used to stand for probability in general. 
p Each example is assumed to have a p probability of being accurate. 
q The number of sections into which the hypothesis space is divided. 
(This value tends to infinity.) 
h A hypothesis. 
H
 
The set of all possible hypotheses. 
Hi Any subset of the set of all hypotheses. 
s The coordinate at which a particular hypothesis begins. 
e The coordinate at which a particular hypothesis ends. 
s1 The lowest value of s which any hypothesis in a particular subset of 
hypotheses can have. 
s2 The highest value of s which any hypothesis in a particular subset of 
hypotheses can have. 
e1 The lowest value of e which any hypothesis in a particular subset of 
hypotheses can have. 
e2 The highest value of e which any hypothesis in a particular subset of 
hypotheses can have. 
Table 3.2. Summary of Symbol’s Meanings 
First of all it may be noted that p is a constant term throughout the model. n and m 
correspond to how many of the example colours come within the range of the 
hypothesis under consideration, and how many outside of it. Hence these values will 
vary between hypotheses, depending on which colour examples each hypothesis 
includes in its range, and which it excludes. These values will change discretely at 
fixed points in the hypothesis space, and so integrations over the space of hypotheses 
cannot include hypotheses for which the corresponding values of n and m would vary. 
Integrating over the whole of the hypothesis space would only be possible if an 
equation relating the values of n and m to the hypotheses could be substituted for 
these values. Hence the value of the sum over P(d | h) will have to be calculated in 
sections, with the values of the sum for different values of n and m considered 
separately.  
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At this point, it is also worth noting that we wish to derive separately the sum over 
P(d | h) for those hypotheses which include the point of interest, x, and those which 
do not. This is also a property which will change discretely at points in the hypothesis 
space, and so, similarly, it will be necessary to consider sums over areas of the 
hypothesis space where x is included in the range of the hypothesis separately to those 
where x is not included in the range of the hypothesis. 
The final two terms to consider are s and e, which correspond to the location in the 
hypothesis space of the start and the end of a hypothesis. These values define the 
particular hypothesis under consideration, and so when we sum over areas of the 
hypothesis space, we are in fact summing over equation (3.21) for ranges of the 
variables s and e. Recall from section 3.2.5 (on page 87 above) that the hypothesis 
space, H, is composed of hypotheses which may start at any point in the colour space, 
and may end at any point. Hence, when we sum over areas of the colour space, we 
must sum over equation (3.21) for a range of values of s, and for each value of s, for a 
range of values of e. Recall from section 3.3.1 (on page 89 above) that, for the 
purposes of implementation, the variable specifying the end of a hypothesis, e, will 
always have a value greater than that specifying the start, s (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 
3.4 on page 91 above). So in some cases the value of e will be greater than the size of 
the colour space (100) . In most such cases, the hypotheses include the origin in their 
range. In fact, in some cases, we will consider continuous ranges of hypotheses where 
the range of start values also crosses the origin, and in these cases the upper limit of s 
(which is labelled s2 below) will also be greater than 100, to indicate a location in the 
colour space clockwise from the origin. 
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As summing over ranges of the hypothesis space requires summing over ranges of 
two separate variables, this must be implemented using a double integration. (3.22) 
expresses how the probability of the data given a range of hypothesis is determined by 
summing over a range of the hypothesis space. However the expression h ∈ H seen in 
earlier equations, indicating that the sum takes place over the full range of hypotheses, 
is replaced by two separate integrals, specifying that the sum be taken over a specific 
range of hypotheses, which here are represented collectively as Hi. This specific area 
of the hypothesis space, Hi, contains the range of hypotheses which start anywhere 
between the points s1 and s2, and which end anywhere between the points e1 and e2. 
Throughout the rest of this thesis, I will use Hi to refer to any particular range of 
hypotheses currently under consideration.  
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If we substitute for the expression P(d | h) in (3.22), using (3.21), we obtain equation 
(3.23), which specifies exactly the integration which must be performed, in order to 
derive an equation, allowing the sum over the probabilities of a set of data to be 
calculated, for a specific range of the hypothesis space. It is now necessary to perform 
first the integration over e, and secondly the integration over s, so as to allow this 
expression to be evaluated for specific values of the parameters. 
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3.4.2.1 Integrating Over e 
We can note first that we will only use integration to sum over areas of the hypothesis 
space in which n and m do not change, and hence, for the purposes of integration 
(over both e and s), these terms, along with p, are all constants. As the value of s is 
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not dependent on the value of e, it too will be a constant for the purposes of the 
integration over e. As a first step in performing the integration, we may note that a 
constant term may be removed entirely from the scope of both the integrations, so as 
to derive equation (3.24). 
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Now it may be noted that the term to be integrated with respect to e is a binomial 
expression, so we can use the binomial expansion, as given in (3.25) to replace this 
term. (Note that the expansion of rnC  is as specified by equation (3.26).) If we equate 
a with the first part of the binomial, as in (3.27), and b with the second part as in 
(3.28), we can observe the equivalence of the term to be integrated and the left hand 
side of equation (3.25). 
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When we use expression (3.25) to substitute for the appropriate term in (3.24), the 
result is equation (3.29). 
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By removing constant terms from the scope of the integrations, and removing the 
discrete summation from the scope of the continuous ones, (3.29) can be transformed 
into (3.30). 
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We may now note that the integration to be performed is straightforward, but that it 
will have a special case when n-r is equal to one. This will be the case when r is equal 
to n-1, and so we will use the discrete summation up to only, n-2, and then include 
separate terms for when r is equal to n-1 and when r is equal to n. The resulting 
equation, after these terms have been separated out is given in (3.31).  
(3.31) 










−





 −
+





−





 −





 −
=   
−
∈
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
11
1
0
0
)(
1
100
)1(
)(
1
100
)1(
100
)1()|(
s
s
e
e
ns
s
e
e
nm
Hh
dsde
se
p
npdsde
se
pppdhhdP
i
 
                           










−





 −
+  
−
=
−
−
2
0
2
1
2
1
)(
1
100
)1(n
r
s
s
e
e
rnr
rnr
n dsde
se
ppC
 
Simplifying terms which now are now raised to the power of one, or to the power of 
zero, results in equation (3.32). 
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We must note, however, that when the binomial expansion was separated into three 
separate parts, an implicit assumption was made that n was equal to or greater than 
two, so that elements of the summation could be separated for the cases when n was 
equal to one, and when n was equal to zero, and that this would still leave at least one 
greater value of n which would be covered with the summation. However, in some 
cases n will be equal to one, or to zero, which will be so when the range of hypotheses 
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under consideration contains only a single colour example, or no colour examples at 
all. Substituting the value of zero for n in equation (3.30) results in equation (3.33), 
which is the equation to be integrated in the case that the hypotheses span no colour 
term examples at all. 
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Substituting the value of one for n in equation (3.30), results in equation(3.34), which 
is the equation to be integrated in the case that the hypotheses span only a single 
colour term example. 
(3.34) 








−
+
−





 −
=   
∈
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
)(
1
100
)1(
100
)1()|(
s
s
e
e
s
s
e
e
m
Hh
dsde
se
pdsdeppdhhdP
i
 
We may note that equation (3.33) contains an instantiation of the term corresponding 
to the first integral in (3.32) and (3.34) contains a sum of instantiations of the first and 
second integrals in the same equation. Hence, rather than proceeding with the 
integration of these equations separately from that of the equation for when n is 
greater than or equal to one, they will be derived by substituting in the appropriate 
value of n to the terms in the final integrated form of equation (3.32), and omitting 
those terms which will not appear when n is equal to one or zero. Hence, we can now 
proceed with the integration of this equation, first rewriting the final integral as in 
(3.35), so as to make the integration more transparent. 
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When the three integrations with respect to e are performed, the result is as given 
in (3.36). 
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This completes the integration over the variable e. However, before the integration 
over s is performed, it is necessary to consider what the values of the limits on the 
integration will be, as the result of the second integration will depend on whether e1 
and e2 are constants with respect to the value of s. 
3.4.2.2 Identifying the Limits on the Integration 
The nature of the limits on the integrations will be considered with reference to an 
example of generalizing from a specific set of colour examples, to a previously 
unlabeled colour. Figure 3.6 below shows a representation of the conceptual colour 
space on which are shown the colours associated with three instances of the use of the 
colour term yellow, along with the point, x. We are considering the situation in which 
we wish to calculate the probability that x comes within the denotation of the term 
yellow. 
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Figure 3.6. The Phenomenological Colour Space with Observed Colour Term Examples. 
The values of the terms n and m will differ, depending on how many examples of the 
colour term yellow are within the scope of the hypothesis. Hence, when we consider 
continuous ranges of the hypothesis space, these values will change as either the 
position of the start or the end of the hypothesis being considered passes one of these 
points. Similarly, as the position of the start or the end of the hypothesis crosses the 
point x, the property of whether the hypothesis includes or excludes that point changes. 
As the integral will not work over areas of the hypothesis space which have different 
values for the parameters n and m, and we wish to find separately the probability of 
the data summed over all hypotheses including x, and all hypotheses excluding x, we 
cannot use the equation for ranges of the colour space which cross the location of a 
colour example, or the point x. However, as we wish to consider the probability of the 
data given all the hypotheses, but, for reasons of efficiency and simplicity, making as 
few calculations as possible, with each calculation, we will always consider as large a 
range of hypotheses as is possible within these constraints. In most cases this will 
involve setting the limits on the integration to points in the colour space either where 
there is an instance of an example of the colour term, or at the location of the point x. 
  yellow 1 
yellow 2 
yellow 3 
  x 
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As an example, we can consider calculating the probability of the data given all of the 
hypotheses which include the example colours labelled yellow 1 and yellow 2 in 
Figure 3.6 above, but which exclude the point x, and the example labelled yellow 3. 
This is a case of calculating the value of 
∈ iHh
dhhdP )|( , where Hi corresponds to this 
range of hypotheses. These hypotheses are those which start after x, but before yellow 
1, and which end after yellow 2, but before yellow 3. Hence the values on the limits on 
the integrals will correspond to these four points. The first position at which a 
hypothesis may start, s1, will be the location of x, and the last position at which a 
hypothesis may start, s2, will be the location of yellow 1. The first position at which 
hypotheses may end, e1, will be yellow 2, and the last position at which hypotheses 
may end, e2, will be yellow 3. When these values are substituted into the final form of 
the equation, its evaluation will determine the value of 
∈ iHh
dhhdP )|( . 
In the above example, the limits on both s and e were all constants. This will be the 
case whenever there is at least one colour example or the point x separating the range 
of positions in which the hypothesis may start, from the range of positions in which it 
may end. The integration in such cases is completed in section 3.4.2.3 (which starts on 
page 117). However, there are some instances in which this condition does not hold, 
so the following paragraphs consider integration in these circumstances. 
Let us now consider another example, that of calculating 
∈ iHh
dhhdP )|(  when the set 
of hypotheses under consideration, Hi, corresponds to a case where there is neither a 
colour example, nor x separating the starts of hypotheses from the ends of hypotheses. 
This will be so whenever we consider hypotheses that contain all the colour examples 
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and the point x. If we consider this with respect to Figure 3.6, there are four separate 
ranges of such hypotheses. These are those hypotheses which both start and end 
between x and yellow 1, between yellow 1 and yellow 2, between yellow 2 and yellow 
3 or between yellow 3 and x. Consider as an example the case of hypotheses starting 
and ending between x and yellow 1. It might at first seem that the value of s1 would be 
x and s2 yellow 1, and that e1 would be x+100 and e2 yellow 1+100. (100 would be 
added to these latter values to indicate that the hypothesis would go all the way 
around the colour space and past the origin.) However, it is clear that these values are 
not correct when we consider the hypothesis which starts at the earliest possible point, 
x, and finishes at the latest, yellow 1. This hypothesis would go all the way around the 
colour space from x, but the last section, from x to yellow 1, would overlap itself. This 
is problematic, as the hypothesis is larger than the whole of the colour space, and 
includes some of the colours twice, which does not have a coherent meaning within 
the model.  
What is wrong with the above values on the limits of the integration, is that they do 
not take account of the fact that the end of the hypothesis must not appear more than 
one full circle around the hypothesis space from the start. It is easy to incorporate this 
restriction into the limits on the integration by setting the upper limit on the end of the 
hypotheses, e2, to s+100, rather than to yellow 1+100. Now the end of a hypothesis 
may reach all the way to yellow 1 only in the case that this is also exactly where the 
hypothesis started. Incorporating these new limits on integration into equation (3.36) 
(from page 112) results in equation (3.37). 
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However, (3.37) only applies in the case that all the colour examples are within the 
range of the hypotheses. Hence, in such cases there will be no colour examples 
outside of the range of the hypotheses, and so m will be equal to zero. Substituting 
this value into the equation results in (3.38). Integration with respect to s will now 
produce a different equation, as the upper limit on e is now no longer constant with 
respect to this integration, but is a variable dependent on s. The completion of the 
integrations in this case is presented in section 3.4.2.4 (which starts on page 121). 
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The only other situation in which there is neither a colour example nor the point x 
separating the range of possible values for the starts of the hypotheses and for the 
ends, is when there are no colour examples nor the point x within the range of the 
hypotheses. In Figure 3.6 above, there are four situations which correspond to this 
case. These are when the whole of each hypothesis is between x and yellow 1, 
between yellow 1 and yellow 2, between yellow 2 and yellow 3, or between yellow 3 
and x. We can first consider, as an example, the hypotheses within the part of the 
colour space between yellow 2 and yellow 3. It is not possible to simply set the lower 
limits on both s and e to yellow 2, and the upper limits on both these same variables to 
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yellow 3, as this would allow cases in which the end of the hypothesis came before the 
start. 
What is needed is to constrain the range of permissible endpoints of hypotheses, such 
that these may only occur in positions between the start of the hypothesis and yellow 3. 
This can be achieved by making the lower limit on e equal to s. Making this change to 
equation (3.36) (on page 112) results in equation (3.39).  
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We may note, however, that in such cases, as there are no colour examples within the 
range of the hypotheses, n will be equal to zero. Hence, in this case only the first 
integration should be included. Making this change, and setting n equal to zero, 
results in equation (3.40). The integration over s in this case is presented in 
section 3.4.2.5. 
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These three cases for different types of limits on the values of e cover all the possible 
limits on the integrations, so it is now possible to proceed with the integration of 
equations (3.36), (3.38) and (3.39) with respect to s. 
3.4.2.3 Integrating over s when the limits of e are constants  
This section completes the derivation of an equation for 
∈ iHh
dhhdP )|(  when the range 
of locations for the end of the hypotheses is separated from the range of locations for 
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the start by at least one colour point or the point x, and hence the limits on the 
integrations are all constants. Firstly, the limits on the value of e in equation (3.36) 
(on page 112) are substituted in to give equation (3.41). 
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Rewriting the third integration results in (3.42). 
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We should note that the integration of the third term will have a special case when r is 
equal to n-2, and hence it is necessary to separate this case out of the discrete 
summation. Making this change results in equation (3.43). Rewriting the equation in 
this way assumes that n is greater than or equal to three, so it will be necessary to 
consider another special case of the equation for when n is equal to two. 
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(3.43)
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Performing the integrations results in (3.44). 
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When the integrals are expanded, by substituting the values of the limits on the 
integration for s, the resulting equation is given in (3.45). This equation is correct 
when there are at least three colour examples within the range of the hypotheses being 
considered, but we also need to derive equations for when there are only two colour 
examples, when there is only a single colour example, or no colour examples at all, 
within the range of the hypotheses being considered. 
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Firstly, an equation will be derived for the case where there are no example colours 
within the range of the hypotheses, and hence n is equal to zero. As noted above, this 
equation will contain only a term corresponding to the first integral. The second 
integral is applicable only when n is greater than or equal to one, the third when n is 
greater than or equal to two, and the fourth when n is greater than or equal to three. 
When only the first integral, and the constants it is multiplied by, are included in the 
equation, and the value of zero substituted in for n, the result is equation (3.46). This 
equation applies in all instances where the limits on the integration are constants, and 
the range of hypotheses contains no colour examples. As the range of start and end 
points for the hypotheses must be separated by discontinuities, the discontinuity after 
the start but before the end must be the point x, as there cannot be a colour example 
within this range. 
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Next, an equation will be derived for the case that there is only a single colour 
example within the range of the hypotheses. As noted above, this equation can be 
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derived by including only the first two integrals. Taking the corresponding integrals 
from equation (3.45), and substituting the value one for n, results in equation (3.47). 
This equation applies in all cases where the limits on integration are constants, and the 
hypotheses contain a single colour example. 
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Finally, it is necessary to derive one more equation, for the case when the hypotheses 
include exactly two colour examples within their range. Here we take the first three 
integrals of equation (3.45), and set n equal to two. This results in equation (3.48), 
which applies in all cases where the limits on integration are constants, but where the 
hypotheses contain two colour examples. 
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Four final equations have now been derived, equations (3.45), (3.46), (3.47) and 
(3.48). These hypotheses cover all the cases in which the range of start values and the 
range of hypotheses are separated by at least one colour example or the point x, and 
were used in the final implementation of the model. 
3.4.2.4 Integrating over s when the upper limit on e is dependent on s 
In this section, equations are derived for situations in which the hypotheses under 
consideration include all of the colour examples and the point x. First, substitutions 
are made of the limits on e in equation (3.38) (from page 116), which results in(3.49).  
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As was the case for the integrations when the limits on e were both constants, the 
integration of the term in the discrete summation will have a special case when r is 
equal to n-2, and so this case must be separated out of the summation, so as to enable 
the integration to be performed. Making this change results in equation (3.50). 
(3.50)  −




 −
=
∈
2
1
1100
)1()|(
s
s
n
Hh
dssspdhhdP
i
 
                            −+−




 −
+
− 2
1
)100ln()100ln(
100
)1(
1
1 s
s
n
dssspnp  
                           
−
−
−+−




 −−
−
2
1
1
1
2
2 )100(
100
1
100
1
2
)1( s
s
n
dsssppnn  
                            
−
=
−−
−−
−






−+
−










 −
+−
+
3
0
1
1
12
1
100
1
100
1
100
)1(
1
n
r
s
s
rnrnrrn
r
n ds
ss
p
nr
pC  
When the integrations over s are performed the result is equation (3.51). 
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Finally, substituting in the limits on s produces equation (3.52). This is the equation 
which will be used to calculate 
∈ iHh
dhhdP )|(  for ranges of the hypothesis space which 
include all of the colour examples and x, where there are at least three colour 
examples. However, we also need to consider the cases where there are only two 
colour examples, where there is only a single colour example, or where there are no 
colour examples at all. 
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First the case where hypotheses contain no colour examples, and hence n is equal to 
zero, will be considered. The equation will contain only the first integral, and when 
the value of zero is substituted in for n, the result is as given in (3.53). 
(3.53) 
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However, in the case that equation (3.53) applies, that is when there are no colour 
examples within the range of the hypotheses, and hence n is equal to zero, no colour 
examples can have been observed at all, because the hypotheses must include any 
colour examples which do exist. This means that there will only be a single 
discontinuity in the hypothesis space, at the point x. So, as we will always consider 
the largest possible range of the hypothesis space that is possible with each use of an 
equation, in this case we will consider the range of hypotheses which start anywhere 
in the range from just after the point x, right round to the other side of this same point. 
Hence, the end of this range will be 100 units after the start, expressible with the 
equation s2=s1+100. Substituting into (3.53), using this equation, results in 
equation (3.54).  
(3.54) 5000)|( =
∈ iHh
dhhdP  
Equation (3.54) tells us that the sum of the probability of the data given a hypothesis, 
over the full range of hypotheses containing any single point, x, is the same, 
regardless of where in the colour space that point is, and is equal to 500043. This 
                                                 
43
 Obtaining a probability equal to 5000 may seem an impossibility. However, it should be noted that 
this is a sum over a range of hypotheses, and not the probability of any one particular hypothesis. 
Furthermore, at the beginning of section 3.4.2 it was noted that the equation to be integrated contained 
a constant term, but that this term would cancel out, and hence it has been omitted in later stages of the 
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equation may seem to be fairly meaningless, given that it applies only in the case that 
there is not any data, but it will be useful in calculating the probability that particular 
colours may be within the denotation of a colour term in the case that no colour 
examples have yet been observed44. 
The second case to consider is when there is only a single colour example. In this case 
n will be equal to one, and the corresponding equation will contain terms 
corresponding to only the first two integrals in equation (3.52). When these changes 
are made to the equation, the result is as given in (3.55). 
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Lastly it remains to derive an equation for when there are only two colour examples, 
and hence n is equal to two. This equation will include terms corresponding to the 
first three integrals of equation (3.52). Including just these integrals, and setting n 
equal to two, results in equation (3.56). 
                                                                                                                                           
derivations. This term would also modify the obtained value of 5000 if it were reintroduced, but as one 
value in it, q, tends to infinity, we cannot actually put a true correct value on the sum of probabilities 
over this range of hypotheses. 
44
 In such a case, application of the Bayesian inference procedure will reveal that each colour is equally 
likely to be within the colour word’s denotation as outside of it. This result follows from the a priori 
assumption that denotations are equally likely to be of any size, and are equally likely to occur 
anywhere in the colour space (see section 3.2.5 which starts on page 87). 
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The four final equations derived in this section, (3.52), (3.54), (3.55) and (3.56) cover 
all cases in which the range of the hypotheses include all the colour examples and x, 
and will be used in the final computer implementation of the model. 
3.4.2.5 Integrating over s when the lower limit on e is dependent on s 
This section derives an equation for 
∈ iHh
dhhdP )|(  for continuous ranges of the 
hypothesis space which contain no colour examples, nor the point x. Starting with 
equation (3.40) (from page 117 above), substituting in the values for the limits on e 
results in equation (3.57).  
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Integrating over s produces equation (3.58). 
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And substituting in the limits on s results in equation (3.59). This equation will be 
used to calculate the value of 
∈ iHh
dhhdP )|(  for all ranges of hypotheses which contain 
neither any colour examples nor the point x. 
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3.4.3 Applying the Equations 
Table 3.3 summarises the conditions under which each of the nine final equations 
derived in section 3.4.2 are applicable. They can now be used to calculate 

∈ iHh
dhhdP )|(  for all regions of the hypothesis space. The total of the results of these 
calculations for all the ranges of the hypothesis space containing x, and the total for all 
the ranges not containing x, can be calculated. (Remember that x is the location in the 
colour space for which we are calculating the probability of whether it can be denoted 
by the colour term or not.) These values can be substituted into equation (3.20) (from 
page 105) to determine the probability that the point x comes within the denotation of 
the colour term (P(x ∈ C | d)). Calculating this probability for all possible values of x, 
will give the degree of fuzzy membership of each hue within the denotation of the 
colour term, thus defining a fuzzy set. 
Number of colour 
examples within 
hypothesis space 
Hypothesis includes all the points and x, none 
of the points nor x or neither of these is the 
case. 
Equation 
>2 Neither (3.45) 
2 Neither (3.48) 
1 Neither (3.47) 
0 Neither (such a hypothesis will always contain x) (3.60) 
>2 All (3.52) 
2 All (3.56) 
1 All (3.55) 
0 All (such a hypothesis will always contain x) (3.54) 
0 None (3.59) 
Table 3.3. Summary of the conditions under which each equation applies. 
3.5 Computer Implementation 
The model was implemented on a PC running the windows operating system, using 
the C++ programming language. The source code is given in Appendix A, and the 
same model was used for the purely acquisitional investigations, and the combined 
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acquisitional and evolutionary investigations presented in Chapter 4. The execution 
speed when naming colours is cubic on the number of colour examples which a 
particular agent (artificial person) has remembered for each individual colour, and 
linear on the number of colour terms which the agent knows. Generally, on a 
computer with a CPU speed of 1.72GHz, with only a small number of colour 
examples, the program will be able to name a colour in a fraction of a second, but 
with greater numbers (for example one hundred examples), it may take several 
seconds. 
3.6 Learning the Denotation of English Colour Terms from 
Examples 
In order to investigate how the model would perform in practice, and what properties 
the learned denotations of the colour terms would have, the model was trained on the 
six chromatic basic colour terms of English, which are distinguished principally on 
the basis of their hues (that is red, orange, yellow, green, blue and purple). This 
experiment was conducted primarily to determine whether the resultant denotations 
would have prototype properties. Five examples of each of these colour terms were 
given to the model, and from these it learned the denotations shown in Figure 3.7. 
This figure gives a graphical representation of the fuzzy set denotation derived for 
each colour using the Bayesian model. 
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Figure 3.7. The Fuzzy Denotation of English Basic Colour Terms after 5 Examples, with p=0.8. 
The examples were created by randomly selecting points within ranges of the colour 
space corresponding to each colour term. The size of the denotation of each colour 
term was based on the data for English colour terms given in Berlin and Kay (1969). 
Berlin and Kay showed the extent of each colour term on an array of Munsell colour 
chips. As the Munsell system is designed to space the chips in phenomenologically 
even gradations of colour, the number of colour chips within the range of each colour 
term should be approximately proportional to the size of the part of the conceptual 
colour space that can be denoted by that colour term. (Munsell chips, and Berlin and 
Kay’s use of them, are discussed above in section 2.1.) The denotations of each colour 
term were then mapped onto the colour space of the model, so that they filled the 
whole of the colour space, and yet the size of each was proportional to its extent on 
Berlin and Kay's array of Munsell chips. The denotation of red began at hue 0, 
followed by the denotations of orange, yellow, green and blue in that order, and 
finally ending with purple, the denotation of which finishes at hue 100, which, due to 
the circular nature of the colour space, is also hue 0. The actual ranges of each 
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denotation are given below in Table 3.4. In order to simulate inaccuracy in the data, 
and to allow for the fact that colour term's extensions are not in reality so precisely 
and consistently delineated, each example was then randomly moved within the range 
of plus or minus five units45. The accuracy parameter, p (introduced in section 3.3.1 
above), was set to 0.8, so that the model would have an expectation that 80% of 
examples would be accurate, and that 20% would be positioned at random. 
Range of denotation Colour Term 
Start End 
red 0 13 
orange 13 30 
yellow 30 56 
green 56 80 
blue 80 91 
purple 91 0 
Table 3.4. The Ranges of the Denotations for the English Colour Terms Taught to the Model. 
The horizontal axis in Figure 3.7 corresponds to the range of colours in the conceptual 
colour space, from red to orange, yellow, green, blue, purple and finally back to red. 
(As the colour space is circular, the left and right edges of the graph represent 
                                                 
45
 We should note that this has introduced a form of noise into the model, but that this noise is in a form 
that is very different to what the model expects. The model expects noise to be completely random, and 
below in Chapter 7 an investigation is made of the effect of adding that kind of noise to the model. 
However, arguably the kind of noise introduced here is more realistic, as it simulates the situation in 
which the speakers of the language who are the source of the data have all learned slightly different 
denotations for the colour terms, which is what is normally observed when the colour term denotations 
known by several speakers of a language are investigated empirically. Probably in reality both kinds of 
noise are present in input data, as if a hearer mistook the referent of a colour term, we would expect the 
colour associated with that term to be completely random, as it would be the colour of some object 
other than the one that the speaker had intended to label using the colour term. 
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adjacent points in the colour space.) The vertical axis represents the probability with 
which the learner believes that each colour comes within the denotation of each 
colour term. Therefore values on this axis range from zero at the bottom of the graph, 
indicating that a colour is definitely not within the range of a colour term, to one at the 
top, indicating that it definitely is. These values may alternatively be interpreted 
simply as the degree of membership of each colour within the categories 
corresponding to the colour terms. For every colour term, the probability that it could 
be used to denote each colour was calculated, and so there are no sudden jumps in the 
degree of membership of neighbouring colours. Hence, when these values are plotted 
on the graph, they form continuous curves. 
From Figure 3.7, we can observe some important properties of the learned denotations. 
Firstly, we can see that each colour category has a single prototype. In Figure 3.7, the 
prototypes locations are all marked by an ×. Consider, for example, the curve 
corresponding to the colour term yellow. This curve rises to a single peak near the 
middle of the graph, where the learner is very sure that that colour can be referred to 
by the term yellow, and this would appear to correspond to the colour which is the 
prototype of this person's yellow category. However, on either side of the prototype, 
the curve falls away, showing that the probability that a colour is a member of the 
category yellow decreases the further the colour is away from the prototype. There is a 
range of colours which the person is almost certain come within the denotation of 
yellow (where the yellow curve is very high), and there is a section of the colour space 
which the person thinks is unlikely to come within the denotation of yellow (where the 
curve drops low down).  
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In between the ranges of colour about which the person is fairly confident of whether 
they can be denoted by yellow or not, are colours which may be considered marginal 
examples of the colour term, especially where the curve is near the 0.5 level. These 
points correspond to colours which the person considers are equally likely to come 
within the denotation of the colour term as to be outside of its scope. Hence we can 
see that the denotations have another key property of prototype categories besides 
prototypes, and that is that they have fuzzy boundaries. Moving between these fuzzy 
edges of the category and the prototype, colours become better exemplars of the 
category as they get more similar to the prototype. 
If we look at areas close to the boundaries of two colour terms, for example the 
boundary between blue and purple towards the right of Figure 3.7, we can see that 
there are colours which are considered more likely than not to be within the 
denotation of more than one colour term. This has occurred because the model has 
tended to overextend the colour categories, and this effect has been most severe for 
the smallest categories. This is because a priori a learner considers the denotation of 
all colour terms to be equally likely to be of any possible size, and hence the average 
size for all possible hypotheses is equal to half the colour space. As the person has 
observed only five examples of each colour term, the model has been influenced to a 
very large extent by the a priori assumptions made in assigning probabilities to 
hypotheses. 
Next, it was investigated how a person's representation of colour term denotations 
would change once they had observed more examples of a word's use. Fifteen more 
examples of each colour term were added to the model, and the resulting denotations 
are shown in Figure 3.8. The main difference between this graph and Figure 3.7 is that 
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the model is now much more certain about which colours come within the denotation 
of each colour term, and which do not. There are areas where the curves come very 
close to the top of the graph, where they are very flat, because in these areas the 
model is almost completely certain that the colours come within the denotation of the 
corresponding colour term. (While on the graph it may look as though the curves are 
completely flat at these points, and that they have reached all the way to the top of the 
graph, actually they are just very close to the top. If reference is made to the points 
from which they were plotted, it can be seen that each curve still rises to a single peak, 
and the degree of membership decreases very slowly on each side of this point.) 
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Figure 3.8. The Fuzzy Denotations of English Colour Terms after 20 Examples, with p=0.8. 
We can also see that the model is almost completely certain that some colours cannot 
be labelled with particular colour terms. This is the case in areas of the graph where 
the curves are very close to zero, running along the bottom of the graph. As the 
learner now had more data available from which to learn, they were able to determine 
the correct denotation of the colour terms with a greater degree of accuracy, and so 
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whether a colour is a member of a colour category is only really in doubt for a small 
range of colours. However each category still retains the overall prototype structure: 
colours have varying degrees of membership, and each category has a single best 
example, and some marginal examples.  
Further experiments have determined that colour terms can equally well be learned by 
the model, no matter where in the colour space their denotations are, and that the 
model is able to learn colour terms covering much larger parts of the colour space 
than the English terms do. (Languages with fewer colour terms would have such 
colour terms, as in such languages, each term must denote a larger range of colours.) 
However, the general findings concerning prototype effects are also applicable to such 
colour terms. Therefore, it seems that the model is able to learn the basic colour term 
system of any language, at least in so far as the colour term system can be represented 
in the one-dimensional colour space. 
3.7 Learning with Unreliable Data 
Given the success of learning the English colour terms from reliable evidence, it was 
decided to investigate to what extent the model would be able to learn if it was 
presented with data which contained a large proportion of erroneous examples. As 
noted in section 3.2.3, it is important that the model is able to learn when presented 
with inaccurate data, as it is likely that this is similar to the situation in which children 
learn the meanings of words.  
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The examples given to the model were generated in the same way as in section 3.6, 
but this time only the denotation of green was considered46. A comparison was made 
between the denotation learned when the model was presented with only accurate 
examples, and when it was given an equal number of accurate and random examples. 
In all cases the accuracy parameter was set to 0.5, so that a learner would have the 
same expectation of encountering random examples, as of encountering accurate ones.  
The learned denotations, together with the exact position of each example, are shown 
in Figure 3.9. We can see that when the model was presented with just five accurate 
examples, a denotation is learned which assigns very high degrees of membership to 
colours which are within the correct denotation of green, and low degrees of 
membership to other colours. 
                                                 
46
 The choice of green was completely arbitrary, and these results should be equally applicable to other 
colour terms. 
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Figure 3.9. The Fuzzy Denotations Learned for Green, with p=0.5. 
When five random examples are present, as well as the five accurate ones, we can see 
that the model is unsure of the limits of the denotation. While the prototype remains in 
approximately the right place, the degree of membership of colours declines more 
gradually moving away from this point. Never does the degree of membership get 
below 0.4, so in this situation a learner would not be sure that any colour could not be 
named by the colour term. This problem has arisen because the model has no way of 
distinguishing between which examples are accurate and which are not, and so it will 
not be certain which examples really come within the denotation. 
However, we can see that the situation changes dramatically if we add a further five 
accurate examples, even if they are accompanied by a further five random ones. Now 
the model's performance at determining the denotation correctly is almost as good as 
if it had only observed the accurate examples. With this greater number of examples, 
the cluster within the correct denotation of green becomes clearer, and the model is 
able to decide with quite a high degree of confidence that examples outside of this 
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range are erroneous. Hence, we can see that just a small increase in the number of 
examples allowed the model to learn accurately, despite the fact that half of those 
examples were erroneous. 
3.8 Robustness of the Model to Random Noise 
Having seen that the system is able to learn when presented with data containing a 
large proportion of misleading examples, it was decided to investigate more 
rigorously to what extent the learning process was robust in the face of large 
quantities of random noise. This was done by adding varying levels of random noise 
to the input data, and measuring how accurately the model determined the target 
category in each case. 
A target category of size 30 was created for the model to learn (the whole colour 
space being 100 units wide)47. Examples of this category were generated in the same 
way as for the English colour categories, but varying amounts of completely random 
examples were added to the training data to simulate noise48. The parameter, p, was 
                                                 
47
 The decision to make the category 30 units wide was arbitrary. However, 30 units probably 
corresponds roughly to the size of many real colour categories. 
48
 It should be noted that noise is used differently here to the way in which it is typically used within 
the machine learning community. I count any example which is random as noise, but some of these will 
in fact be accurate simply by chance. In contrast, in the machine learning literature, typically only 
examples which are inaccurate are counted as noise, so in this case that would be examples falling 
outside of the target category. (As machine learning research is usually performed on empirical data, it 
would often be impossible to separate examples which are accurate by chance from those which 
accurate for any other reason.) 
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adjusted, so that it always accurately reflected the proportion of examples which was 
accurate, so that the model had advance knowledge of how reliable the data was, 
though it did not know which particular examples were accurate and which were not. 
The model was judged to have correctly categorized a colour, if the colour came 
within the category, and was assigned a degree of membership of greater than 0.95, or 
if the colour came outside of the category, and it was assigned a degree of 
membership of less than 0.05. If a colour was assigned a degree of membership 
between 0.05 and 0.95, then that colour would be considered not to have been 
classified. Examples were wrongly classified if they were assigned a degree of 
membership greater than 0.95, but were in fact outside of the category, or if they were 
assigned a degree of membership of less than 0.05, but came within the category. 
The results of these experiments are given in Figure 3.10, which shows the proportion 
of colours classified accurately, and left unclassified, when the level of noise in the 
data varied from 20% to 80%, and the number of accurate training examples observed 
varied from 5 to 30. The program was run twenty times in each condition, and the 
values plotted in the graph are averages over all the runs in each condition. These 
examples would in each case be accompanied by the number of random examples 
needed to simulate the appropriate level of noise (see Table 3.5). The results were 
derived from sampling at 100 evenly spaced points in the colour space, and in each 
case investigating whether that colour was classified by the model as coming within 
the colour category, outside of the colour category, or whether the model did not 
classify that colour at all. If we viewed these experiments from the perspective of the 
standard machine learning test data–training data paradigm, then these 100 points 
would correspond to a stratified sample of 100 test data items, each of which has to be 
139 
classified. The results from which Figure 5 was plotted are shown together with their 
standard deviations in Table 3.5. 
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Figure 3.10 Accuracy of Learning with Noisy Data 
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5 20 0 0 0 0 99.9 0.654 0.150 0.654 
10 40 0.200 0.872 0.600 2.62 93.3 15.3 5.90 12.8 
15 60 0 0 0 0 85.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
20 80 0.450 1.43 0 0 79.0 16.8 20.6 16.4 
25 100 0.300 1.31 0 0 60.3 25.1 39.5 25.1 
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30 120 0.450 1.43 0.200 0.872 57.6 23.2 41.8 23.0 
5 5 0 0 0 0 92.1 8.37 7.90 8.37 
10 10 0.450 1.36 0 0 71.9 17.1 27.7 16.9 
15 15 0.200 0.678 0 0 49.6 21.1 50.3 21.1 
20 20 0 0 0.300 1.31 33.0 18.3 66.7 18.0 
25 25 0 0 0.0500 0.218 20.9 14.4 79.1 14.4 
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30 7 0 0 0 0 10.7 3.02 89.4 3.02 
Table 3.5. Means and Standard Deviations Showing Precision and Accuracy of Learning with 
Noisy Data. (Accuracies are to 3s.f., and results are averages over 20 runs.) 
We can see that, as more training examples are observed, a higher proportion of 
colours is correctly classified. Also, if a higher proportion of training examples are 
accurate, this leads to more accurate classification. However, even when 80% of the 
data are random, once 30 accurate training examples have been observed (by which 
time 120 random training examples would also have been seen), over 40% of test 
colours are classified accurately. When 50% percent of the data was accurate, the 
model achieved very good performance with 30 accurate training examples, correctly 
classifying over 80% of the test colours. 
Of course, classifying a high proportion of examples accurately would not be an 
impressive result if a large proportion of examples were also classified inaccurately. 
However, we can see from Table 3.5 that there was a very low level of error in 
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making classifications. The highest proportion of test colours which were ever 
classified inaccurately, in any condition, was 0.8%. (This was when 80% of examples 
were random, and only 10 accurate examples had been observed, and 0.8% is an 
average, based on all 20 runs of the system in this condition.) In most cases, there 
were even fewer colours classified inaccurately, and in many cases none at all. So we 
can see that learning can proceed with a very high degree of precision even in the 
presence of large quantities of noise. When there are very high levels of noise in the 
training data, or when there is only a small number of training examples available, a 
large proportion of test colours are left uncategorized. However, even in such 
conditions, very few examples are classified incorrectly.  
It is often reported that children are able to learn accurately in the face of very noisy 
data (Siskind, 1997), though whether they can really learn with the very high levels of 
noise used in these experiments is an interesting question. Resolving this issue would 
involve empirical investigations concerning exactly what input children receive, or 
what they are able to learn from input which was intentionally made noisy. Both of 
these possibilities go beyond the scope of this thesis, so they will be left as possible 
future research goals. 
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Chapter 4  
Comparing Acquisitional and 
Evolutionary Simulations 
So far, all of the experiments conducted with the Bayesian model have investigated 
whether it can learn real colour term systems of the types which have been observed 
in the world’s languages. However, some authors have suggested that an acquisitional 
linguistic theory should do more than simply account for how attested languages can 
be learned. In section 2.2 it was noted that Chomsky (1972, 1984, 1986, 1995) has 
argued that an acquisitional theory should be largely responsible for explaining, not 
only how attested languages are learned, but also why we do not see languages of 
unattested types. This section investigates whether the acquisitional model correctly 
predicts the existence of only the attested types of colour term systems, or whether the 
range of attested languages is better explained when an evolutionary dimension is 
incorporated into the theory, as was proposed by Hurford (1987, 1990). 
4.1 Learnable Colour Term Systems 
In order to investigate whether the acquisitional model was able to explain the 
properties of colour term systems, it was investigated whether it could learn colour 
term systems which had properties inconsistent with the colour term systems of real 
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languages. If the model were not able to learn such systems, then this would provide 
an explanation as to why such systems are not seen in real languages, but if it were 
able to learn them, then it would have failed to have explained why those types of 
colour term system do not exist49. The model was tested with respect to two key 
properties of colour term systems: prototype properties and partition. 
Figure 4.1 shows one colour term system which was learned by the Bayesian model, 
but which is not of a type reported in empirical studies. The colour terms were learned 
by first deciding on a section of the colour space which was to correspond to the 
denotation of each word, and then selecting random example colours from within 
these parts of the colour space, and presenting them to the model50. We can see that 
the colour term system shown in Figure 4.1 contains two overlapping colour terms, 
which both denote hues in the red and yellow part of the colour space. The model has 
observed ten examples of each of these colour terms, and using these it has been able 
to determine roughly which colours come within each term's denotation. We can see 
that both of these terms display the prototype properties which are characteristic of 
basic colour terms. Each term rises to a single point which is the best example of the 
term, but the degree of membership in the colour term category declines gradually 
                                                 
49
 We should note that a theory of colour term acquisition also needs to be able to account for the 
acquisition of attested colour term systems, but it was shown in Chapter 3 above that it is able to do 
this, so there is no need to repeat the demonstration here. 
50
 In all the examples in this section and in section 4.2, the accuracy parameter, p, was always set to 
0.5. 
 
144 
moving away from that point. (It may be difficult to determine the exact location of 
the prototypes from the graph alone. This is because the graph is only drawn with 
limited accuracy, and so the curves may appear flat on top. However, reference to the 
values from which the graph was plotted, reveals the exact locations of the prototypes, 
which have been marked on the graph.) 
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Figure 4.1. A Learnable Colour Term System of a Type which is Unattested Typologically. 
 (×’s mark prototype locations and p=0.5.) 
In contrast, the colour term on the right hand side of the graph has quite different 
characteristics. This colour word was learned from examples generated in the same 
way as for the other two colour words, but in this case the model has observed 60 
examples of colours named by the colour term. There is a range of hues for which the 
model has a very high degree of certainty that they are members of the colour 
category, and in this part of the graph the curve is almost completely flat, and right at 
the top of the graph. However, for almost all other colours, the model is very certain 
that they cannot be named by the colour term, which is indicated by the curve being 
very close to the bottom of the graph. There are only a very few colours for which the 
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degree of membership is at an intermediate value, and so the boundaries of the colour 
category are demarcated by almost vertical lines.  
This colour term does not have prototype properties, as it does not have fuzzy 
boundaries, and the degree of membership of colours in the category is almost 
completely constant throughout its denotation. (The degree of membership does in 
fact rise to a single maximum close to the centre of the colour category, but this 
cannot be seen on the graph, because both the colour with the greatest degree of 
membership, and those immediately surrounding it, have almost identical degrees of 
membership). This colour term clearly does not resemble the colour terms seen in real 
human languages, which shows that the Bayesian model is able to learn languages 
with properties which are unattested typologically. 
If we look at the colour term system as a whole, we can identify another property of 
this system which is not in accord with the colour term systems which have been 
observed in real languages, and that is that the colour terms do not partition the colour 
space. Rather than having a single word which can be used to name each range of 
colour, we have two overlapping colour terms, with their prototypes in almost the 
same part of the colour space, something which is not usually observed in real 
languages51. There is a further inconsistency between this colour term system and 
those observed in real languages, and that is that there are large gaps between the 
                                                 
51
 As mentioned above, MacLaury (1997a) identified the coextension phenomenon that is seen in some 
languages, in which two overlapping colour words denote roughly the same range of colours. However, 
in such cases, each colour term tends to have its prototype in a different part of the colour space, so this 
phenomenon does not correspond to the case of the overlapping colour terms seen here. 
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overlapping colour terms and the other term, so that many colours are left without any 
corresponding linguistic label. In contrast, empirical evidence shows that colour terms 
almost always partition the colour space, so that for every colour there is a 
corresponding colour word which may be used to name it 52 . If Figure 4.1 
corresponded to a real language, then we would expect to observe a series of colour 
terms, with little or no gap between them, and only minimal overlapping of 
neighbouring terms. 
4.2 Evolvable Colour Term Systems 
The results of section 4.1 clearly show that the acquisitional model alone is 
insufficient to explain the empirical data concerning colour term universals, and so 
the program was extended so that it could model not only learning, but also the social 
processes in which language is used, and through which it is passed on to each new 
generation of speakers. Rather than just using a single model of acquisition, and 
presenting it with random examples, multiple copies of the model were created in 
order to simulate a whole community of people. In all the simulations reported in this 
                                                 
52
 As noted in 2.1, Kay and Maffi (1999) and Levinson (2001) do report the existence of a very small 
minority of languages in which the colour terms do not appear to partition the colour space. However, 
such colour term systems are exceptional, so it would seem that we are more in need of an explanation 
of why almost all languages partition the colour space, rather than an explanation of why a minority do 
not. Once an explanation of why partition occurs has been developed, we may then be able to explain 
non-partition as a chance occurrence, especially if the explanation relies on rules which only make 
statistical rather than absolute predictions. 
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chapter, ten artificial people were used53. These artificial people were then made to 
talk to each other, and to learn from one-another. This process was simulated over a 
number of generations, until eventually the simulation was stopped and the properties 
of the emergent language were examined. 
In the initial state of the model, each person had observed a single random colour 
anywhere in the colour space, together with a colour word which had been used to 
name it. Initially the colour words known by each person were all different, so that 
there would be no coherent language in the community. Each person was assigned a 
random age, varying from zero to the maximum age to which people in the simulation 
could live. The procedure through which the simulation proceeds is outlined in Figure 
4.2. Firstly a speaker and a hearer were chosen at random (the only restriction being 
that these could not both be the same person). A colour for the speaker to name would 
then be chosen, also at random, and the speaker would find the word which they 
thought most likely to be a correct label for the colour54. This word, together with the 
corresponding colour, would then be observed by the hearer, and remembered by 
                                                 
53
 Varying the number of people used in the simulations does not appear to have a significant effect on 
the results, but as the number of people is increased the program tends to run more slowly. Clearly a 
real language community would contain more than ten people, but increasing the number of people 
simulated would not seem to be necessary for present purposes. 
54
 At first each person only knows one word, so they will have to say that word, but as soon as they 
have remembered examples of more than one word, they will then choose a word according to the 
examples they have observed, and the colour which is being named. 
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him55 as an example. He would then use this example to help determine the best word 
to choose when it came to be his turn to be the speaker. This procedure was then 
repeated many times, to simulate people talking to each other and using colour terms. 
However, one time in every thousand, instead of the speaker choosing the best word 
based on the observations they had made, they would be creative instead, and make 
up a completely new word. This occasional creative behaviour is necessary, because 
otherwise there would be no way for new words to enter the language, or for the 
overall number of terms known within the community to increase. 
                                                 
55
 For convenience I refer to all artificial people in the simulation as though they were male, although, 
as no distinction is made in the model concerning the sex of the artificial people, this decision is 
completely arbitrary. 
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Figure 4.2. Outline of the Evolutionary Algorithm. 
(P stands for the probability of making each choice.) 
A parameter in the model controlled how long each person lived for, measured in 
terms of how many times a person would speak during their lifetime. The actual life 
span of each person was varied randomly, by an amount of up to 20% either above or 
below the chosen average life span. Once a person reached the end of their life span, 
they would be replaced by a new person with an age of zero, who had not observed 
Yes (P=0.001) 
The Speaker makes up a new 
word to label the colour. 
A speaker is chosen. 
A hearer is chosen. 
A colour is chosen. 
Start 
Decide whether 
speaker will be 
creative. 
No (P=0.999) 
The speaker says the word which they think is 
most likely to be a correct label for the colour 
based on all the examples which they have 
observed so far. 
The hearer hears the word, and 
remembers the corresponding colour. 
This example will be used to determine 
the  word to choose, when it is the 
hearer’s turn to be the speaker. 
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any colour term examples. (If a person should ever be chosen as the speaker before 
they had observed any colour terms, then the program would just go back and choose 
another person instead.) 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the result of one experiment, where the simulation was run for a 
period of time equal to ten average life spans, and where, on average, each person 
heard 60 examples during their lifetime. This graph shows the colour words learned 
by one person in this simulation who was near the end of his life span. It shows that a 
language has evolved which has six colour terms, each of which is focused in a 
different part of the colour space, and each of which has prototype properties. Most of 
these terms were those known by the people at the start of the simulations, but the 
parts of the colour space in which these colour terms have their denotations does not 
appear to be related to where the initial examples of these terms were located. At the 
beginning of the simulation, each person only knows one colour term, so they will use 
that term to name the whole of the colour space. Hence, we would expect initial 
naming behaviour to be fairly random, until a coherent colour term system becomes 
established. However, even after this point, semantic drift occurs, so that the 
denotations of each colour term tend to move in the colour space, and after a number 
of generations, the range of colours denoted by each term may change completely. 
Two of the colour terms in this simulation were ones that had been created after the 
simulation had begun (by speakers making up new colour terms), and which had then 
become established in the language. These terms may well have displaced established 
colour terms, which would then have been lost from the language. 
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The terms roughly partition the colour space, dividing it up so that there are only 
small overlaps or gaps between the colour terms. All the other people in the 
simulation who had observed more than 30 examples, had learned similar colour term 
systems, each containing the same six terms. (Although the location of the category 
prototypes and boundaries varied somewhat between people, as each would have 
observed a unique set of examples.) The colour term systems of the youngest 
members of the community were more variable, as these people would not have 
observed enough data to determine accurately the correct denotation for all the colour 
terms, and may not even have observed any examples at all of some terms. 
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Figure 4.3 A Colour Term System which Emerged in an Evolutionary Simulation. (p=0.5) 
The simulation has produced a colour term system which appears to have the general 
properties of colour term systems found in real languages, in that it partitions the 
colour space, and each term clearly has prototype properties 56 . Repeating the 
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 Clearly the simulations do not explain all the reported properties of colour term systems, most 
obviously because they make no attempt to explain the typological data of the type reported by Berlin 
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simulation produced similar results, although there was some variation as to the exact 
number of colour terms which emerged. We might expect that if people observed 
more colour term examples during their lifetimes, then towards the end of their lives 
they would learn the denotations of the words with a very high degree of confidence 
and precision. This would cause words to lose their prototype properties and become 
like the rightmost term in Figure 4.1.  
However, this does not happen in practice during the evolutionary simulations. When 
the average number of examples which a person observes during their lifetime is 
increased, the emerging colour term systems tend to have more words, and so the 
number of examples of each word observed by each speaker remains more or less 
constant. Conversely, decreasing the number of examples observed by each speaker 
tends to produce colour term systems with fewer colour terms, but again people will 
observe a similar number of examples of each term. The relationship between the 
number of colour examples people observe during their lifetime, and the number of 
colour words in their languages, is investigated more thoroughly in section 6.3, but 
here we should just note that the mechanism through which language is transmitted 
between generations appears to control the number of colour terms, and hence ensures 
that all colour terms will always have prototype properties. 
                                                                                                                                           
and Kay (1969). Before learning begins, the colour space in the present model is completely uniform, 
and so gives no special status to any particular colour, and hence there is no possibility of the model 
explaining why colour terms tend to be focused on particular locations in the colour space. It will be 
shown below in Chapter 6 that, when unique hue points are added to the model, as was proposed in 
section 3.2.4, the model is then able to account for much of the typological data. 
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4.3 Implications of the Results 
The results of the simulations of sections 3.6, 4.1 and 4.2 clearly show that both 
partition and non-partition colour term systems are learnable by the acquisitional 
model, as are colour terms with prototype properties and those without. As empirical 
observations have found that languages do generally partition the colour space, and 
that basic colour terms do have prototype properties, it would appear that the 
acquisitional model fails to sufficiently constrain the range of learnable languages.  
That, at least, is the view consistent with Chomsky's (Chomsky 1986) focus on 
language acquisition, and on speakers’ individual knowledge of language, as the 
primary objects of study in linguistics57. This is because, if we took as our primary 
data colour term systems of the type which emerged in the evolutionary simulations, 
we would reach the conclusion that people are equipped with an innate Language 
Acquisition Device which forces the learned colour term systems to both partition the 
colour space, and to have prototype properties, as all the systems which emerged in 
these simulations had those properties. However, in the case of the simulations 
reported here, we can see that any such conclusion would be completely incorrect, as 
there is nothing in the acquisitional model which gives any preference to learning 
colour term systems which conform to the property of partition, and the model is quite 
capable of learning colour term denotations which do not have prototype properties. 
The simulations therefore demonstrate that I-language (see section 2.2), is too narrow 
a concept to allow us to understand the observed properties of colour term systems. 
                                                 
57
 Chomsky’s approach to linguistics, and the concepts of language which he defines, were introduced 
in section 2.2. 
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The extensions which Hurford (1987, 1990) makes to Chomsky's model of language 
acquisition are uncontroversial, in that it is clear that we learn language from other 
people, and so the language which provides the input to our Language Acquisition 
Devices will be determined by other individual's I-languages, and the social context in 
which language is used. What is controversial about Hurford's model is whether it is 
necessary to consider the diachronic perspective when understanding central aspects 
of synchronic language58. In my evolutionary simulations of colour term systems 
(section 4.2), we saw new properties emerging which were not predictable from the 
properties of the acquisitional model. This demonstrated that, at least in this situation, 
the social processes in which language is used are as important as individual 
psychology for understanding the properties of colour term systems. This is clearly 
supportive of de Saussure's (de Saussure, 1959/1916) view that language is 
simultaneously a social and a psychological phenomenon. It seems that we can only 
understand the synchronic properties of language through considering the diachronic 
processes of language evolution, although the nature of diachronic change is 
determined by synchronic processes. 
This discussion about the need for the psychological model to be placed within a 
social simulation in order to explain the data adequately relates to the particular 
acquisitional model developed in this thesis. However, there are almost certainly 
significant differences between how the acquisitional model learns colour terms, and 
how people learn them. This raises the question of how general this result is, or 
whether with a significantly different model, which potentially could more closely 
                                                 
58
 Synchronic and diachronic were defined in section 2.2. 
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reflect the actual psychological processed being modelled, both partition and 
prototypes would emerge, even when no social aspects of language were modelled. 
Such a model would have to explain these properties as arising from the 
psychological process through which the input data is mapped to create the learners 
knowledge of the language. This would involve showing that when a model was 
presented with input data, it always produced a grammar with the partition and 
prototype properties. It is common in linguistics to assume that linguistic universals 
must exist because languages with alternative properties simply are not learnable (for 
example Nowak, Komarova and Niyogi, 2002). However, as discussed in sections 2.1 
and 4.1, there appear to exist a small number of languages for which partition does 
not apply, so for any purely acquisitional model to provide an adequate account of 
partition, it would have to achieve partition with almost all, but not quite all input 
data. 
However, non-partition appears to be a relatively stable phenomenon in some 
languages, and this is presumably because the learners of those languages receive 
input reflecting this from other speakers of the language. Therefore it would seem that 
it is unproblematic for input data received by a learner to map to an adult grammar 
with a non-partition colour term system, and so whether a learner learns a partition or 
a non-partition language depends on the language spoken by other speakers in their 
community. Such an explanation therefore necessarily requires a model with a social 
dimension, as it makes reference to input received from other speakers. In contrast, as 
far as I am aware, all colour terms in all languages have prototype properties. So it 
could be that the only type of representations for colour terms that humans are capable 
of learning is a prototype one. If this is the case, the correct explanation of the 
prototype properties of colour terms would be purely in terms of a psychological 
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process, either concerning colour term acquisition, or representation, or both. 
Therefore it would seem that this chapter has provided stronger evidence that a social 
explanation of language is needed with regard to the property of partition, as 
compared to the phenomenon of prototype properties. 
I believe that this model also exemplifies the value of the computational evolutionary 
modelling methodology59 in helping us to gain a better understanding of language. 
Surprising new properties emerged in the evolutionary simulations – properties which 
it would have been difficult to predict simply by extrapolating from the properties of 
the acquisitional model. This raises some interesting questions regarding other 
computational models of language acquisition. For example, Ellefson and 
Christiansen (2000) constructed a recurrent neural network which they used to model 
the acquisition of syntactic rules concerning question formation. They found that the 
neural network could learn simple artificial languages, in which the question 
formation rules were of the type found in real languages, better than it could learn 
artificial languages in which the question formation rules violated universal 
constraints on the syntax of question formation. They suggested that this learning bias 
has caused languages to evolve in such a way that they all conform to what now 
appears to be a universal rule. However, in the light of the findings of this chapter, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether Ellefson and Christiansen's model would 
in fact produce languages with the predicted properties if a community of speakers 
                                                 
59
 By computational evolutionary modelling, I simply mean any approach that simulates a process of 
evolution on a computer, including all of the expression-induction models discussed above in 
section 2.4. 
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was modelled over several generations, and whether any other unexpected properties 
would emerge. At present, most acquisitional models take too much time to learn to 
make such simulations practicable, but as computers become more powerful there will 
be increasing opportunities to make use of this kind of evolutionary methodology. 
In conclusion, this chapter has presented evidence which suggests that colour term 
systems partition the colour space as a result of diachronic processes. The simulations 
therefore do not provide any evidence to support the hypothesis that a component of 
the Language Acquisition Device, or any aspect of the ontogenetic process, prevents 
us from learning basic colour terms which either overlap, or which leave large ranges 
of colour without any corresponding colour term60. This is because, partition in the 
simulations clearly does not emerge as a result of the non-learnability of non-partition 
languages, and so, in the languages emerging in the simulations, partition in the model 
is clearly not due to learnability constraints imposed by the Language Acquisition 
Device. It was also proposed that the mechanism that we use to learn colour terms 
may be equally able to learn colour terms which have prototype properties, as ones 
which do not. Colour terms in real languages may have prototype properties only 
because of the social processes which moderate the number of colour terms which 
emerge in a language. In general, the synchronic properties of a language may best be 
understood by placing the language in a diachronic context, and so using existing 
acquisitional models as part of an evolutionary simulation may increase their 
                                                 
60
 We should note, however, that neither does the model provide evidence that the Language 
Acquisition Device does not impose the constraint that acquired languages must be partition languages. 
It is quite possible that the acquisitional model used in these simulations is not accurate in this respect. 
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explanatory power, thus demonstrating the importance of the computational 
evolutionary approach to linguistics. 
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Chapter 5  
Adding Unique Hue Points to the 
Model 
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 it was shown that the Bayesian model can account for 
some of the properties of basic colour terms, but so far the model is completely unable 
to account for the typological data. In section 3.2.4 it was proposed that the model 
should incorporate points in the colour space termed unique hue points. These points 
are especially salient, and appear to be particularly well remembered by people 
compared to other areas of the colour space (see section 2.3). However, in the version 
of the acquisitional model used so far, no special status was given to any part of the 
colour space. This chapter describes the new model which was created to remedy this 
earlier omission, and investigates what predictions it makes concerning colour term 
acquisition. 
5.1 Specification of the New Model 
The previous acquisitional model (described in Chapter 3), treated the colour space as 
a continuous dimension, but this necessitated the use of calculus for performing 
summations over ranges of hypotheses. As should be apparent from section 3.4, this 
necessitated the use of some fairly complex maths, and the maths would have been 
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more complex if unique hue points had been incorporated into the model. To avoid 
this problem, the colour space was divided into 40 discrete colours, and so each 
individual colour could be indexed with a number between 1 and 40. The choice of 40 
colours is an arbitrary one, but treating the colour space as a number of sections 
allowed discrete summation to be used rather than calculus, hence making the maths 
simpler. This difference also allowed the model to run more quickly61, and yet it did 
not appear to greatly affect the results obtained62. We may note that, as the number of 
unit colours in the whole colour space is increased, the model will increasingly 
closely correspond to the version with a continuous, non-discrete, colour space. 
Using this coordinate system, the red unique hue point is at hue 7, yellow at 19, green 
at 26, and blue at 30, so that the largest distance between adjacent unique hue points is 
17 units between blue and red, and the smallest is just 4 units between green and blue. 
Yellow and green are also considerably closer than are red and yellow. These 
locations where chosen partly by a process of trial and error, and were adjusted in 
order to make the results of the model parallel the empirical data as closely as 
possible. Note, however, that these values are compatible with the less precise 
specification, concerning the unique hue point locations, made in section 3.2.4. Each 
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 While the time complexity of the first model was cubic on the number of examples of each colour 
term, the second model was constant with respect to this variable. However, the second model was 
quadratic with respect to the number of units into which the colour space was divided, a measure not 
relevant to the first model. 
62
 No rigorous investigation was made concerning the differences between the first and the second 
model, but a number of tests showed that the new model learns colour term denotations which have 
similar properties to those produced by the first model. 
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colour is assigned a probability corresponding to how likely a person is to remember 
an example if it corresponds to that colour. These values will be written Rc, and were 
set at 0.05 for colours which did not correspond to unique hue points, and at 1 for 
unique hues, so that it was 20 times as likely that examples of unique hues would be 
remembered as examples of other colours. These values were also chosen largely by a 
process of trial and error, and hence are fairly arbitrary. However, they implement the 
specification made in section 3.2.4, concerning the relative memorability of unique 
hues and other colours. These changes were made in the hope that they would allow 
the model to account for typological data. The new model is essentially the same as 
the original one in other respects, as will become evident from the description below. 
The next step towards achieving an implementation, was to specify how values could 
be calculated for the terms in Bayes’ rule. First of all we needed to identify what 
would correspond to hypotheses for the purpose of learning colour words’ 
denotations. Again a hypothesis will correspond to one possible denotation of a colour 
word, and so will specify the range of colours that come within the word’s extension 
if that hypothesis is correct. A hypothesis can vary in size from taking up only one 
unit of the colour space to taking up the whole of the space, and can start and end 
anywhere in the colour space63. It was noted above, in section 3.2.5, that all such 
hypotheses are considered to be equally likely a priori, so all hypotheses will have 
equal a priori probabilities. Hence the term P(h) will be the same for all hypotheses. 
                                                 
63
 We should note that there will hence be 40 hypotheses of each size, except for the largest hypothesis, 
which takes up the whole colour space, as there can only be one such hypothesis. 
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Determining the probability of the data with respect to a hypothesis, P(d | h), is 
somewhat more difficult, because this probability will vary depending on how 
accurately the hypothesis predicts the observed examples. If an example is accurate, 
then it must appear within the range of the hypothesis. If that is all we know about an 
example, then it is equally likely for that example to have been observed on any of the 
colours with the range of the hypothesis, assuming that the hypothesis is correct. 
However, because some examples will be forgotten, the proportion of examples 
which we would expect to have remembered for each particular colour would be 
equal to the probability of remembering examples of that colour, divided by the sum 
of the probabilities of remembering examples on all the colours within the range of 
the hypothesis, which will be written as Rh64. This ratio, which is given in (5.1), would 
correspond to the probability of an example, when that example was within the range 
of the hypothesis, and when we knew both that the hypothesis was correct, and that 
the example was accurate. 
(5.1) 
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Erroneous examples are equally likely to be observed anywhere in the colour space, 
but because we are more likely to remember them if they occur at unique hue points 
than elsewhere, the actually probability of an erroneous example being remembered at 
any particular colour, is equal to the probability of remembering an example if it 
occurs at that colour, divided by the sum of the probabilities of remembering 
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 Again this assumes that people are equally likely to observe examples of colours anywhere in the 
colour space. For discussion of the validity of this assumption see section 3.3.1. 
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examples of all colours throughout the colour space (Rt). This ratio is expressed 
as (5.2). 
(5.2) 
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(5.1) and (5.2) apply when we know whether an example is accurate or not, but in 
reality, when a person has remembered an example, they will not be sure whether or 
not it is accurate. A parameter p was added to the model, which corresponds to the 
probability that each individual example is correct. Now, if we see an example outside 
of the hypothesis space, we know that it must be inaccurate (we are still assuming that 
the hypothesis is correct). Because the probability that an example is accurate is p, the 
probability that it is not accurate is (1-p). So the overall probability of an example 
which comes outside of the range of a hypothesis will be the probability of an 
inaccurate colour being observed at that point in the colour space multiplied by the 
probability of an example not being accurate, and so the probability of each example 
which is outside of the hypothesis is given by (5.3).  
(5.3) 
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However, if an example is within the scope of the hypothesis, then we cannot be sure 
whether it is accurate or not (because it could have come within the range of the 
hypothesis simply by chance). So, in the case of an example which is within the range 
of a hypothesis, we have to add its probability assuming that it is accurate, to what its 
probability would be if it was erroneous, each of which must be weighted by the 
probability of examples being accurate (p), or inaccurate (1-p). The resulting overall 
probability of such examples is given by (5.4). 
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Equations (5.3) and (5.4) allow us to calculate the probabilities of individual examples 
with respect to a hypothesis, but usually we will have several examples for a 
particular colour word, so we need to combine these individual probabilities to obtain 
an overall probability for all the data. This can be done simply by multiplying 
together the probabilities of each individual example, e, from the set of all examples, 
E, as shown in (5.5). For every example, we must use either equation (5.3) or (5.4) to 
calculate P(e | h), depending on whether or not the example is within the scope of the 
hypothesis. 
(5.5) ∏
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So far we have specified two of the three terms on the right hand side of Bayes’ rule, 
but in order to determine hypotheses a posteriori probabilities, we also need to be 
able to assign a value to the third term, P(d). This is the probability of the data, before 
we start to consider any particular hypothesis. We can again calculate this probability 
by multiplying the probability of the data, given each individual hypothesis, by the a 
priori probability of each hypothesis, and then totalling the resulting probabilities for 
each hypothesis in the set of all possible hypotheses, H. This is expressed 
mathematically in (5.6). 
(5.6) [ ]
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If we substitute this equation into Bayes’ rule, as it was given in (3.1), we obtain 
equation (5.7), which we can simplify by cancelling out the constant terms P(h) and 
P(hi). (The h’s of equation (5.6) now have a subscript, i, to distinguish them from the 
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specific hypothesis under consideration, h. However, as the a priori probability of all 
hypotheses is equal, each P(hi) will be equal to P(h).) 
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Equation (5.7) lets us calculate the probability of an individual hypothesis which 
corresponds to one possible denotation of the colour word. However, remember that 
what we really want is to calculate how likely it is that a colour can be denoted by the 
colour word, given all the examples that have been remembered. We can do this by 
calculating the a posteriori probability of each hypothesis which includes the colour 
within its range, and adding together all these probabilities. This will give us the 
overall probability that the colour comes within the denotation of the colour word.  
As with the previous model, if we calculate such values for all colours, then we will 
obtain a fuzzy set, where each colour is assigned a degree of membership in the 
category corresponding to the colour word, according to the probability with which a 
person believes that that colour comes within the extension of the colour word. The 
only difference between the fuzzy sets obtained with this model, and those obtained 
with the previous one, is that those of the present model assign degrees of 
membership at 40 discrete points throughout the colour space, while, with the first 
model, the degree of membership changes continuously throughout the colour space. 
Like the original model, this model was also written in C++, and the source code is 
given in Appendix B. Most of the code is the same, with the main differences being in 
the parts of the program which actually calculate the probability of colour words 
denoting particular colours. It generally executes somewhat more quickly than the 
original model, although, when only a small number of examples of each colour 
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(about ten) are used, there is no great difference. In all of the simulations using this 
model, the value of the parameter, p (which occurs in equations (5.3) and (5.4)), was 
set to be 0.5. 
5.2 Predictions of the Acquisitional Model 
While the aim of this research was to model the evolution of colour words, it is worth 
investigating exactly what the acquisitional model was able to explain on its own, 
before it was placed in an evolutionary context. The ability of the model to learn 
colour term systems was investigated by presenting it with examples corresponding to 
the colour term system of Urdu65. The data was obtained from a colour chart showing 
the range of colours which each word denotes, which was published in Berlin and 
Kay (1969). From the chart, the approximate range of colours denoted by each colour 
term was determined, and these were then mapped onto the colour space of the 
Bayesian model, taking account of the location of the unique hues in the model, which 
do not correspond exactly to their locations on Berlin and Kay’s chart. Berlin and Kay 
report that Urdu has 8 basic colour terms, corresponding roughly to the English terms 
red, yellow, green, blue, purple, brown, black and white, although there was no term 
for grey, orange or pink. Because the model is restricted to only considering the 
dimension of hue, only the red, yellow, green, blue and purple terms are relevant here. 
It would appear that the Urdu term for yellow has extended to include most of the 
colours which would be denoted by orange in English, although its prototype is in the 
same part of the colour space as that of English yellow. 
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 Urdu was chosen simply because data concerning Urdu colour terms was readily available, and 
because Urdu has a colour term system somewhat different to that of English. 
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Hues were then chosen at random, and the corresponding Urdu colour term was 
determined in each case. These hues were then passed as examples to the model, 
except that only 5% of those examples which were not of unique hues were 
remembered (as compared to all the examples for unique hues). This process was 
repeated until the model had remembered 40 examples. This process simulated the 
acquisition of the colour term system, although in the condition where it was learned 
from a completely reliable informant, who was always completely consistent in which 
colour term he used to name each colour66. 
Once the training of the model was complete, the degree of membership in the colour 
category corresponding to each colour word was determined, and is displayed in 
Figure 5.167. In the graph, the unique hue points are labelled +, the leftmost one being 
red, then yellow, green and finally blue. We can see that each of the colour terms 
which contains a unique hue point has that point as its best example, which is 
consistent with the empirical results. Furthermore, each colour word has prototype 
properties, with one particular colour being the best example of it, but colours further 
                                                 
66
 We should note that the colour space in the model does not correspond to the Munsell colour space 
which Berlin and Kay (1969) used in collecting the data. As, at least in this thesis, distances between 
hues in the Munsell colour space are regarded as being somewhat arbitrary (see section 2.1), the 
mapping of colour terms between the Munsell colour space and the one used by the model is fairly 
approximate. A colour term which denotes a large part of the Munsell colour space might denote a 
much smaller part of the colour space in the model, or vice versa, and there is no single correct way to 
map from one colour space to another. 
67
 The raw data for this experiment, and for all the other experiments performed with the model using a 
discrete colour space, is given in Appendix C. 
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away from that colour being progressively worse examples of the colour word. This 
experiment has therefore demonstrated that the model is able to learn the colour term 
system of a real language. Further experimentation has shown that colour terms 
denoting both larger and smaller regions of the colour space can be learned by the 
model, and that all these terms will normally have prototype properties. Furthermore, 
there is a very strong tendency for the prototypes of colour terms to occur at unique 
hues. 
Figure 5.1. Learned Denotations for Urdu Colour Terms.  
(p=0.5, the colour space is of size 40, and the unique hues are at 7, 19, 26 and 40.) 
The model still does not explain the typological patterns seen in colour term systems 
cross-linguistically, because, as was shown in section 4.1 using the previous version 
of the model, colour systems which were of types which had not been attested cross-
linguistically could equally well be learned. With the new model, it is probably in 
general easier to learn attested colour term systems than non-attested ones, because, 
for example, green and blue are closer together than are blue and red, so attested 
terms, such as green-blue composites, can be learned more easily than unattested 
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ones, such as blue-red ones. However, a number of informal experiments have shown 
that languages of unattested types can still be learned. Hence, we cannot use this 
model to explain colour term typology as the result of a purely psychological process. 
The next stage of the research involved incorporating the acquisitional model into a 
social context, in order to produce an expression-induction model, and so investigate 
whether we could account for colour term typology as the product of an evolutionary 
process. 
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Chapter 6  
Simulating Colour Term Evolution 
As the acquisitional model of Chapter 5 is, on its own, insufficient to account for all 
the typological data concerning colour terms, it was decided to test Berlin and Kay’s 
(1969) original hypothesis that the typological patterns observed in colour term 
systems across languages are the result of an evolutionary process. This was done by 
incorporating the Bayesian model into an evolutionary expression-induction model, 
which simulated the historical change of colour term systems over several 
generations. 
6.1 The Evolutionary Model 
The evolutionary model was based on the one described in section 4.2. It also 
contained ten copies of the acquisitional model, each of which corresponded to a 
simulated person. As noted above, this community is of course unrealistically small, 
but, as with the previous model, the results obtained do not appear to differ radically 
with larger communities68. Therefore, simulations using ten artificial people were 
                                                 
68
 This conclusion was obtained based on the results of several experimental simulations using various 
numbers of artificial people, but the effect of the number of artificial people on the results was not 
investigated rigorously. 
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considered to be adequate, especially as this allowed the program to run much faster 
than when more artificial people were used. As with the simulations reported in 
section 4.2, in the initial state of the simulation, each of the artificial people had 
observed one example of a colour word, which would have been used to name a 
randomly chosen hue69. The colour words were randomly created by concatenating 
any three letters together, and so usually each person would know a different colour 
word. 
Ages were assigned to each person in the same way as in the previous evolutionary 
simulation (section 4.2). To obtain the results reported in this chapter, the average 
lifespan was variously set at any of the values 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 30, 35, 40, 50, 
60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110 or 120, with 25 separate simulations being made in each 
condition. (Recall from section 4.2, that lifespan corresponds to the number of colour 
terms that each artificial person will observe on average during their lifetime.) The 
simulation then proceeded in the same way as the previous ones, with the exception 
that when examples were passed to the hearers, if they did not correspond to a unique 
hue then there would only be a 5% chance of them being remembered (compared to a 
100% chance of unique hues being remembered). The algorithm is summarised in 
Figure 4.2, and the rate of creativity was kept the same as in the previous evolutionary 
simulation. Hence, on average, a new colour word would be introduced once in every 
1000 times that any artificial person spoke. All the simulations reported in this chapter 
                                                 
69
 Because the model has a tendency not to remember examples of colours which are not unique hues, 
several examples may need to be given to the model before it remembers one of them. There is hence a 
greater probability for the initial example to correspond to a unique hue rather than another colour.  
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were run for a period of time equal to twenty average life-spans of the people in the 
simulation. As there were 17 different lifespans used, and 25 simulations were 
performed under each condition, there would be a total of 425 separate simulations. 
The results reported in this chapter are based on the languages spoken by the people at 
the end of these simulations. In all cases, the value of the parameter, p, was set at 0.5. 
6.2 Emergent Colour Term Systems 
A general picture of the kind of colour term system typically emerging in the 
simulations can be obtained by examining Figure 6.1. This shows the colour term 
systems of four people from the end of one evolutionary simulation, in which the 
average lifespan of the artificial people was set at 100. As is the case with all the 
results reported in this chapter, only colour terms for which the person has observed at 
least four examples were included. This was because one of the necessary criteria for 
a colour term to be considered basic is that it must be salient for a speaker, and it 
seems reasonable to propose that if a person has observed only one or two examples 
of a colour word, then that word would be less salient for that speaker than one for 
which they had observed more examples. We can see that, with respect to this 
criterion, speaker (a) and (b) both know four basic colour terms, with their prototypes 
at the red, yellow, green and blue unique hue points (which are marked by crosses). 
Speaker (c) knows these same four terms, plus two extra terms, which both denote 
purple hues, while (d) does not know the green term, and so has only three basic 
colour terms. 
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Figure 6.1. The Basic Colour Term Systems of Four Artificial People from the same Simulation. 
(+’s mark unique hue locations, p=0.5, and people are creative one time in a thousand.  
Only terms for which people have remembered at least four examples are included.) 
As the average lifespan of the artificial people was 100, they would, on average, 
remember 100 examples during their lifetimes. (a) was aged 78, (b) 72, (c) 113, and 
(d) 38. This helps to explain why (c) knows more basic colour terms than any of the 
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other people, because he has had more chance to observe examples, and so will have 
seen enough examples of each term for it to attain basic status. (d), being aged only 
37, has seen many fewer examples, and so has not observed enough examples of the 
green term for it to be considered basic. In fact (a) and (b) have both observed 
examples of each of the purple terms, but not enough for either of these terms to be 
considered basic for those speakers. All of (a), (b) and (c) have also seen at least one 
example of an orange term, though this term was not basic for any of the people in the 
simulation. This particular simulation, and, within it, these four artificial people, were 
chosen fairly arbitrarily, simply in order to illustrate one particular language 
community. The other people in the simulation had similar colour term systems, 
except that the youngest people had seen very few colour examples, and consequently 
did not know as many colour terms, and nor had they learned the denotations of all 
the colour terms accurately. Full details of this community appear in Appendix C. 
We can see that a colour term system has emerged which is in general shared by most 
members of the community, but in which there is considerable variation between 
individual people. The variation concerns which colour terms each person knows, 
which they consider to be basic, and the exact denotation which they have learned for 
each colour term. Sources such as MacLaury (1997a) report that these are all 
phenomena that are prevalent in real language communities, and so I would see it as a 
strength of the model that there are inconsistencies between the individual I-languages 
learned by each person. In reality, probably no two people speak exactly the same 
language, and this is equally true in the simulation. 
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6.3 Number of Basic Colour Terms 
Clearly, the number of basic colour terms which exist varies considerably between 
different languages. Empirical evidence appears to show a correlation between the 
type of society in which a language is spoken, and the number of colour terms in the 
language (Berlin and Kay, 1969; MacLaury, 1997a). Languages spoken by tribal 
people, with relatively low levels of technology, tend to have fewer basic colour terms 
than languages spoken in highly industrialized societies. One of the crucial 
differences between these environments would seem to be the range of coloured 
objects, and the uses to which colour is put. In tribal societies, there will typically be a 
limited range of coloured objects available, and those objects will tend to simply have 
their natural colours, or the colours of the limited range of dyes which are available. 
In contrast, in highly industrialized societies, we can make many objects in any colour 
we want, and so there is much more opportunity to use colour to identify particular 
objects. We even use colour as a form of language in itself, for example in colour 
coding of electrical wires, traffic lights, etc. These factors suggest that people in 
industrialized countries might use colour words much more frequently than people 
living in societies with lower levels of technological development, and it is possible 
that this is the reason for the variation seen in the number of colour words in the 
languages of these societies. It was investigated whether a relationship holds in the 
simulations, between how often people use colour words during their lifetimes, and 
the number of basic colour words emerging in the languages which they speak. The 
results in this and the following section are based on all 425 runs of the simulation, in 
which the average lifespans of the artificial people was varied from 18 to 120, as 
described in section 6.1. 
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In general, when trying to classify the languages spoken in each simulation, only 
people whose age was greater than or equal to half the average lifespan were 
included. (These people are subsequently referred to as ‘adults’.) This is because 
younger people might not have observed enough examples to have determined with a 
reasonable degree of accuracy the language spoken in the community. In practice 
when field linguists collect mappings showing the denotations of basic colour terms, 
they would also exclude young children from their studies, instead relying on adults, 
who would be expected to have completed the process of language acquisition, and to 
have relatively stable language competencies. 
For each such person alive at the end of each simulation, the number of colour terms 
of which they had observed at least four examples was determined, and these values 
were used to calculate the mean number of colour words spoken by people under each 
condition of the simulation, where the average number of colour examples observed 
during a person’s lifetime was varied from 18 to 120. These means are plotted in 
Figure 6.2, and are given together with the corresponding standard deviations in Table 
6.1. We can see that there is a clear positive correlation between how often people use 
colour terms during their lifetimes, and the number of colour terms in their language, 
so this could provide an explanation of why languages of industrialized societies tend 
to have more colour words than those of less industrialized societies.  
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Figure 6.2. Relationship of Number of Frequency of use of Colour Terms to Number of Basic 
Colour Terms in Emergent Languages. 
Number of colour examples 
remembered on average 
during lifetime 
Mean number of basic 
colour terms in 
emergent languages 
Standard Deviation of 
number of basic colour 
terms in emergent languages 
18 
20 
22 
24 
25 
27 
30 
35 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
2.13 
2.28 
2.40 
2.39 
2.57 
2.53 
2.74 
2.80 
3.09 
3.71 
3.92 
4.20 
4.44 
4.59 
4.82 
5.10 
5.17 
0.373 
0.452 
0.492 
0.510 
0.496 
0.515 
0.493 
0.618 
0.538 
0.584 
0.419 
0.528 
0.626 
0.712 
0.809 
0.896 
0.452 
Table 6.1. Means and Standard Deviations of the mean number of Basic Colour Words in 
Emergent Languages. 
The above result is probably unsurprising, but we should note that nothing was built 
into the model to force people who use colour words more often to have more colour 
words in their languages. We could conceive of a situation in which people who used 
colour words more frequently simply used the same number of words, but used each 
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one of them more often. This would give each person the opportunity to observe more 
examples of each word. However, the above graph shows that this does not appear to 
be what happens in the simulations. We should note that the artificial people do not 
receive any reward for communicating, nor in fact any feedback about whether 
communication is successful, so they cannot have added more colour words to their 
languages because this helps them communicate more effectively. It is not clear 
exactly why this relationship between frequency of use of colour words and number 
of basic colour terms holds, but it does suggest that, in general, we may have a lot of 
words in a particular domain simply because we talk about that domain often, rather 
than because those words are actually useful. 
6.4 Typological Analyses 
The previous section looked at the results of the simulations in a very general way, 
because it took account only of the number of colour words emerging, but not of what 
ranges of the colour space each one denoted. In order to investigate whether the 
typological patterns identified by Kay and Maffi (1999) are replicated in the 
simulations, it was necessary to first classify each language in terms of which kinds of 
basic colour terms it contained. In order to make this process consistent and objective, 
a number of rules for classifying colour terms were developed. 
Firstly, for each person, every colour was considered in turn, and calculations were 
made to determine how confident the person was that that colour could be named by 
each colour term which the person knew. The colour term which received the highest 
confidence score was taken to be the colour term which the person would use to name 
that colour. The results of this process, for one run of the simulation, in which people 
observed 60 examples on average during their lifetimes, is shown in Figure 6.3, where 
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each colour term is given an arbitrary label, A, B, C or D, and each row represents 
one person. (The choice of this particular community to serve as an example was 
made completely arbitrarily.) Each column corresponds to a colour, with hue 1 at the 
left, and hue 40 at the right. The boxed columns correspond to the unique hues, red, 
yellow, green and blue.  
A A A A A A A A A A A A C C C C C C C C C D D D D D D B B B B B B B B B B B B A 
B A A A A A A A A A A A A A C C C C C C C C D D D D D D B B B B B B B B B B B B 
B B A A A A A A A A A A A C C C C C C C C D D D D D D D B B B B B B B B B B B B 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A C C C C C C C C D D D D D D B B B B B B B B B B B A 
A A A A A A A A A A A A A A C C C C C C C C D D D D D D B B B B B B B B B A A A 
B C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C D D D D B B B B B B B B B B B B B 
Figure 6.3. Denotations of Basic Colour Terms for all Adults in a Community. 
(Adults are people whose age is over half the average lifespan of people in the community.) 
The full range of each colour term was then considered to be the smallest range of 
colours which included all the hues which would be named by the colour term, if the 
person always used the term which they were most confident was correct. (This could 
potentially include some hues which would be named by a different colour term, 
because there might be another term which had greater confidence values for a 
smaller range of colours within the range of hues named by the first term.) Colour 
terms were classified as red, yellow, green or blue if they included the corresponding 
unique hue point, and no other unique hue point. If they did not include any unique 
hue points, then they were classified as orange, lime, turquoise or purple, depending 
on whether they were between the red and yellow unique hue points, the yellow and 
green ones, the green and blue ones, or the blue and red ones respectively. If a colour 
term included more than one unique hue point, it would be classified as a composite 
of those unique hue points, for example red-yellow or yellow-green-blue. 
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The next stage of the analysis consisted of determining which colour terms the 
language spoken by each community as a whole could be said to contain. This process 
was not entirely straightforward, because not all terms would necessarily be 
considered to be basic for all speakers, nor would each term necessarily be given the 
same classification for each speaker. (We should note that this is entirely consistent 
with empirical data, because mappings of colour terms on charts collected by field 
linguists for different speakers of the same language typically show considerable 
discrepancy, and often one informant will not report all the colour terms used by other 
speakers (MacLaury, 1997a).) 
If we examine Figure 6.3, we can see that the classification of all the terms would be 
the same for the first five speakers, in that A contains the red unique hue point and so 
would be classified as red, and B, C, and D would likewise be classified as blue, 
yellow and green respectively. However the sixth speaker, who corresponds to the 
bottom line of the chart, has not seen enough examples of term A for it to be 
considered basic, and consequently he names the red unique hue, and the surrounding 
colours, with term C, which he also uses to name unique yellow. C was therefore 
classified as a red-yellow term for this speaker. 
In order to arrive at a consistent classification for each community, a number of rules 
were derived for cases in which speakers disagreed on the denotation of a colour term. 
Firstly, a colour term was considered to be basic in a language only if it was known 
by at least half the adults. This criterion was justified because one of Berlin and Kay’s 
(Berlin and Kay, 1969) original criteria for a colour term to be considered basic was 
that it should be known by all members of a community, so it would seem likely that 
if this term was not salient enough to be considered basic by more than half the 
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speakers, then this criterion might well not be satisfied. Colour terms which did not 
satisfy this criterion were excluded from the analysis. 
The second rule was that, if not all speakers agreed on the classification of a term, in 
terms of which unique hues it denoted, then that classification which was supported 
by the greatest number of people would be chosen. If this rule cannot be applied, 
because two or more possible classifications are supported by equal numbers of 
people, then, if one of the terms contained fewer unique hue points, it would be 
chosen over a term which contained more unique hue points. This would introduce a 
conservative bias into the classification system, so that if there was doubt as to the 
exact range of colours which a term denoted, a smaller range would, in general, be 
chosen over a larger one. If the application of all these principles failed to produce a 
unique classification for each term in a language, then the whole language would be 
excluded from the analysis. In addition, if a speaker did not know any colour terms 
for which they had observed at least four examples, or if they knew only one such 
term, they would not be considered during the analysis70. After the application of all 
                                                 
70
 Speakers knowing only a single term would use that term to name all parts of the colour space, 
including even those hues which they believed were very unlikely to come within the term’s 
denotation, and it was for this reason that such speakers were excluded from the analysis. If colour 
terms were really used in this way, they would appear to be communicatively useless. It would seem 
more likely that real people would simply not use any word to name hues which did not have at least a 
moderately high degree of membership in the denotation of any colour term. However, taking account 
of this would have complicated the analysis, as it would have necessitated adding a parameter 
concerning the degree of membership in a colour term’s denotation at which to demarcate its boundary, 
and so no such addition was made to the analysis system. 
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these criteria, a unique classification was obtained for the languages emerging in 420 
of the 425 runs of the simulation. 
The number of terms which were classified as being of each type in all the emergent 
languages is listed in Table 6.2. For the terms which contain a unique hue point, these 
data were converted to percentages, and are shown in Figure 6.4. Both Table 6.2 and 
Figure 6.4 also contain equivalent data from the World Colour Survey (WCS), as 
reported in Kay and Maffi (1999). Kay and Maffi did not take account of colour terms 
which did not contain a unique hue point in making their classifications. Hence, the 
relevant data on these terms is absent from their paper, and consequently does not 
appear here. However, Kay and Maffi did take account of colour terms which are 
either achromatic, or distinguished from other colours on the basis of some dimension 
other than hue. Such colour terms have simply been excluded from the analysis. 
Composite terms which included white or black and one or more unique hue would be 
treated as if they only contained the unique hue. For example, a colour term denoting 
warm colours (white, red and yellow), would be treated the same as a colour term 
denoting only red and yellow. This is necessary in order to reconcile the results of 
empirical surveys with those of the model, in which the colour space has been 
reduced to a one dimensional hue circle. 
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Type of Colour Term World Colour Survey Simulations 
Orange n/a 20 
Lime n/a 4 
Turquoise n/a 0 
Purple n/a 80 
Red 70 382 
Yellow 67 334 
Green 26 191 
Blue 27 214 
Red-Yellow 9 31 
Yellow-Green 1 12 
Green-Blue 50 170 
Blue-Red 0 1 
Red-Yellow-Green 0 1 
Yellow-Green-Blue 2 38 
Green-Blue-Red 0 3 
Blue-Red-Yellow 0 0 
Table 6.2. Frequencies of Colour Terms of each type in the Simulations and the World Colour 
Survey.71 
Kay and Maffi (1999) did not arrive at an unambiguous classification for 25 of the 
110 World Colour Survey languages, as those languages appeared to be in transition 
between two of the types attested in their evolutionary sequence, so these languages 
were not included in determining the total numbers of each type of colour term 
attested. There were also six languages which did not appear to fit into any clear 
evolutionary sequence, so these too were not counted when compiling the data shown 
                                                 
71
 This table could also potentially include Red-Yellow-Green-Blue composites, which included every 
unique hue. However, no such terms were found in the World Colour Survey or in the results of the 
simulations. We should remember though that terms which were used to name every hue were 
excluded from the analysis of the results of the simulations, so this could have eliminated some such 
terms. Red-Yellow-Green-Blue composites emerging in the simulations could only have been included 
in the analysis if the person using the term used another term to name at least one part of the color 
space in between unique hues. 
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in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.4. The total counts for each colour term were derived simply 
by counting them once for every language in the World Colour Survey which Kay and 
Maffi reported contained those colour terms as basic colour terms. 
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Figure 6.4. Percentage of Colour Terms of each type in the Simulations and the World Colour 
Survey. 
Figure 6.4 clearly shows a close relation between the frequency of each term in the 
World Colour Survey and in the simulations. The key differences between the 
empirical data and the results of the simulations are that the simulations produce 
somewhat too many Yellow-Green-Blue composites, and too few Green-Blue ones. 
As was mentioned above, there is also empirical data concerning the relative 
frequencies of basic colour terms which do not contain unique hues. It has been 
reported (for example by MacLaury, 1997a), that both purple and orange derived 
terms are frequently reported, and that purple terms occur more frequently than do 
orange ones. This finding is also supported by the results of the simulations given in 
Table 6.2, in which it can be seen that more emergent languages contained purple 
terms than orange terms. 
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As well as accounting for the expected colour terms, the simulations also produce a 
small number of terms of types which have not been attested empirically. There are 1 
Blue-Red composite, 1 Red-Yellow-Green composite, 3 Green-Blue-Red composites, 
and 4 Lime terms. The presence of a small number of previously unattested colour 
terms should not be surprising. As linguists have examined the colour terms of more 
and more languages, colour terms of types which were not found in Berlin and Kay’s 
original survey (Berlin and Kay, 1969) have been discovered. The evolutionary model 
reported in this chapter does not place absolute restrictions on the types of colour 
terms which can evolve, but simply introduces biases so that some kinds of colour 
term emerge much more frequently than others. The simulations produced 425 
languages, while the World Colour Survey has sampled only 110, so it would seem 
likely that it would have missed some types of colour terms which might exist in 
some human language. Even if the colour term system of every language in the world 
were examined, some colour terms which might potentially evolve may not be seen, 
simply due to historical accident, which has resulted in no language which exists at 
this point in time having evolved in such a way as to include that colour term. Hence 
this kind of result is unproblematic because, as Poortinga and Van de Vijver (1997) 
argued, it appears that ‘constraints on colour categories are probabilistic rather than 
deterministic’ (p205). 
The only colour terms which it would seem might be problematic are the Green-Blue-
Red composite and the Lime term, because these terms both occur in several 
simulated languages. It is not clear if it is best to explain these terms simply as 
diverging randomly from the data of the World Colour Survey, or whether the 
evolutionary model is at fault in over-predicting the occurrence of these terms. There 
is also the possibility that such colour terms do exist in real languages, but that they 
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have either been given an alternative analysis by the linguists making the 
investigation, or have been classified as non-basic, and hence excluded from the 
analysis. The process by which Kay and Maffi’s (Kay and Maffi, 1999) classifications 
were produced was necessarily somewhat impressionistic and subjective, and it is not 
clear how much attention is paid to existing theories when eliciting and analyzing 
field data. When I have discussed this issue with field linguists, they have sometimes 
suggested that it is likely that existing theories influence how field data is analysed, 
and what data is elicited. Furthermore, when other linguists come to reinterpret that 
field data, there are further opportunities for the raw data to get distorted. It would 
certainly seem that in a language such as English there is a lime colour term, namely 
‘lime’ or ‘chartreuse’, but it seems clear that this term should not be considered a 
basic colour term with respect to the criteria of Berlin and Kay (1969), so perhaps the 
lime terms emerging in the simulation should likewise have been excluded from the 
analysis. 
Kay, Regier, Cook and O’Leary (n.d.) have acknowledged the need for more rigorous 
methodology, and report that they are undertaking a project to comprehensively 
investigate World Colour Survey data using statistical tests, but results are not yet 
available. MacLaury (1997a) analysed some of his data using statistical tests, but it 
would seem that the way in which he sampled the data may mean that few interesting 
conclusions can be drawn from the results. If we wish to compare two languages, then 
we would normally draw a number of samples from each language, probably taking 
each sample from a different speaker. We could then test for a difference between the 
set of data for the first language, and that for the second. However, if we wished to 
make a generalisation about languages in general, then we would take one sample for, 
for example, each of two or more constructions in each language, and then we could 
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look for differences between types of language, or correlations between particular 
features. The samples taken for each language could be based on data from individual 
speakers, or on an analysis of the language as a whole (as in the case of the results for 
colour term systems given above). However, MacLaury appears to sample data by 
taking samples from several languages, while also including more than one sample 
from each language (MacLaury, 1997a, 1995, p241). This is because, for at least some 
of the languages, he takes one sample from each of several speakers. It would seem 
that the results of statistical tests which analyse such data will be of little interest, 
because they can neither be used to make claims about languages in general, or about 
the particular languages concerned72. 
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 This argument might be made clearer by considering an extreme case. Suppose that we wanted to 
compare languages of type A to type B, and we had available data from 5 languages of each type. If we 
took one sample from each language, then we would likely find that the results of a statistical test were 
not significant, which would not be surprising, because a cross-linguistic pattern might not show up in 
such a small sample of languages. If, however, for 4 of the languages of each type we had only 1 
speaker available, but for the other 2 languages we had 1000 speakers, we might be tempted to include 
one sample for each speaker. We would now be much more likely to obtain a significant result for the 
statistical test (assuming that there is in fact a significant difference between the two types of languages 
in the feature for which we are testing), because there is now much more data available. However, I 
think that it will be clear that any result from this test should not be taken to be applicable to languages 
in general, because almost all of the data came from only two languages. Sampling in this way is 
simply a more extreme case of the way in which MacLaury (1997a) obtained samples for his tests. Of 
course, the sampling problem is a general problem in typology, because it is always difficult to argue 
that two languages are independent. A correlation between features seen in two languages could be due 
to contact between those languages, or to their historical relatedness, in which case we should take the 
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So far, the similarities and differences between the empirical data and the results of 
the simulations of this chapter have been compared only impressionistically, but it 
would clearly be preferable to make a more rigorous statistical analysis of the 
performance of the model. Hence, for each type of colour term (again excluding those 
which do not contain unique hues), the number of languages in which it occurs in the 
World Colour Survey is plotted in Figure 6.5 against the number of languages in 
which it occurred in the results of the simulations. There appears to be a clear positive 
correlation between these two variables, as is highlighted by the trend line. Pearson’s 
product moment coefficient was calculated for these two variables, and it was found 
that there is a correlation of 0.959 between the results of the World Colour Survey and 
the simulations. This correlation is highly significant (P   0.01)73. 
                                                                                                                                           
two languages as providing only a single example supporting the generalization that those features tend 
to co-occur universally. 
73
 We should, however, use caution in interpreting this significance value, because several different 
values of the parameters of the model were adjusted in order to achieve a close fit between the 
predictions of the model and the empirical data. Hence we should really correct this value to account 
for the multiple comparisons. However, it would seem that this significance value is not overly 
important, as it is clear from inspection that the correspondences between the frequencies of each type 
of term in the simulations and the empirical data are not simply due to chance, and so it seems 
inconceivable that these results could constitute a type II error. 
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Figure 6.5. Scatter Graph Showing Relationship between the Frequencies of Colour Terms in the 
World Colour Survey and the Simulations. 
Focusing simply on the frequencies of each type of colour term has enabled a clear 
and objective comparison to be made between the results of the simulations and the 
World Colour Survey, but we should remember that the evolutionary sequences which 
have been proposed (Berlin and Kay, 1969; Kay, Berlin, Maffi and Merrifield, 1997; 
MacLaury, 1997a; Kay and Maffi, 1999), have been based on analysis of colour term 
systems as a whole. Therefore, it seems desirable to examine what kind of overall 
colour term systems existed in each language emerging in the simulations. 
Table 6.3 lists the 353 most common colour term systems found in the simulations. 
When the systems have been classified in terms of which colour terms they contain, 
and which they do not contain, only the eleven types of colour term system given in 
Table 6.3 occur five or more times. These results contain examples of all of the types 
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of system which Kay and Maffi (1999) placed in their evolutionary sequences74, plus 
three other types of system. Two of these extra systems, Red, Yellow, Blue, and Red, 
Green-Blue, do not have a term which can consistently be used to name one of the 
unique hues, and so the overall classification for the systems do not include terms 
which can name either green in the first case, or yellow in the second. This situation 
has arisen because different people would name those hues with different terms, but 
the best classification that could be arrived at for those terms did not include the 
unique hue. The third unexpected type of system is the Red, Red-Yellow, Green-Blue 
system. This system contains two terms, both of which can be used to name the red 
unique hue. MacLaury (1997a) notes that many languages appear to have more than 
one colour term which can name particular hues, although usually one term is 
dominant and the other is a less salient term. Hence systems of this type do not seem 
to be problematic as far as the validity of the evolutionary model is concerned, and 
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 Remember that Kay and Maffi (1999) did not take account of colour terms which did not contain a 
unique hue when making their classifications. We should expect that purple and orange terms will be 
observed to exist together with terms containing a unique hue, and that we should see them more often 
in systems which contain more colour terms, than in those systems which contain fewer colour terms. 
Therefore, if a system corresponded to one on the evolutionary trajectory, except that it contained a 
purple or orange term (or both), it was regarded as coming within the evolutionary sequence. This is 
supported by empirical evidence, as MacLaury (1997a) notes that sometimes we will observe purple 
terms in systems in which there is still a green-blue composite term, and we do in fact see four purple, 
red, yellow, green-blue systems. There was also one purple, red, yellow-green-blue system. This was 
classified as being consistent with the evolutionary trajectories, even though systems with yellow-
green-blue composites probably do not usually contain purple basic colour terms. 
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their existence might even strengthen the claim that it accurately parallels the 
evolutionary processes affecting real languages. 
Basic Colour Terms in Language Number of Languages with this Type of Colour 
Term System in Simulations 
Red, Yellow, Green, Blue 112 
Red, Yellow, Green-Blue 110 
Purple, Red, Yellow, Green, Blue 44 
Red, Yellow-Green-Blue 30 
Red-Yellow, Green-Blue 22 
Orange, Purple, Red, Yellow, 
Green, Blue 
7 
Red, Yellow, Blue 7 
Red, Green-Blue 6 
Orange, Red, Yellow, Green, 
Blue 
5 
Red, Blue, Yellow-Green 5 
Red, Red-Yellow, Green-Blue 5 
Table 6.3. The Most Common Colour Term Systems Emerging in the Simulations. 
The simulations also produced 67 systems of types which occurred four times or less. 
Most of these systems diverged from those in Kay and Maffi’s evolutionary trajectory 
(Kay and Maffi, 1999), because they either contained more than one term which could 
name a unique hue, or because no term was classified as denoting one of the unique 
hues. As noted above, five of the less common systems conformed to Kay and Maffi’s 
evolutionary trajectories (the four purple, red, yellow, green-blue systems, and the one 
purple, red, yellow-green-blue system). Nine systems also contained colour terms 
which are of unattested types. All of the languages, including those already counted in 
Table 6.3, are summarized in Table 6.4 in terms of these criteria. The full 
classification, including the frequency of each type of colour term system, appears in 
appendix C. 
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Classification of Colour Term System Number of Systems 
Conforms to Evolutionary Sequence 340 
Contain Unattested Colour Term 9 
No term consistently names one or more unique hues 35 
More than one term can name one or more unique hues, 
or there is more than one purple term 
37 
Table 6.4. Classification of How the Languages in the Simulations Diverge from the Attested 
Evolutionary Sequences75. 
What is clear from these results, is that there is a small set of colour term systems 
which occur very frequently, and that the colour term systems of the vast majority of 
languages can be classified as belonging to one of these types. However, there is also 
a significant subset of languages which diverge from the classification in some way or 
another, in that they have extra terms which could be classified as basic, they do not 
give a consistent name to one part of the colour space, or the exact combination of 
basic terms does not conform to the expected pattern. However, this finding is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Kay and Maffi (1999) and MacLaury 
(1997a), who note that many colour term systems are not easily classifiable in terms 
of one widely attested type. Kay and Maffi considered six of the 110 World Colour 
Survey languages to be exceptional and resistant to classification in terms of their 
evolutionary trajectories76. 
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 There was one Orange, Lime, Purple, Purple, Red, Yellow, Green-Blue system. This system contains 
an extra purple term, and also a lime term, so it was classified both as having an extra term and an 
unattested term, and is counted twice in Table 6.4. 
76
 Comparing the number of systems which are exceptional in the World Colour Survey and in the 
simulations is problematic, because the analysis of World Colour Survey data was somewhat 
subjective, and so the number of languages which was classified as being exceptional would depend on 
exactly how the analyses were made. In contrast, the analysis of the results of the simulations was 
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6.5 Investigating the Effect of Unique Hue Points 
Section 6.4 discussed the results of the simulations largely in terms of the typological 
classification of Kay and Maffi (1999), but it did not look closely at the effect of the 
unique hue points on the emergent colour terms, or at the prototype structures of the 
colour terms. A question can be asked about exactly what effect the unique hue points 
have on the resulting languages. Even if the unique hue points were not added during 
the simulations, we would still expect to find, for example, more green-blue 
composites than blue-red ones, simply because the green and blue unique hues are 
closer together in the colour space. In order to investigate the effect of simulating 
unique hue points, the simulations were repeated without the unique points being 
made any more salient than any other colours. In all other respects, the simulations 
were identical to those performed previously, and again 425 separate simulations were 
performed, with the same life expectancies as before77. This section describes the 
results of these simulations, and compares them to those of the previous section, and 
                                                                                                                                           
made by a computer program which applied precise rules. While this would have resulted in a 
completely objective analysis, the choice of the rules themselves was fairly arbitrary, and consequently 
so was the proportion of systems which was classified as being exceptional. Therefore it is difficult to 
determine whether there is a greater number of exceptional systems in the results of the simulations, or 
in the World Colour Survey. 
77
 Note, however, that age and lifespan are always measured in terms of the number of examples 
remembered by agents, so that the same number of examples will, on average, be remembered by 
agents regardless of whether unique hue points are simulated or not. This is even though the simulation 
of unique hue points necessitates that agents do not remember a certain proportion of the examples 
generated. 
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also investigates just what effect the unique hue points have on colour terms 
containing them. 
Figure 6.6 shows the number of colour terms with their prototypes at each of the 40 
hues, both for simulations with unique hues and those without. All basic colour terms 
known by adults are included78. Each person is treated individually here, and so a 
colour term is counted once for every person who knows it. This shows very clearly 
that the simulation of unique hue points has concentrated most of the colour term 
prototypes on just four hues. In contrast, in the absence of simulated unique hue 
points, the prototypes of colour terms are distributed evenly across the space of colour 
terms. Hence the model provides a possible explanation of the observation that the 
prototypes of most basic colour terms in most languages appear to be clustered in a 
few small regions of the colour space. 
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Figure 6.6. Locations of Colour Term Prototypes.  
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 Remember that an ‘adult’ is a person whose age is over half the average lifespan within the 
simulation, and a term is considered ‘basic’ if a person has remembered at least four examples of it. 
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However, it is possible that the evolutionary model is too constraining in the 
predictions it makes about where colour term foci will emerge. Figure 6.6 can be 
compared to Figure 6.7, which is an equivalent graph, except that it uses empirical 
data from the World Colour Survey. Figure 6.7 also shows four clear peaks, 
corresponding to locations in the colour space in which most of the colour terms have 
their prototypes. These are not in the same places as in Figure 6.6, because the unique 
hues are placed at different points in the colour space in the model compared to where 
they are in the Munsell system. However, if we ignore this point, it is still clear that 
there are significant differences between the two graphs. In Figure 6.6 the peaks are 
each on a single hue, while in Figure 6.7 they are more gradual, and spread out onto 
neighbouring hues. It is necessary, therefore, to provide some explanation of the 
differences between these two graphs.  
 
Figure 6.7. Frequency Distribution of 10,644 WCS Colour-term Foci across the Hue Columns of 
the Ethnographic Munsell Array. (Reproduced from MacLaury, 1997b, p 202.) 
Perhaps part of the difference is due to different criteria being used for choosing 
which terms to include. MacLaury (1997b) included colour terms regardless of 
whether they were basic or non-basic, and whether they named ‘hue, brightness, 
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saturation or another quality of the light sense’ (p202). MacLaury noted that ‘the 
consequent noise decreases the percentage of terms that will be focused in reference 
to hues.’ (p202), so this could explain why there is a greater number of prototypes on 
chips which do not correspond to unique hues, but it does not explain why those 
prototypes which are not on chips corresponding to unique hues are nonetheless 
mainly clustered close to those chips. A possible explanation for that, is that varying 
light conditions might lead to inconsistent recognition of unique hues, and we might 
also expect that different people’s perceptual processes are not necessarily entirely 
consistent, even when they are presented with exactly the same stimuli. Either of 
these possibilities could lead to small, effectively random, displacements of where in 
the colour space informants located unique hues, and this would be expected to result 
in gradual peaks of the kind seen in Figure 6.7. The computer model did not simulate 
varying light conditions, and all the simulated people were identical in the way in 
which they conceptualized colour, so we would not expect to observe gradual peaks in 
the results of the simulations.  
An alternative explanation of the differences between Figure 6.6 and Figure 6.7 is 
simply that the simulated unique hue points in the computer model were made too 
strong, and hence were too constraining. If this is the correct explanation of the 
differences between the two graphs, the problem could be solved by making the foci 
weaker. One other possibility is that unique hues do not give an especially salient 
status only to such narrow ranges of colour. Perhaps the effect of unique hues is 
spread out more gradually over a range of neighbouring chips, with the focus being 
strongest on the centremost one. There are clearly a number of plausible explanations 
of the differences between the results of the World Colour Survey and the simulations 
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using unique hues, but at present there does not seem to be any clear way to determine 
which, if any, is the correct one. 
Another finding which seems to be implicit in the results of the World Colour Survey 
is that the unique hues tend to be evenly distributed between colour terms. For 
example, we would not generally expect to find a colour term containing two unique 
hues (for example, a red-yellow term) in a language which also had a colour term 
containing no unique hues (for example a purple term). We would normally expect to 
see a purple term only if a language had separate red and yellow terms. MacLaury 
(1997a) does however report that there is a considerable number of exceptions to this 
generalization, as purple and orange terms are sometimes seen even when there are 
also composite terms containing two unique hues79 . Here I refer to colour term 
systems as balanced systems if the difference between the number of unique hue 
points in the term with the most and the term with the fewest is one or zero. Other 
colour term systems are called unbalanced systems. So, for example, a system with 
red, yellow, green, blue and purple terms would be balanced, because the unique hues 
are distributed as evenly as is possible in a five term system, four terms having one 
each, and the purple term having none. The issue which I wanted to investigate was 
whether simulating unique hue points would lead to an increase in the number of 
balanced systems. 
                                                 
79
 However, MacLaury does not give a precise figure concerning in exactly what proportion of 
languages such systems are found. 
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Figure 6.8. The Distribution of Unique Hue Points between Colour Terms. 
Figure 6.8 shows the number of balanced and unbalanced systems in the simulations, 
both when unique hue points were made especially salient, and when they were not 
treated differently to other colours. For the simulations in which unique hues were not 
especially salient, the classification of systems as balanced or unbalanced was made 
based on the same locations for the unique hues as when the unique hues were 
especially salient. (People were again treated individually here, as in the analysis from 
which Figure 6.6 was produced, so the counts concern the number of individual 
people in the simulations with balanced colour terms.) We can see that, even when 
unique hue points were not simulated, half of all colour term systems were balanced. 
This result is to be expected, because we would generally expect the denotations of 
colour terms to be of roughly equal size, and so they will tend to spread out evenly 
throughout the colour space, so that there is a considerable chance that each will 
contain similar numbers of unique hues. However, because of the uneven distribution 
of unique hues, we should also expect to see a large number of unbalanced systems, 
and this is confirmed by Figure 6.8. 
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It was hard to predict the effect of adding simulated unique hue points to the model. 
However, Figure 6.8 reveals that it led to a big increase in the proportion of balanced 
systems. This is probably because a large proportion of examples which are 
remembered are now at unique hues, so that if a colour term does not contain a unique 
hue point, or if it includes fewer unique hue points than other colour terms, then the 
artificial people in the simulations may not observe enough examples of it for it to 
survive transmission between generations. Regardless of whether this explanation is 
correct or not, Figure 6.8 clearly shows that the simulation of unique hue points has 
had a major effect, beyond simply determining prototype locations. 
Given the above results, we would probably expect that the simulations without 
unique hue points would diverge considerably from those with them, in terms of the 
frequencies with which colour terms of each type emerged. Figure 6.9 plots the 
percentage of terms of each type emerging in the simulations without unique hues, 
alongside the equivalent results for simulations with unique hue points and empirical 
data from the World Colour Survey, which was previously given in Figure 6.4. (All of 
this data ignores derived colour terms, though the frequencies of these, and of all the 
other types of colour terms, are given in Table 6.5.) We can see that, the removal of 
unique hues from the model has had little effect on the proportion of colour terms of 
each type which emerge. Simply because of the varying distances between unique hue 
points used when analyzing the data, some types of colour term are much more 
frequent than others. For example, there are far more green-blue terms than blue-red 
ones, because the green and blue unique hues are closer together than the blue and red 
ones. 
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Figure 6.9. Percentage of Colour Terms of each Type. 
A greater effect of unique hues can be seen when we look at the frequencies of the 
derived terms shown in Table 6.5, and compare them to the equivalent results when 
unique hue points were simulated, given in Table 6.2. The most obvious finding is 
that when the simulation of unique hues is removed, there are a far greater proportion 
of derived terms than in the previous simulations. This is presumably because in 
simulations with unique hue points, colour terms would first become established on 
these most salient points, and so derived terms tended to be seen only in languages 
with greater numbers of colour terms. Table 6.5 also shows that the simulations 
without unique hue points contain large numbers of derived colour terms of unattested 
types (lime and turquoise terms, of which there is a total 134 occurrences), while in 
the simulations with unique hues, there were only four such terms. 
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Type of Colour Term Number of Terms in Simulations with no 
Unique Hues 
Orange 374 
Lime 118 
Turquoise 16 
Purple 644 
Red 366 
Yellow 278 
Green 159 
Blue 196 
Red-Yellow 32 
Yellow-Green 40 
Green-Blue 130 
Blue-Red 7 
Red-Yellow-Green 3 
Yellow-Green-Blue 45 
Green-Blue-Red 2 
Red-Yellow-Green-Blue 4 
Table 6.5. The Frequency of Each Type of Colour Term in Simulations without Unique Hues. 
Looking just at the proportion of colour terms of each type gives the impression that 
the unique hue points have had relatively little effect on the simulations, but when we 
look at overall colour term systems, we can see that this is not really the case. Table 
6.6 lists the types of colour term system which emerged most often in the simulations 
without unique hue points (the full analysis of all the systems can be found in 
Appendix C). We can see firstly that many of these languages are inconsistent with 
the empirical data, because they contain several purple or orange terms (each of which 
usually denotes a separate part of the colour space). This result could have been 
predicted, given the extremely large number of derived terms in the simulations as a 
whole. However, we can also see that many of the languages lack any term which 
consistently names one or more of the unique hues. For example, the six purple, red, 
yellow-green systems are missing a term which consistently names the blue unique 
hue. (In five languages, no colour term could be found which consistently named any 
of the unique hues at all.) This is in contrast to the results in which unique hues were 
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simulated, where only 35 languages were missing terms for a unique hue (Table 6.4 
on page 192). It seems that the unique hues had the effect of ensuring that, in the 
majority of languages, most speakers would know a colour term for each of the 
unique hues. When unique hues were not simulated, the whole colour space 
effectively became uniform, so colour terms would be just as likely to have unique 
hues at their boundaries as near their prototypes. This would lead to inconsistency 
concerning which colour terms would name each unique hue. This is because, if 
speakers disagreed slightly about a colour term’s boundary, this could result in that 
term being given a different classification for each speaker. 
Basic Colour Terms in Language Number of Languages 
with this Type of 
Colour Term System  
Consistent with 
Evolutionary 
Trajectories 
Purple, Red, Yellow, Green-Blue 15 yes 
Red, Yellow, Green-Blue 13 yes 
Purple, Red-Yellow, Green-Blue 8 yes 
Red, Yellow-Green-Blue 8 yes 
Red-Yellow, Green-Blue 8 yes 
Red, Blue, Yellow-Green 7 yes 
Orange, Orange, Orange, Purple, Purple, 
Purple, Purple, Red, Yellow, Green. Blue 
6 no 
Orange, Orange, Lime, Purple, Purple, 
Purple, Purple, Red, Yellow, Green 
6 no 
Orange, Orange, Purple, Purple, Red, 
Yellow, Green, Blue 
6 no 
Orange, Purple, Red, Yellow, Green-
Blue 
6 yes 
Purple, Red, Yellow-Green 6 no 
Purple, Red, Yellow-Green-Blue 6 yes 
Red, Yellow 6 no 
No consistent colour terms 5 no 
Orange, Red, Green-Blue 5 no 
Table 6.6. The Most Common Types of Emergent Colour Term Systems in Simulations without 
Unique Hues. 
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Classification of Colour Term System Number of Systems 
Conforms to Evolutionary Sequence80 87 
Contain Unattested Colour Term 122 
No term consistently names one or more unique hues 148 
More than one term can name one or more unique hues, or 
there is more than one of one type of derived terms 
230 
Total number of languages classified 415 
Table 6.7. Classification of Emergent Languages.81 
Table 6.7 classifies all the languages in the simulations without unique hues, and 
shows that only a fairly small proportion of them is consistent with the evolutionary 
trajectories. Many languages were problematic, because they contained lime or 
turquoise terms, or they contained composite terms of unattested types (for example, 
seven languages contained blue-red terms). A bigger problem was the lack of terms 
consistently naming unique hues, and the presence of extra terms, either extra orange 
or purple terms, as noted above, or simply multiple terms for one or more unique hues 
(for example, some languages had two yellow terms). Some common types of system 
were also extremely rare in these simulations. For example, there was only one red, 
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 Systems are included here so long as all their terms are of attested types, there is a term 
corresponding to each unique hue, and there are not multiple purple or orange terms. Some of these 
systems do not strictly belong on the evolutionary trajectories. For example, one system included here 
has red-yellow, green and blue terms, although we would not normally expect to find red-yellow 
composites with separate green and blue terms. Systems were classified in this way primarily so that 
Table 6.7 would be comparable with Table 6.4 (on page 192), which did not contain any such 
problematic cases. Also, many of the systems in Table 6.7 contained purple or orange terms (or both) 
as well as yellow-green-blue or red-yellow composites, and such systems are unattested, or at least 
extremely uncommon. 
81
 Many systems are counted here more than once, because they diverge from the evolutionary 
trajectories in more than one of the ways listed in the table. 
204 
yellow, green, blue system, while in the simulations with unique hues this was the 
most common system, occurring 112 times (Table 6.3 on page 191). The general 
conclusion that we can draw from this data is that the addition of unique hue points to 
the model has had a significant effect on the emergent languages, in that it has 
ensured the emergence of terms naming each unique hue, and has prevented the 
emergence of unattested types of colour term. It has also prevented the emergence of 
such large numbers of derived terms, of both attested and unattested types. 
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Chapter 7  
Adding Random Noise to the 
Evolutionary Model 
Chapter 6 showed that the evolutionary model could account for much of the 
typological data, but there is one key aspect of the evolutionary simulations which 
appears to be unrealistic, and that is that the data from which the artificial people learn 
was completely free from noise. As was noted in section 3.2.3, inferring the intended 
referent of a word used by another person would seem to be a somewhat difficult task, 
and so it seems unlikely that this is always accomplished without error. Hence not all 
the data from which children learn colour words will be accurate, due to errors made 
by the children when observing other speakers. The original acquisitional model, 
which had a continuous colour space, and was described in Chapter 3, was designed 
to be able to cope with erroneous data. It was shown above (in section 3.8), that the 
model was able to learn even when as much as 80% of the data presented to it was 
random noise. We could expect that the new acquisitional model, with a discrete 
colour space, would also have this property. However, in the evolutionary simulations 
described in Chapter 6, no random noise or erroneous data was added to the data from 
which the artificial people learned. 
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The research described in this chapter was conducted to investigate whether coherent 
colour term vocabularies would emerge in the presence of large quantities of random 
noise, and, if so, whether the colour term systems would still reflect the typological 
patterns described by Kay and Maffi (1999). The same model was used as in Chapter 
6, and unique hue points were simulated in the same way. However, 50% of the time, 
instead of the data from which an artificial person learned being produced by another 
artificial person, a completely random colour was paired with the colour word 
produced by the speaker. 
The simulation was run 170 times82, 10 times in each of 17 conditions, and again the 
number of accurate colour examples which each artificial person observed during 
their lifetime on average was varied between 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 30, 35, 40, 50, 60, 
70, 80, 90 , 100, 110 and 120. However, in each case there would be, on average, one 
random example for each accurate one, constituting a level of random noise equal to 
50%. Figure 7.1 shows some of the results of these simulations, together with those in 
which there was no random noise (repeated from Figure 6.2). The average number of 
basic colour terms emerging in each condition was measured as before (see section 
6.3), and these averages were plotted on the graph together with the equivalent results 
from the simulations without random noise. 
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 The decisions to set the noise level at 50%, and to perform a total of 170 simulations were made 
fairly arbitrarily. The aim was simply to generate a level of noise that might well be expected to have a 
major impact on the results, and to perform enough simulations for the results to be reliable. 
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We can see that the number of colour words emerging in the languages is still, on 
average, roughly proportional to the average number of colour examples observed by 
the artificial people. Perhaps surprisingly, the number of words emerging seems to be 
dependent solely on the number of accurate examples of colour words which people 
observe during their lifetimes. Even though in the condition with 50% noise, twice as 
many examples were observed by each person as the people who observed the same 
number of accurate examples but no random noise, the number of colour terms 
emerging seems to be essentially the same in each condition. (The small differences 
between the no noise and 50% noise conditions can be attributed simply to random 
variation.) This result was obtained despite the models being identical in other 
respects, as each time the acquisition mechanism had an expectation that half of the 
examples would be random (p=0.5). We should remember here that this is despite the 
fact that the artificial people received no feedback for successful communication, so 
we cannot attribute this effect to them learning fewer colour words in order that they 
can learn each one better, and so communicate more accurately. 
Figure 7.1. The Number of Basic Color Terms in Emergent Languages. 
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It seems that in the condition with 50% percent random noise, the simulations have 
performed in almost exactly the same way as when that noise was not present. This 
result seems somewhat counter intuitive, because no parameter was changed between 
the simulations which would have given the model any indication that there were 
varying amounts of random noise. (In both cases the parameter p was set at 0.5, so 
that 50% random noise would have been expected in both sets of simulations), and 
there was no indication given to any of the artificial people which would have allowed 
them to distinguish accurate from random examples. 
The most important consideration, however, was whether the simulations would still 
reproduce the typological patterns, even when there was so much random noise. 
Figure 7.2 compares the proportions of basic colour terms which were classified as 
red, yellow, green, or blue, or as composites of these terms, in each condition of 
having no noise, or 50% noise, to the proportions of terms which were classed as 
being of each of these types in languages on the evolutionary trajectories in Kay and 
Maffi (1999). 
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We can see that the typological patterns in the relative frequencies of each type of 
colour term are still roughly reproduced in each condition. The only major differences 
between the condition with no noise, and that with noise, is that there are fewer green, 
blue and yellow terms when there is a high level of noise, and a greater proportion of 
yellow-green-blue terms. These differences might be due simply to random variation. 
However, if this result is not simply due to random variation, then it might be possible 
to make the results with 50% noise, more closely reflect those with no noise by 
altering the parameters controlling the location of the unique hue points. In any event, 
it is clear that in some ways adding noise has resulted in the simulations more closely 
reflecting the empirical data, especially in that the proportion of blue terms is now 
almost the same as that found in the World Colour Survey. (Although the simulations 
with noise in some ways mirror the World Colour Survey less closely than those 
without noise, for example, in that there are far too many yellow-green-blue terms 
emerging in the simulations with noise.) 
Figure 7.2. The Frequencies of Each Type of Colour Term. 
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We should also consider colour terms which do not contain a unique hue point. 
Remember that, in the noiseless condition, 76.9% of terms not containing a unique 
hue point were purple, while 19.2% of such terms were orange (Table 6.2). With 50% 
noise, these figures were 60.6% for purple, and 26.8% for orange. Hence in both 
conditions the empirical finding that orange is less common than purple was 
supported by the simulations.  
The corresponding figures for lime and turquoise terms were 3.8% and 0% with no 
noise, and 9.9% and 0.3% with 50% noise. These results are consistent with the 
empirical data, in that in general basic lime and turquoise terms are not found in 
natural languages. Possibly the occurrence of basic lime terms is somewhat more 
frequent than should be expected, although it is possible that sometimes such terms 
are simply ignored in linguistic analyses, as there is a theoretically motivated 
expectation that they will not be basic, and so this is the classification which field 
linguists may be inclined to make. 
 
The crucial conclusion to be drawn from these results, is that the addition of large 
quantities of random noise to the simulation, which ought to have made it more 
realistic, has not prevented the model from accounting for the empirical data. In fact, 
it has not radically affected the results, as compared to the noiseless condition, at all. 
This would seem a very desirable property for a model of language evolution, as it 
would be a very poor model of language which was unable to account for empirical 
data when attempts were made to reproduce conditions similar to those in which real 
language evolution takes place. Generally simulations using expression-induction 
models are carried out without the simulation of any noise at all, and it may be that 
the behaviour of many such models would change radically if a high level of noise 
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were added to the simulation83. Hence, the results of this chapter provide further 
support for the claim that the model simulates colour term evolution in a realistic way. 
                                                 
83
 One notable exception to this generalization is the model of Steels and Kaplan (1998). They showed 
that coherent languages could emerge among populations of artificial people in the presence of 
moderate amounts of random noise, but that when there were very high levels of noise, coherent 
languages would not emerge. The high level of noise in Steels and Kaplan’s experiments was 70%, 
compared to the 50% level of noise used in the simulations of this chapter. However, there were 
considerable differences between Steels and Kaplan’s model, and the model of colour term evolution, 
in terms of the types of meanings communicated, and the interactions between agents. Steels and 
Kaplan also simulated noise which disrupted the transmission of word forms as well as their meanings, 
while, in this chapter, word forms are always transmitted intact, and only the transmission of meanings 
is subject to noise. Hence, it is not clear that a meaningful comparison (in terms of resistance to noise) 
can be made between Steels and Kaplan’s system, and the simulations of this chapter. However, Steels 
and Kaplan showed that, even if the level of noise was set at a level that would prevent coherent 
languages from emerging, if a coherent language already existed, then it could be maintained, despite 
the presence of the noise. This demonstrated that established languages were more resistant to noise 
than developing ones. 
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Chapter 8  
Implications and Future 
Directions 
The results presented above, especially those given in section 6.4, demonstrate that 
the typological patterns observable in basic colour term systems can be explained if it 
is assumed that the unique hues are not evenly spaced in the conceptual colour space, 
and that people remember the unique hues better than other colours. That unique hues 
are better remembered and more salient than other colours, is well supported by 
results obtained in psychological experiments, as is the hypothesis that the unique 
hues are not evenly spaced in the conceptual colour space. The unequal spacing of 
unique hues is exemplified by most colour order systems, such as the Munsell system 
(Cleland, 1937), as these systems do not place the unique hues at equidistant locations 
around the colour space 84 . However, establishing that the unique hues are not 
                                                 
84
 The natural colour system (Hård, Sivik and Tonnquist, 1996) is a notable exception to this 
generalisation. It does place the unique hues at evenly spaced points around the colour space, so that 
red and green are at opposite points on the hue circle, as are blue and yellow. However, it does not 
make any claim that this corresponds to a conceptual colour space. 
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conceptually equidistant, does not necessarily mean that the particular unique hues 
locations proposed in this thesis are correct.  
The primary evidence for the locations chosen for the unique hues is the data 
contained in the World Colour Survey, but a question should be asked concerning just 
how closely that data constrains the locations. The set of parameter settings used was 
arrived at by a process of trial and error, in which hundreds of simulations were 
performed for each setting, and the resulting languages compared to the World Colour 
Survey. Based on each set of results, the parameter settings were adjusted to try to 
make the results more closely reflect the empirical data. However, it was not possible 
to exhaustively test every possible set of parameters, and so it could be possible that 
there exists a quite different set of locations for unique hues that would account 
equally well for the typological patterns.  
A further problem arises in that the modelling of the colour space was not completely 
accurate, especially as the dimensions of saturation and lightness were neglected. We 
could expect that extending the model to incorporate these dimensions would affect 
the evolution all colour terms, and not just the emergence of black, white and brown 
terms, which cannot be learned by the existing model. If the model were changed, so 
that it used a full three dimensional colour space, the current settings might result in 
quite different typological patterns being apparent in the emergent languages. When 
using such a model, we might only be able to reproduce the patterns observed in the 
World Colour Survey data by changing the locations of the unique hues. 
(Conceivably, it might not be possible to replicate the patterns at all when using such 
a model, which would raise serious questions concerning the correctness of the 
present model). Any change in the way in which the model learns, or in how the 
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unique hues are modelled, could well affect the results of the simulations in 
unpredictable ways. Hence it is difficult to predict what results such a model would 
produce, without actually implementing the model. 
It is important to note that the kind of data which the results of the simulations should 
be compared with, is data which gives an accurate picture of how languages in 
general tend to evolve. This raises the issue of how accurate a picture the results of 
the World Colour Survey which were used in this thesis give of the ways in which 
languages tend to evolve. It is not clear that the languages sampled for the World 
Colour Survey do in reality accurately reflect the frequency with which colour terms 
and colour term systems of each type tend to emerge. Because many of the languages 
in the World Colour Survey were probably closely related (either genetically, in the 
sense of being descended from a common ancestor, or simply because there was 
contact between speakers of the languages), some of the similarities between 
languages might have been due to their relatedness. This might lead to some types of 
colour term appearing to be much more common than they would have been if all the 
languages in the survey were unrelated. (For example, if a type of colour term only 
existed in a few related languages, but the World Colour Survey included data from 
several of those languages, it would appear to be common, when in fact it was not.) 
Factors such as these could lead to considerable discrepancies in the patterns apparent 
in the typological evidence, which would influence our evaluation of how accurately 
the model replicated the empirical data. Hence, it seems that we should be cautious 
about making any assumption that the World Colour Survey provides a completely 
accurate picture of the quantitative facts concerning colour terms. However, the 
World Colour Survey does contain data from a very diverse range of languages, and it 
is certainly by far the most comprehensive data source available for studies of colour 
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typology. Hence, it would seem that the World Colour Survey almost certainly gives a 
good indication of the approximate frequencies of at least the most common types of 
colour term, even if factors such as biased sampling and language relatedness distort 
the results to some extent. 
Another potential objection to the results of the World Colour Survey might be that 
they rely on the Munsell colour system, and that if another colour order system had 
been used, quite different results might have been obtained. Clearly, if we regard the 
spacing between colours in colour order systems as being to some extent arbitrary (a 
position which was argued for in section 2.1), the number of colour chips denoted by 
each colour term will be equally arbitrary. However, the typological analyses of 
section 6.4 did not take account of the size of the denotations of any colour terms, but 
simply classified colour terms based on the locations of the unique hues relative to the 
terms’ denotations. As which colour chips in the Munsell colour system correspond to 
the unique hues is not in doubt, it is unproblematic to equate these colour chips with 
the unique hue points in the model. Hence, so long as the analysis of the data is based 
on unique hue locations, and no account is taken of the actual sizes or locations of the 
boundaries of colour term denotations, the results should not be affected by the colour 
order system used in obtaining the empirical data. 
Given all of the above issues, it seems that we should be cautious about what claims 
are made concerning the unique hue locations. Probably, they should be interpreted 
simply as being indicative of the relative distances between unique hues in the 
conceptual colour space. It seems likely that in reality the relative distances between 
unique hues are ordered from green and blue being closest, followed by green and 
yellow, then yellow and red, and with blue and red being the furthest apart. However, 
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making a more precise claim about the locations of unique hues would be unjustified, 
and it is not possible to be certain even about this ordering of relative distances.  
A more cautious interpretation of the results would be to conclude that the models 
have shown how learning biases can affect how languages evolve, and that such 
learning biases could result in the emergence of a range of languages which 
collectively mirror typological patterns, but not to make any more specific claims. 
The models showed how human languages could be understood as a product of innate 
psychological properties acting in combination with cultural pressures, and that 
typological patterns may only be explainable as the result of evolutionary processes 
occurring over several generations of speakers. This is clearly an interesting result, 
because it is at odds with some previous analyses. For example, it has often been 
suggested that implicational hierarchies exist because they reflect restrictions on the 
range of languages which people are able to learn, due to restrictions imposed by 
Universal Grammar (see, for example, Travis,1989). It has also been proposed that 
implicational hierarchies are due to functional pressures arising from speakers’ 
communicative needs (see Hawkins, 1988, for discussion). The colour term models 
correspond to neither of these possibilities, but instead explain an implicational 
hierarchy as the product of both acquisitional and functional pressures. 
Other researchers have also tried to relate colour term typology to human physiology. 
One such approach was Kay and McDaniel (1978), outlined above, but this was not 
the first such study. Ratliffe (1976) proposed a psychophysiological basis for 
universal colour terms, noting the three pairs of opponent colours, black and white, 
red and green, and yellow and blue. They argued that the black-white opponency was 
the strongest, hence explaining why two colour term languages divide the colour 
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space up roughly into dark and light colours. Furthermore, they argued that there are 
neurophysiological factors which cause our discrimination of blue to be particularly 
weak, and of red to be particularly strong. This could explain why red terms emerge 
before green and yellow ones, which in turn emerge before blue ones. However, 
Ratliffe failed to explain why we see only a limited number of types of colours term 
which do not contain unique hues (for example, why we do not see light green or 
turquoise basic colour terms), although they did note that brown, pink, purple and 
orange are all adjacent to red, hence suggesting that the existence of these terms may 
be related to the special status of red. Ratliffe’s proposal has many similarities to my 
theory, but it leaves unspecified some intermediate steps necessary to explain how 
neurophysiological effects, giving special status to unique hues, come to affect colour 
vocabulary. 
While the evolutionary model attempts to explain colour term systems in terms of 
universal properties of the human visual system, attempts have been made to explain 
colour term typology in different ways. Foley (1997) presented the relativist position, 
which claims that consideration of wider cultural practices is necessary to gain an 
understanding of colour terms. Foley stated that ‘culture must be the crucial 
autonomous intermediary between any innate and hence universal neurological 
perception of colour stimuli and the cognitive understanding of these.’ (p160). As 
noted above, relativists such as Saunders (1992) have stressed that colour terms are 
not easily isolatable pieces of reality, but are ‘culturally constructed’ and are linked to 
cultures’ ‘meaningful practices’ (Foley, 1997, p161). The evolutionary model of this 
thesis shows how colour vocabularies could emerge as a result of interactions between 
speakers, but it does so without modelling any wider cultural meanings of colour 
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terms, suggesting that considering such factors are not necessary for explaining colour 
term typology. 
It has also been proposed that the presence of particular colour stimuli in the 
environment might have an effect on colour terminology. For example the universal 
salience of red could be attributed to the universal red colour of blood, something 
which is constant across cultures. Certainly such factors might well influence colour 
term systems, but, because the evolutionary model was able to explain typological 
patterns without reference to such environmental factors, it suggests that they may not 
play an important role in shaping colour term systems. While such cultural and 
environmental factors could well affect the range of colour term systems attested 
cross-linguistically, the present model provides no evidence to support the view that 
they do. 
MacLaury (1997a, 1999) has tried to account for colour term typology using a theory 
called vantage theory, which he has developed based on colour term data, but which 
he has proposed can be applied as a general theory of category formation. Like the 
evolutionary colour term model, MacLaury’s theory rests on the premise that ‘green 
and blue appear more similar to each other than do red and yellow, yellow and green, 
or red and blue.’ (MacLaury, 1997a, p87). However, MacLaury did not provide a 
computer implementation of his model, and so it is difficult to be sure that the 
typological patterns are derivable from the axioms of his theory, and that the theory 
could not equally well be interpreted in another way to account for a different set of 
data. 
MacLaury’s model is based on the premise that colour categories are formed on an 
analogy with space and motion. His theory relies on the existence of six ‘elemental 
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sensations’, corresponding to the four unique hues, plus black and white. He proposed 
that colour categories are then formed by ‘analogy to the fixed and mobile coordinates 
by which people make sense of their positions in space-time’ (MacLaury, 1997a, 
p380). He claimed that people form colour categories by focussing on one of the 
elemental sensations, and adjusting the degree to which they see it as similar or 
different from other colours. MacLaury developed a formal notation for describing 
colour categories, and he suggested that this system constrains the forms of emergent 
categories. 
As an example, the simplest kind of category corresponds to a word such as English 
red, which is defined using three ‘coordinates’: a ‘fixed’ image of elemental red, and 
‘mobile’ emphases on similarity and difference. The category is then constructed by 
relating these coordinates. Firstly, elemental red and the similarity coordinate are 
related, so that reds other than elemental red are still seen as red, because of the 
emphasis on similarity. We can also ‘zoom in’ so that similarity becomes a fixed 
coordinate, which is then related to the difference coordinate. This second relation 
curtails the extent of the categories range, preventing it from extending indefinitely, 
because colours further from the similarity coordinate are now increasingly seen as 
not belonging to the category. 
The theory draws on concepts such as the figure-ground distinction which are well 
established in cognitive science (Ungerer and Schmid, 1996). However, terms such as 
‘coordinate’ are not used in any sense with which I am familiar, and the justifications 
for the design of the theory are unclear. While vantage theory is a cognitive theory, 
and so presumably describes processes which are hypothesized to occur in people’s 
brains, there is no attempt to specify exactly what the cognitive processes are at a 
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computational level, but instead the theory is described in terms of much more general 
and vague concepts.  
The categorization of red using vantage theory, described above, may seem somewhat 
intuitive, but I find it hard to find much justification for the description of some other 
categories such as Hungarian vörös, which MacLaury classifies as a ‘recessive 
vantage’. Both this term and piros name red in Hungarian, but vörös generally names 
a narrower range of colours, and has a darker red as its prototype. The category 
underlying piros is constructed in the same way as English red, but vörös is 
constructed differently, though using the same coordinates. Firstly, elemental red is 
related to the difference coordinate, and then, in the second step, the difference 
coordinate is related to the similarity one. The difference coordinate is always further 
from elemental red than the similarity coordinate. So in this case, the second relation 
between coordinates involves a move back towards elemental red. MacLaury argues 
that because this category includes the difference coordinate twice, it narrows the 
range of vörös, because there is now more emphasis on difference than on similarity. 
It is, however, unclear exactly why we should expect categories to be formed in this 
way, and I am inclined to question whether the mapping from category structure to 
the denotational range of the colour term can really be completely explained simply in 
terms of the coordinates, and the relations between them, proposed by MacLaury. 
Because of the complexity of MacLaury’s theory, it is very difficult to evaluate it 
objectively, but it seems that we should only accept his theory if the relevant data 
cannot be accounted for by a theory which makes fewer assumptions. 
Categories which have overlapping denotations, such as Hungarian piros and vörös, 
where one category appears to be dominant and the other recessive, play a prominent 
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role in MacLaury’s arguments in support of vantage theory. (These terms constitute 
an example of the phenomenon which MacLaury calls coextension, which was 
mentioned above in section 2.1.) However, this general kind of pattern was seen in 
languages emerging in the evolutionary simulations, simply because the boundaries of 
each colour term are not always clear cut, and sometimes a speaker will hear more 
examples of one term as opposed to another. Hence terms which could be analysed as 
being coextensive in MacLaury’s terminology, appear and disappear during the 
simulations simply as chance phenomena. This suggests that MacLaury may be over-
explaining his data, by proposing specific mechanisms to explain what is in reality 
random variation. As far as I am aware, no other colour term researchers consider 
coextension to be a systematic occurrence. (Kay, Berlin, Maffi and Merrifield (1997, 
p35) say they will discuss ‘the prevalence in the data (or lack thereof) of the 
phenomenon of coextension’ in a forthcoming book.) Hence, it may not be necessary 
to account for the kind of co-extensive phenomena which MacLaury has exemplified 
using terms such as Hungarian piros and vörös. 
Above it was noted that some researchers, such as Taylor (1989), have claimed that 
colour terms (and other words with prototype properties) have underlying prototype 
structures (Taylor, 1989). However, this is problematic because the prototype 
approach seems to be insufficient to account for certain properties of colour terms. 
Roberson et al (2000, p 395) have also argued that ‘Berinmo [colour] categories have 
not formed around prototypes as, for the most part, there is little agreement about best 
examples.’, and have instead suggested that ‘color categories are developed from 
demarcation at boundaries’. Lammens (1994) created a computer model which was 
able to represent the meanings of colour terms using prototype representations. This 
required that the prototype structure be made completely explicit, hence making it 
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easier to evaluate whether colour terms are actually represented in this way. 
Lammens’ model defined colour categories by specifying the location of the 
category’s prototype in the colour space, and the size of the category. The degree of 
membership of a colour in the category depended on its distance from the prototype, 
and the size of the category was determined by a numeric parameter specifying how 
rapidly the degree of membership in the category decreased as the distance from the 
focus increased.  
Lammens proposed that his model could form the basis of an account of how the 
meanings of colour terms are learned. However, it seems that in this respect there are 
some problems with his model. These problems have implications regarding whether 
people represent colour categories using prototype structures. Lammens’ model does 
not specify how a language learner can establish the foci of colour categories. Instead 
it was assumed that these must be fixed, presumably innately (p. 143), and learning 
would then consist just of determining the extent of the colour category. Hence, 
during learning, only the parameter controlling the size of the category would be 
adjusted, and the observed data could neither affect the location of the category’s 
prototype, nor the category’s shape. This seems somewhat problematic because, as 
mentioned above, typological evidence seems to suggest that not all categories have 
universally determined foci, and the shape of categories, and hence exactly where 
their boundaries are, certainly varies between languages. For these reasons, I believe 
that Lammens’ work illuminates the most problematic aspects of the prototype 
approach to linguistic categories. It seems that prototype theory cannot account for 
categories where peripheral members may be further from the prototype in one 
direction than in others, and that it usually relies on the existence of pre-linguistic 
natural prototypes. Given these problems, and that the models presented in this thesis 
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learned categories with prototype properties, despite those categories not being based 
on prototype structures, it seems best to assume that prototype effects are a by-product 
of learning mechanisms, and are not due to underlying prototype representations. 
Levinson (2001) made an important observation concerning the theories of Kay and 
Maffi (1999) and Berlin and Kay (1969), who proposed that the typological patterns 
in colour term systems are due to an evolutionary progression in which languages 
gradually add basic colour terms, but never lose them. This was based partly on age-
stratal data, which in some cases showed that older speakers of a language used fewer 
colour terms than younger ones85, and is partly supported by historical textual data, or 
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 We should note that this is the opposite situation to that occurring in the model, in which younger 
speakers tended to know fewer terms than older ones (see section 6.2). This was because younger 
speakers had not always had sufficient time to learn all the colour terms in the language spoken in their 
community. We would not expect to find this effect in empirical investigations, because normally only 
adult informants would be used, or at least informants who were old enough to have learned all the 
basic colour terms in their language. However, the model cannot explain how we can get a situation in 
which older speakers know fewer terms than younger ones. It would seem that this situation occurs 
because people tend not to add new colour terms to their own I-language after they reach a certain age. 
Hence, if new colour terms enter the language, they will only be acquired by younger people, which 
would result in younger people knowing more colour terms than older people. This situation could be 
replicated in the evolutionary models, if the artificial people were modified so that, after a certain age, 
they no longer remembered new examples, but simply spoke based on the language they had learned up 
until that point. If the lifespan of agents (measured in terms of how often colour terms are used during a 
lifetime), was then increased over the course of a simulation run, we would expect that younger 
speakers (excluding the very youngest speakers who would not have had sufficient time to learn all the 
colour words), would know more colour terms than older ones. However, such a situation has not yet 
been simulated, and so it remains a topic for further research. 
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reconstruction of earlier states of the languages. However, in the majority of cases, the 
only evidence we have concerning the colour term systems of languages is data 
obtained from informants concerning the present form of the language. Levinson 
noted that it is a more usual practice in typology simply to form an implicational 
hierarchy, as in Figure 2.1 (on page 16 above), rather than to argue that languages 
progress from one type to another in a predictable order.  
While I am not aware of any evidence showing that a language has ever lost a basic 
colour term, it does not seem clear what form that evidence would take86. We can 
often infer that colour terms are relatively recent additions to a language if they are 
also the name for some object with the same colour (for example English orange), or 
if they have been borrowed from another language (for example Japanese buruu, 
derived from English blue). However, we clearly could not use such evidence if a 
basic colour term was lost from a language; it would either just cease to exist, or, 
perhaps more likely, would be retained as a non-basic colour term, with more limited 
application. So it does not seem that there is clear evidence showing that languages do 
not lose basic colour terms, just an absence of evidence showing that this has ever 
occurred. 
Above (in section 6.3 and Chapter 7) it was shown that the evolutionary model 
demonstrated a positive correlation between the number of colour words in a 
language, and how often people used colour words, which was equated with the level 
                                                 
86
 This is true at least for the majority of languages, for which there is not a long written record. For the 
handful of languages for which we have written records covering a long period of time, we could 
expect such evidence to be available.  
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of technological development of those people’s societies. Hence, at a point in history 
when the level of technological development of a society was rising, we would expect 
that it would be much more likely for that society’s language to gain basic colour 
terms than for it to lose them. As the communities in which most, if not all, languages 
are spoken, are probably at present rapidly increasing in their level of technological 
development, we would expect to find evidence of a rise in the number of basic colour 
terms, and this might appear to be a universal tendency. 
If, however, the level of technological development of a community were to remain 
constant, then we would expect the number of basic colour terms to also remain fairly 
constant. However, as shown by Table 6.1 (on page 177), the correlation between the 
number of basic colour terms, and how often these are used, is not perfect, and so the 
number of basic colour terms in a language is not completely predictable. Hence, in 
situations in which there was no change in the frequency with which colour terms 
were used, we might expect to observe some random drift in colour term systems, 
with basic colour terms occasionally being lost or new ones being gained. This 
hypothesis is supported by experiments conducted using the evolutionary model. If 
the frequency with which colour terms are used by people in the community is kept 
constant, then, once an initial colour term system has been established, occasionally 
basic colour terms are lost or gained, but the average number of colour terms present 
during a long range of time in the simulation, remains fairly constant. 
Hence we might conclude that Berlin and Kay’s (1969) hypothesis of a unidirectional 
movement towards languages with increasing numbers of basic colour terms is a 
product of the situation which communities throughout the world are in today, rather 
than a fundamental property of human languages. At points in human history, it 
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would seem likely that many communities remained at more or less constant levels of 
technological development for long periods, and at such times they would be as likely 
to lose basic colour terms as to gain them. 
It might seem obvious that the meanings of colour terms can only be acquired through 
observing examples of colours which they can denote, and that in the absence of such 
data it would not be possible to learn their meanings. However, Landau and Gleitman 
(1985) studied the acquisition of colour terms by a blind child, and found that her 
knowledge of colour words was in many respects similar to that of sighted children of 
the same age. For example, she knew that colour words belong to a single domain, 
and that they apply only to concrete objects, as well as being aware that they denoted 
a property which she herself could not identify. This clearly demonstrates that many 
aspects of the meaning of colour terms can be acquired even if no examples of their 
denotations are available. The child studied by Landau and Gleitman must have 
learned what she did about colour terms simply from the context in which the words 
were used, though clearly the most central aspect of the meaning of colour terms, that 
is, exactly which colours they denote, could not be acquired in such circumstances.  
The evidence from Landau and Gleitman’s study does, however, suggest that 
contextual and morpho-syntactic cues may be an additional source of evidence used 
by children when determining the meaning of colour terms. Such cues were not used 
by the colour models described above, but could potentially be incorporated into new 
versions of the models. This could be of particular benefit in addressing some of the 
issues concerning colour term acquisition not addressed by the present models, 
including how children come to identify what kind of property colour terms denote. 
Landau and Gleitman reported that this seems to be a difficult task for children, 
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noting that colour terms seem to be acquired later than adjectives denoting most other 
kinds of property, and that, at a relatively late stage of acquisition, children appear not 
to understand that colour words denote colour. This was not a problem for the 
computer models, as they were presented only with data concerning hue, and could 
not consider any possibilities other than that the words they were learning denoted a 
range of hues. However, in the real world, determining what kind of property a word 
denotes would seem to be a very difficult task (probably more difficult than learning 
the specifics of the denotations once the problem of the relevant domain has been 
solved). If children could use cues from linguistic context to identify the set of colour 
words, then the task of identifying their domain of reference would seem to be much 
easier, as once we had identified that one of those words denoted colour, it would be a 
relatively easy step to proceed to the conclusion that all of them do. We should note 
that Redington, Chater and Finch (1998) created a program which was largely able to 
single out the set of English basic colour terms, based simply on their locations in 
sentences relative to other words87, and so it would seem likely that children use such 
a mechanism to identify the set of colour words, before they begin to learn their 
meanings. 
While this thesis has shown that a Bayesian acquisitional model can account well for 
the data concerning colour term typology, the evidence concerning the correctness of 
the acquisitional model is somewhat indirect. It is supported because it explains the 
phenomena of prototype properties, and the typological properties of colour term 
systems, and because it is similar to other cognitive models that have been well 
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 Redington et al’s program is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9. 
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supported by empirical data. It would, however, be desirable to try to investigate more 
directly how closely the behaviour of the acquisitional model mirrors humans’ 
behaviour. One way to do this would be to perform psycholinguistic experiments, in 
which participants were taught artificial colour terms. At the beginning of such 
experiments, subjects would be told that they were going to be taught colour terms in 
a language that was completely unrelated to English. They would then be shown 
several different colour chips, and for each one would be told the word for it in the 
artificial language. The number of colour chips that participants would be shown for 
each word would be varied, as would the hues of the colour chips that were shown. 
The participants would then be shown colour chips which they had not seen before, 
and asked to name each one with the appropriate word from the language that they 
had just been taught. The validity of the model could then be judged by seeing if it 
would have used the same colour term to name each of the colour chips, had it been 
presented with the same training data as the human participants.  
By choosing appropriate training and test colour chips, it would be possible to 
investigate specific predictions of the Bayesian model, such as that if a person 
observes a large number of examples chips for a colour term within a particular range, 
then they will be less likely to use that term to name colours slightly outside that 
range, than if they had not seen so many examples, or if the examples had been spread 
over a larger range. The more data of this type that is collected, the better we will be 
able to determine whether the Bayesian model is accurate. However, a problem with 
such a technique is that there might be considerable interference from English colour 
terms (or the colour terms of any other languages that the participants knew), but this 
could be compensated for by using a range of participants, some of whom did not 
speak English, or any other language with a colour term system similar to that of 
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English. Ultimately this kind of experiment ought to be able to resolve the issue of 
exactly what mechanism children do use to learn colour term denotations. 
Above it was argued that partition is not a universal property of colour term systems, 
and that it most likely that children do not apply this principle when they learn 
languages. Therefore partition was not incorporated into the acquisitional model as an 
a priori principle. However, almost all colour term systems do partition the colour 
space, so it is worth considering how a different version of the acquisitional model 
could be created that would make use of the principle of partition. The simplest way 
in which the model could be extended to make use of the partition principle, would be 
to continue to learn each term separately, but to use the positive examples concerning 
the denotations of the other terms as a form of negative evidence. If the partition 
principle applies, then the range of colours denoted by the terms cannot overlap, 
therefore evidence that a particular hue is denoted by one colour term, is also 
evidence that it is not denoted by any other colour term. It would be relatively 
straightforward to extend the present model of colour terms to take into account such 
evidence. 
However, a fuller implementation of the partition principle would be to try to learn 
the denotations for all the colour terms together, and to find the partition of the colour 
space as a whole that best fitted the data overall. If there are N basic colour terms in a 
language, then N boundaries will divide the colour space into the required N 
categories, so that their is one colour category per colour term. If we link one of the 
colour terms to each of the boundaries, we can then take the denotation of each colour 
term to be all those hues starting from the location of the boundary, up to the location 
of the next boundary. We can then generate the full range of possible colour term 
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systems by allowing each of the boundaries to be at any point in the colour space. 
Because this will allow the boundaries to appear in any order, it also allows for all the 
possible ordering of the colour terms. This therefore can define the space of all 
possible hypotheses concerning the colour term denotations, and we can proceed 
using a method very similar to that used for the present model. A hypothesis will now 
specify the denotations for all the colour terms in the system, and hence will predict 
that accurate examples will all come within the denotation of the appropriate colour 
term. Any other examples must be treated as erroneous. However, if a continuous 
colour space were to be used with such a model, the derivation of the integrals 
required for use in hypothesis averaging would become more complex, and would be 
increasingly so the more colour terms were in the language. Similarly, if a discrete 
colour space were used, the time complexity of the problem would increase with the 
number of colour terms, so that for larger numbers of colour terms, it might not be 
possible to calculate a solution in a reasonable amount of time. 
As noted above, an extension to the model which would clearly be very desirable, 
would be to extend the colour space used so that it corresponded to the full three-
dimensional colour space, based on the three dimensions of hue, saturation and 
lightness. This would allow the denotations of colour words such as brown, black, 
pink, grey and white to be learned. There is no reason, in principle, why this could not 
be done, but it would make the acquisitional model more complex. In the present 
model, colour term denotations are represented simply as linear sections of the colour 
space, but, if a full three dimensional colour space were used, then colour term 
denotations would correspond to three dimensional volumes of the colour space. This 
would raise additional problems, because we would now have to specify a probability 
distribution over the possible shapes of the denotations, not just over their size and 
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location, as with the present model. This problem would probably not be 
insurmountable if some simplifying assumptions were made, such as proposing that 
people a priori assume that colour term denotations are roughly round. If possible 
colour term denotations were then modelled with a distribution over, say, ellipsoids, 
we could then expect good results to be obtained, so long as each colour term’s 
denotation could be approximated reasonably accurately with an ellipsoid. From a 
Bayesian perspective, it would seem that people must in reality make some such 
assumption if learning is to be possible at all, as otherwise a very small but oddly 
shaped denotation could be found which would account well for any set of observed 
data.  
We should note that, in the present model, colour term denotations must be 
contiguous, but that is simply an assumption, similar to the proposed restriction on 
shapes in a three dimensional version of the model. Gärdenfors (2000) has 
independently proposed that people have a tendency to prefer to partition conceptual 
spaces in sensible ways, using generally concave shapes, and avoiding demarcating 
regions with complex boundaries. A problem with extending the model so that it 
worked in three dimensions might be that it would almost certainly increase the time 
complexity of the simulations. This might limit the results that could be obtained with 
the model, but empirical investigations would be needed to determine how significant 
a problem this would be. 
Lammens (1994) and Belpaeme (2002) both used three dimensional colour spaces in 
their computer models, but at least one previous model has used a one dimensional 
colour space. The representation used by Kay and McDaniel (1978), who proposed 
that colour term denotations corresponded to fuzzy sets derived from fuzzy logic 
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operations on the outputs of opponent process cells, was also one dimensional. Its 
representations were of almost the same form as those used by the models of this 
thesis. Cells opposing red and green or blue and yellow would be used to derive 
membership in fuzzy sets for each point along the hue dimension, and it was proposed 
that similar cells opposing black and white could be used to derive membership in 
fuzzy sets along the lightness dimension. They proposed that these two dimensions 
could be combined to account for colour terms which must be defined both in terms 
of lightness and hue (such as pink, which can be analysed as a light red), but no 
specific fuzzy set operation was provided for deriving fuzzy set representations for 
these terms (Kay and McDaniel, 1978, p637, footnote). Also, the dimensions of 
lightness and saturation are also relevant to the definition of terms containing a unique 
hue point, such as green, as they are needed to distinguish these terms from white, 
black and grey, but Kay and McDaniel did not address this issue. Hence 
representations of colour terms were obtained partly by extrapolating from the fuzzy 
logic model in much the same way as it might be proposed that the present model 
could account for such terms if it were extended to include the lightness and 
saturation dimensions. However, neither model in itself truly models the three 
dimensional colour space. 
One solution to the problem of how to account for colour term typology in a model 
which can account for all the colour terms, and not just those terms defined by hue, 
would be to modify the model of Belpaeme (2002). If Belpaeme’s model were 
modified, so that it gave a special status to the unique hues, in a similar way to the 
model described in this thesis, then it might well be able to account for the typological 
data. Conducting such experiments would also help to determine to what extent the 
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results obtained here rely on the specifics of the model, and to what extent they might 
be replicable by other models which learn in somewhat different ways. 
While the work of this thesis has attempted to explain typological data in one domain, 
that of colour term systems, the general methodology used, namely expression-
induction modelling, should be applicable to explaining other aspects of linguistic 
typology. Some of these have already been mentioned above, for example de Boer’s 
(1999) work on vowel typology. However, typological patterns have been identified 
in many other semantic domains besides colour, and in most cases no attempt has yet 
been made to explain these patterns using the expression-induction methodology. One 
domain that has recently attracted a lot of interest is that of spatial relations 
(Levinson, 2003a, b). All languages have ways of expressing spatial relations between 
objects, such as that one object is on top of, or above, another. However, the exact 
distinctions which are lexicalised vary between languages, so that while English 
makes a distinction between something being on something else and something being 
over something else, Japanese conflates this distinction, and uses the same word, ue, 
to express both relations. Which relations are conflated in particular languages is 
however far from random, as only some relations are ever conflated, and if it is 
known that certain relations are conflated, then it is sometimes possible to predict 
which other ones will also be merged.  
It would seem likely that this data concerning spatial relations might be explainable 
using an expression-induction model. First it would be necessary to formalise a 
representation for the position of, and relation between, objects in space. Then an 
acquisitional model could be created that would try to infer the meaning of words 
based on a number of examples of specific relations that could be expressed with the 
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word. (These relations would be represented using the spatial formalism.). An 
expression-induction model could then be constructed, in which the simulated people 
would express spatial relations using words they had learned by observing the 
utterances of other artificial people. If such simulations were performed many times, 
and the words expressing spatial relations which emerged in each simulation were 
analysed, we might well see a replication of the typological patterns reported in the 
literature. The emerging languages would probably be shaped primarily by the 
acquisition mechanism used, but the natural properties of space that would be 
encoded in the formal representation of spatial relations could also potentially 
influence the results. This is just one example of the many areas in which expression-
induction modelling might be applied in the future. 
Generally, then, it can be concluded that the models of this thesis have provided 
plausible accounts, both of how colour term denotations can be acquired, and of why 
we see typological patterns in colour term systems cross-linguistically. The prototype 
properties of colour term systems are emergent properties of the Bayesian learning 
mechanism used, while the typological patterns are emergent properties of the cultural 
evolution of colour term systems over time. This generally supports Berlin and Kay’s 
(1969) hypothesis of an evolutionary trajectory, but the models do not support the 
claim that as languages evolve they only gain colour terms and never lose them. The 
evolutionary model ties together observations concerning colour psychophysics, 
neurophysiology and cross-linguistic typology, with a degree of explicitness that has 
not been achieved by any other theory. The major weaknesses of the model are that it 
is restricted to modelling only the hue space, and that it is not possible to be sure 
whether the parameters in the model are accurate, or whether similar results could be 
obtained with a significantly different model. The next chapter moves on to try to 
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explain linguistic data in another domain which has been of great interest to 
theoretically oriented linguists. The specific question addressed concerns the 
learnability of the dative alternation in English, and it is shown how Bayesian 
inference can be used to solve this problem as well. 
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Chapter 9  
Bayesian Acquisition of Syntax 
This chapter describes work which has investigated how children learn their first 
language and, in particular, the syntactic system of that language, based on 
observations of the speech of other people. It conceives of the problem in the 
following way: when exposed to utterances in that language, how is it possible to 
infer the grammatical system which produced those utterances. Further, the learner is 
assumed not to know the meanings of the words, have access to prosodic cues to 
structure, or to receive feedback about which sentences are not grammatical. 
Currently the major paradigm within which language acquisition is explained is 
probably the parameter setting framework (Chomsky, 1995; Belletti and Rizzi, 2002; 
Chomsky, 2002). Within this framework, it is proposed that knowledge of language is 
largely specified innately, and learning consists of identifying word tokens and setting 
a limited number of parameters according to the syntactic structures to which the 
child is exposed. Chomsky argues that this position is necessary because ‘even the 
most superficial look reveals the chasm that separates the knowledge of the language 
user from the data of experience.’ (Chomsky, 1995, p. 5). 
Gold (1967) investigated this problem more formally, and proved that, without 
negative evidence (explicit information about which sentences are ungrammatical), 
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languages are not ‘learnable in the limit’, unless the class of languages which the 
learner may consider, is restricted a priori, for example by innate knowledge. Below I 
will discuss an alternative result by Feldman, Gips, Horning and Reder (1969) which 
suggests that Gold’s result is not relevant to the circumstances under which children 
learn languages. 
Redington, Chater and Finch (1998) investigated to what extent syntactic categories 
could be inferred, based on distributions alone, without knowing a priori what 
syntactic categories existed in the language. They formed vectors by taking the two 
preceding and two following context words for each occurrence of each target word in 
a large corpus of transcribed speech, and recorded how often each context word 
occurred in each position. Only the 150 most frequent words were used as context, 
and so this resulted in 600 dimensional vectors for each word (there being one entry 
for each of the 150 context words in each of four positions). Clustering those words 
whose vectors were most similar, in terms of Spearman’s rank correlation, resulted in 
clusters which corresponded to appropriate word classes for most of the 1,000 target 
words. While this system was good, in that it could be applied to naturally occurring 
speech, it was necessary to decide at what level of dissimilarity to form separate 
classes, and so it does not completely solve the problem of recovering the syntactic 
classes used by the original speakers. 
Elman (1993) demonstrated that not only word classes, but also syntactic patterns in 
which words belonging to those classes appeared, could be learned without much 
innate syntactic knowledge, at least for simple languages. He trained a recurrent 
neural network to predict the following word in artificially generated sentences 
conforming to a simple syntactic system containing 23 words, and syntactic features 
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such as number agreement and recursion in relative clauses. Once trained on 50,000 
sentences in this simple language, the network performed at near optimum accuracy at 
predicting the subsequent word at any stage in a sentence, showing that the network 
had internalized the structural constraints implicit in the data. Lewis and Elman 
(2001) have extended this work by training a network to learn an artificial language 
based on utterances occurring in the CHILDES corpora (MacWhinney, 2000). They 
concluded that ‘the stochastic information in data uncontroversially available to 
children is sufficient to allow for learning.’ (p. 360). 
While Redington et al (1998), and Elman (1993) and Lewis and Elman (2001) 
demonstrate that much of syntactic structure can be learned by making statistical 
inferences based on the distributions of words, Pinker (1989) suggests that some 
aspects of syntax cannot be learned in this way. He proposes that, in order to 
determine verbs’ subcategorizations in the absence of negative evidence, children 
must rely on complex innate rules combined with knowledge of the verbs’ semantic 
representations.  
Verbs such as give can appear in both the prepositional dative construction, as in 
(9.1a) below, and the double object dative construction (9.1b), but there is a class of 
verbs such as donate which can only appear in the prepositional dative construction, 
(9.1c and 9.1d). However Gropen et al (1989) observe that, based on the alternation 
between (9.la) and (9.lb), children sometimes generalize this alternation to verbs such 
as donate, and so produce ungrammatical sentences such as (9.1d). They also 
demonstrated that when presented with novel, nonce, verbs in the prepositional dative 
construction, children will productively use them in the double object dative 
construction in appropriate contexts. However, ultimately children do learn which 
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verbs cannot occur in the double object dative construction, and so we need a theory 
which can explain why children first make such generalizations, and then 
subsequently learn the correct subcategorizations. 
(9.1) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
John gave a painting to the museum. 
John gave the museum a painting. 
John donated a painting to the museum. 
*John donated the museum a painting. 
 
 
While the main point of Pinker (1989) is that syntax cannot be learned from 
distributions alone, he acknowledges that the fact that certain syntactic structures do 
not occur could be used as indirect negative evidence that these structures were 
ungrammatical. However, he notes that children can neither consider that all 
sentences which they have not heard are not grammatical, and nor do they rule out all 
verb argument structure combinations which they have not heard. He says that it is 
necessary to identify ‘under exactly what circumstances does a child conclude that a 
nonwitnessed sentence is ungrammatical?’ (p.14). The computational model presented 
in this chapter is able to do just this, and so predict that a verb such as donate cannot 
occur in the double object dative construction, while at the same time predicting that a 
novel verb encountered only in the prepositional dative construction will follow the 
regular pattern and also appear in the double object dative construction. 
9.1 Bayesian Grammatical Inference 
Most work in syntactic theory assumes that grammars are not statistical, that is that 
they specify allowable structures, but do not contain information about how 
frequently particular words and constructions occur. However, if grammars were 
statistical, it appears that it would be much easier to account for how they were 
learned. In fact Hendriks (2000) has gone so far as to argue that the logical problem of 
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language acquisition does not apply to human language learners at all, because the 
arguments supporting the existence of the problem have been based on the premise 
that people learn language logically. Hendricks has noted that most aspects of human 
behaviour are not particularly logical, and so there is no reason to suppose that the 
language acquisition mechanism is either. Feldman et al (1969) proved that as long as 
grammars were statistical, and so utterances were produced with frequencies 
corresponding to the grammar, then languages are learnable. They note that proofs 
that language is not learnable rely on the possibility of an unrepresentative 
distribution of examples being presented to the learner. While under Feldman et al’s 
learning scheme it is not possible to be certain when a correct grammar has been 
learned, as more data is observed, it becomes more and more likely that the correct 
grammar will be identified. 
Feldman et al’s proof uses Bayes’ theorem, which relates the probability of a 
hypothesis given observed data to the a priori probability of the hypothesis and the 
probability of the data given the hypothesis. For a fixed set of data, the best 
hypothesis is that, for which the product of the a priori probability of the hypothesis 
and the probability of the data given the hypothesis, is greatest. Feldman et al relate 
the probability of a grammar (seen as a hypothesis about language) to its complexity – 
more complex grammars are less probable a priori. As grammars are statistical, it is 
also possible to calculate the probability of the data given a grammar. This leads to an 
evaluation criterion for grammars where the complexity of a grammar is weighed off 
against how much data it has to account for, and how well it fits that data. A more 
complex grammar can be justified if it accounts for regularities in the data, but 
otherwise a simpler grammar will be preferred. 
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Feldman et al’s evaluation measure for grammars can be seen as a form of minimum 
description length. Minimum description length is a general purpose evaluation 
measure for determining how well any theory accounts for some observed data. When 
applied to the acquisition of syntax, the ‘theory’ will be a particular grammar, and the 
‘data’, example sentences of the language being learned. The basic principle of 
minimum description length is that the best theory is the one which gives the simplest 
explanation of the data, where ‘simplest’ means ‘specifiable using the least amount of 
information’. This kind of evaluation measure may seem to be unrelated to Feldman 
et al’s Bayesian approach, but we can use information theory (Shannon, 1948) to 
relate quantity of information to probability. Shannon showed that the amount of 
information conveyed by an event (or a symbol in a grammar, or a word in a 
sentence) is equal to the negative logarithm of its probability88. It is this equivalence 
between probability and information that allows us to link minimum description 
length and Bayesian inference. Rissanen and Ristad (1994) explained that ‘It is 
important to remember that probabilities and code lengths are interchangeable, and so 
the MDL framework is technically equivalent to the Bayesian framework.’ (p165). 
While minimum description length can be seen as a form of Bayesian inference, it is 
often much easier to devise coding schemes for grammars and sentences, which we 
can evaluate based on the amount of information they contain, than to directly specify 
prior probability distributions over the set of all possible grammars. Feldman et al’s 
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 We should note that information is used here in a specific technical sense, which was defined by 
Shannon (1948). The units in which the quantity of information will be measured depend on the base to 
which logarithms are taken, but it is conventional to use base two, in which case the units will be bits, 
and that is the approach taken in this chapter. 
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learning system gave the best evaluation to grammars with the highest a posteriori 
probabilities, and the a posteriori probabilities were calculated by multiplying the a 
priori probability of the grammar by the probability of the data in terms of the 
grammar. However, when this is restated in terms of minimum description length, the 
best evaluation is given to the grammar which results in the shortest overall 
description length, and that is found by adding the description length of the grammar 
itself to that of the data when it is encoded in terms of the grammar89.  
Coding a grammar involves defining the symbols of which it is comprised, and the 
probability of each, and then coding it symbol by symbol. Shannon’s information 
theory can be used to calculate the coding length of each symbol (based on its 
probability), and by adding together the coding lengths of each occurrence of each 
symbol used in the grammar, we can determine the overall coding length for the 
grammar. Coding schemes can also be devised for other kinds of elements that we 
might find in a grammar, but which would not normally be thought of as ‘symbols’, 
such as integers (Rissanen, 1983).  
The next step is to calculate a coding length for the data in terms of the grammar. A 
grammar will place restrictions on the possible sentences in a language (or, if it is a 
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probabilistic grammar, it may simply specify a probability distribution over all 
possible sentences). We can see a grammar as specifying a set of options available to 
a speaker. When a speaker produces a sentence, they will have to choose a series of 
these options, and, using the minimum description length viewpoint, we can see this 
as specifying a series of symbols. A grammar will generally only allow a limited 
number of choices to be made at any point in a sentence, and it is such constraints 
which result in short description lengths for the data.  
In general, the more constraining a grammar is, the shorter the description length it 
will assign to the data, because less options will be available. However more 
constraining grammars will generally have to be more complex, so the minimum 
description length principle will tend to trade off complexity of grammar and degree 
of fit to data to arrive at a reasonable compromise. In general it would be possible to 
have a grammar with a very short description length if that grammar did not describe 
any regularities in the data, but then the data would have a very long description 
length, because the grammar would not constrain the choices available when coding 
data, and so such hypotheses would have bad overall evaluations. The other extreme 
situation is having a complex grammar which specifies the observed data exactly. 
There would now be no choices to make in specifying the data component, and so it 
would have a description length of zero, but the grammar would be very complex, 
because it would have to specify all the regularities in the data. Again this would 
usually result in a very long overall description length. The shortest description 
length, and hence best evaluation, would normally be for a grammar which came in 
between these two extremes. 
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The invention of minimum description length is sometimes credited to Rissanen 
(1978), but the general principle goes back at least to Solomonoff (1964a, b) and 
Kolmogorov’s (1965) work is closely related, though he did not present it as a theory 
of inductive inference. Wallace and Boulton (1968) developed and implemented an 
evaluation metric known as minimum message length, which is also based on the 
same general principle, but which can clearly be distinguished from the usual 
implementations of the minimum description length principle. Baxter (1996), Oliver 
and Hand (1996) and Wallace and Dowe (1999) discuss some of the properties of 
minimum message which make it distinct from minimum description length. Wallace 
and Boulton (1968) were probably the first people ever to implement a learning 
system using a minimum description length type of inference mechanism, as previous 
work had been purely theoretical.  
An important aspect of Solomonoff’s (1964a, b) papers was that he proposed an 
inference mechanism which would consider all possible grammars simultaneously. 
These multiple grammars could be used in a weighted sum to provide a more accurate 
measure of the best overall grammar, and to generalise more accurately when 
classifying new data. This contrasts with minimum description length as it was 
described above, as there it was suggested that the aim is simply to find the single 
grammar with the best evaluation (and hence the highest a posteriori probability). 
However, in section 3.3.1 it was noted that the colour terms model considers all 
hypotheses simultaneously, and so the classification of each hue is based on a 
weighted summation of the probability of each individual hypothesis which included 
that hue. (This is termed hypothesis averaging.) Solomonoff’s proposal concerned 
equivalent procedures for minimum description length, so it would clearly be 
desirable to implement them, as this should lead to more accurate learning. However, 
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this is problematic, because when using minimum description length we often have an 
infinite number of possible grammars, and even if not, there are usually so many that 
it would not be possible to consider all of them. Hence, in practice, minimum 
description length approaches are usually limited to searching for the single grammar 
with the best evaluation. This problem did not occur for Solomonoff, because his 
papers were theoretical, and he did not implement any learning algorithms on a 
computer. It might be possible to address this problem by considering a random (or 
perhaps stratified) sample of possible grammars, rather than all possible grammars, in 
an approach similar to the Monte Carlo method (Andrieu et al, 2003). This kind of 
approach was implemented by Fitzgibbon, Dowe and Allison (2002), but I am not 
aware of any work applying this method as part of a psychological model. 
The minimum description length principle allows us to construct an evaluation 
measure that, given two or more grammars and a corpus of data, allows us to 
determine which is the best. However, there remains a problem because, as discussed 
above, there will usually be such a large number of possible grammars that we cannot 
consider all of them in turn, and it is certainly not possible that a child learning a 
language could. Hence this raises the problem of how we arrive at the candidate 
grammars which are to be evaluated. In the next section, I describe computational 
models which are able to learn grammars despite this problem. They do this by 
starting with a standard initial grammar, and then making small iterative changes 
which gradually lead towards the correct grammar. This avoids the need to consider 
every single possible grammar, and so allows grammars to be learned within a 
reasonable amount of time. 
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We should note that minimum description length is typically used as part of a 
machine learning algorithm by researchers who have little interest in the mechanisms 
which humans use to learn. However, Chater (1999) argued that minimum description 
length may form the basis of a fundamental cognitive principle, and that it could have 
applications in many cognitive domains other than language, including in perception, 
memory, reasoning under uncertainty, in judgments of similarity, and in learning from 
experience in general. He hypothesized that ‘the search for simplicity is a 
fundamental cognitive principle’ (p298), and that minimum description length, or a 
related measure, might be the mechanism which is used in a wide variety of cognitive 
tasks. There have been several cognitive models which have used minimum 
description length besides Chater’s own work. For example, Fass and Feldman (2002) 
used minimum description length to model how people learned categories from 
examples. Such work clearly demonstrates that other researchers also consider that 
minimum description length is a principle that humans may use in learning. Further 
applications of minimum description length in psychology, this time to modelling 
language acquisition, are reviewed in the next section. 
9.2 Computational Models of Syntactic Acquisition 
There is a considerable number of computational models which are related to the one 
which is the topic of this chapter, either because, like it, they have used minimum 
description length, or they have incorporated some other bias towards simplicity. 
Firstly, however, it seems worth mentioning one model which did not incorporate a 
simplicity bias. Carroll and Charniak (1992) reported a method which was used to 
induce dependency grammars from corpora. Their system tried to find the grammar 
which best fitted the corpus, but unfortunately this tended to result in grammars 
containing both large numbers of rules, and very complex rules. Such results led them 
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to suggest that it might be necessary to incorporate a preference for simpler grammars 
into their system, though they were able to improve the performance of the system 
considerably by placing restrictions on the permissible grammars. However, making 
such restrictions would seem to give some indication of the correct grammar a priori, 
and so reduce the degree to which the grammars were actually learned as opposed to 
being pre-specified. Hence their system could be seen as providing an empirical 
demonstration of the problems involved in learning grammars in the absence of a 
simplicity principle. 
Probably the first proposal to use a simplicity metric as part of a system for learning 
grammars was made by Solomonoff (1960). He noted that if grammars were to be 
learned without using negative evidence then ‘the problem of finding a grammar that 
is consistent with a given fixed body of text is complicated by the fact that there are 
always an infinite number of such grammars.’ (p191). However, he went on to 
propose a solution to this problem which, although he did not specify it formally, was 
essentially the basis of the minimum description length principle. He stated that ‘It is 
possible, however, to define a “simplest” grammar from among all possible consistent 
grammars. Another important condition is that the languages defined should contain 
as “few” sentences as possible, in addition to the fixed body of text. The meaning of 
“few” must be suitably defined, since most languages of interest contain an infinite 
number of sentences.’ (p191). Solomonoff did not implement such a system, but the 
model presented in this chapter learns using an implementation of the general 
principles which he originally proposed. 
Langley (1995) created a grammar learning system which learned context free phrase 
structure grammars using a preference for simpler grammars as a guiding principle. 
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Langley’s system was based on earlier work by Wolff (1987, 1991), and began 
learning with an initial grammar which did not capture any generalizations, but which 
essentially just listed every training sentence in its rules. Heuristics were then used to 
find candidate new rules, which could be created either by adding new categories, 
which would be substituted for recurring sequences in other rules, or by merging two 
categories into a single one. After finding a set of candidate merges, the system then 
chooses the one which results in the simplest grammar, where simplicity is measured 
by counting the number of symbols on the right hand sides of the grammar rules. 
Searches proceeded in this way, until no further improvements in the grammar could 
be found. Throughout the learning process, the grammars were always able to parse 
all of the training corpus, because the changes made to the grammars could only 
increase their generality or leave it unchanged, and could never make the grammars 
more restrictive. However, there was a problem with Langley’s (1995) approach, 
because, for any language, it would always be possible to create a very simple 
grammar which failed to capture any regularities in the training data. In order to 
prevent grammars such as these being learned, Langley’s system relied on examples 
of sentences which were not grammatical. Grammars which were able to parse these 
negative examples would not be permitted. However, this is problematic from a 
linguistic point of view, because it is usually assumed that such negative evidence is 
not available to children when they learn their languages. 
In a new version of Langley’s learning system, Langley and Stromsten (2000) 
avoided the need to use negative evidence, by changing the measure of simplicity 
used in evaluating grammars to a minimum description length one. The evaluation 
measure now took account of how well the grammar fitted the data, as well as how 
complex it was. They noted that this would continue to direct the learning system 
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away from ‘large grammars with overly specific rules’ (p 223), but would also avoid 
‘very small, overly general grammars because they can describe too many unobserved 
strings’ (p 223). Given this modification, the system performed well without using 
negative evidence when learning grammars for simple languages of between 8 and 24 
words. 
Stolcke (1994) created a grammar learning system very similar to Langley and 
Stromsten’s (2000) one. His system was somewhat different, however, because the 
grammars learned were statistical, and his new training data could be incorporated 
during learning. Langley’s systems required that all the data was available before 
learning began. In Stolcke’s system, decisions as to what to merge, and when to stop 
merging, were made so as to maximise the Bayesian posterior probability of the 
grammar given the data. However, this Bayesian evaluation measure was effectively a 
form of minimum description length. Using this method, it was possible to learn a 
grammar for simple subsets of English containing 8-12 words, including one of the 
languages learned by Langley’s (1995) system. Further experiments applied the 
system to real language examples, but with only limited success (though the language 
was, in any case, restricted to a very limited domain, hence making the learning task 
easier). Chen (1995) applied a similar approach to relatively large corpora of real 
English, but his system could not learn context free languages, but only the simpler 
regular languages. Chen showed that his system was better than some others at 
predicting statistical regularities in the corpus, which was the aim of his system. 
However, it clearly did not come close to the goal of learning a grammar capable of 
capturing the overall structure of the language, and Chen did not give examples of 
specific structures learned, so his work probably has little relevance to theoretical 
linguistics. 
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Grünwald (1994) also attempted to learn phrase structure grammars from large 
amounts of unrestricted text, more specifically from the Brown corpus (Francis 
and Kucera, 1979). However, he reported that this approach did not lead to very good 
results, so the results he presented related only to a restricted version of his model. 
This restricted version did not attempt to learn grammars, but only to put words into 
classes. Initially each word was placed in a separate class, and bigram statistics were 
then calculated, based on the frequency of each class following each other class in the 
Brown corpus. The description length, both for the set of classes, and for the corpus 
when the bigram statistics were used to help predict regularities, was calculated. 
Merges of all pairs of classes were then considered, and, for the grammars resulting 
from each merge, the description length was calculated. Best-first search was used, so 
whichever merge resulted in the greatest decrease in description length was made, and 
the set of all possible new merges was then calculated again, and the process repeated. 
Learning was stopped when no merge could be found which would reduce the overall 
description length. The result of this learning process was a set of classes which 
generally appeared to correspond well to the kind of classes proposed by 
syntacticians, including adjective classes, classes for various subtypes of verb, and 
one including just the two nominative pronouns he and she.  
Grünwald’s results were similar to those of Redington et al (1998) discussed above, 
though there is an important difference in that Redington et al’s program produced 
hierarchical clusters, but did not actually define distinct classes. Hence, for this 
reason, we might consider Grünwald’s system to be preferable, although this is 
debatable, because it is not clear that distinct classes such as those found by 
Grünwald’s system do actually exist. It is possible that syntactic categories are really 
more fuzzy, with membership being gradable (Taylor, 1989). Furthermore, it seems 
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that, for categories such as verbs, there is clear evidence for hierarchical 
categorisation, as we can identify many subtypes of verb, such as intransitive, 
transitive and ditransitive verbs. However, regardless of which, if any, of these 
possibilities is correct, the results of Grünwald’s program are clearly interesting from 
a theoretical linguistic viewpoint, as they demonstrate clearly that syntactic classes 
can be learned simply on the basis of distributions. 
There has also been a considerable amount of work which has used minimum 
description length to learn some aspects of language structure, but with the principle 
aims of the technique being concerned with applications in language technology, 
rather than advancing our understanding of language from a theoretical perspective or 
explaining how children learn languages. Such work includes Osborne (1999), 
Dowman (2000) and Starkie (2001). Although the aim of such work is not to advance 
linguistic theory, that does not mean that is of no interest to researchers in theoretical 
linguistics. As should be apparent from the above review of literature, developments 
in language technology can have applications in linguistic theory. For example, 
Solomonoff’s (1960) paper was primarily concerned with machine translation, but his 
work has now been applied as the basis of a number of cognitive models, including 
the one presented in this chapter. 
There also has been a considerable amount of work which has applied minimum 
description length to areas of linguistics other than syntax. Firstly Ellison (1992) and 
Rissanen and Ristad (1994), looked at phonology. Ellison showed how the distinction 
between consonant and vowel phonemes could be learned based on distributional 
evidence, and how vowel harmony systems could be learned. Rissanen and Ristad 
showed how minimum description length could help with modelling the acquisition of 
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metrical systems within a parameter setting framework. The acquisition of 
morphology using minimum description length was modelled by Brent (1993) and 
Goldsmith (2001), who both created systems which could analyse texts and discover 
the morphological structures of the words they contained. Brent and Cartwright 
(1997) and de Marcken (1996) showed how minimum description length could be 
used to deduce the correct segmentation of a stream of continuous speech (or written 
text) into linguistic units, such as words. This is a problem which children must 
address, because human speech does not leave gaps between words, and nor is there 
any other clear demarcation of word boundaries. A similar approach by 
Venkataraman (2001) could also be seen as a form of minimum description length, 
though it is described in terms of probabilities and not coding lengths, and it does not 
distinguish between separate theory and data components. All of this work provides 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that children use minimum description length to 
learn language. While it represents a broad spectrum of different approaches, any 
work showing that minimum description length could be used to learn one aspect of 
language, would seem to be supportive of the proposition that it is used to learn 
syntax, and hence of the model of syntactic acquisition described below. 
9.2.1 Description of Model 
Dowman’s (1998) model90 learned grammars for simple subsets of several languages, 
including the English data given in Table 9.1, which corresponds to the grammar 
                                                 
90
 Dowman (1998) is a publication of my MA (Honours) dissertation, and so does not form part of the 
work submitted for the PhD. However, the application of the model to learning verb 
subcategorizations, and the rest of this chapter, is all new material undertaken for the PhD. 
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given in Table 9.2. (In the grammar, Vt is an abbreviation for ‘mono-transitive verb’, 
and Vs for ‘verb taking a sentential complement’.) This was the same model that was 
used to learn the dative alternation in research for this thesis. The only a priori 
knowledge of the structure of the corpus which was available to the model, was 
implicit in the grammatical formalism with which grammars were specified. This 
formalism restricted the model to using binary branching or non-branching phrase 
structure rules, introducing each word with a non-branching rule, and using no more 
than eight non-terminal symbols. The non-terminal symbols were all equivalent 
arbitrary symbols, except that each grammar would contain one special symbol, S, 
with which each top down derivation would begin. 
John hit Mary Ethel thinks John ran 
Mary hit Ethel John thinks Ethel ran 
Ethel ran Mary ran 
John ran Ethel hit Mary 
Mary ran Mary thinks John hit Ethel 
Ethel hit John John screamed 
Noam hit John Noam hopes John screamed 
Ethel screamed Mary hopes Ethel hit John 
Mary kicked Ethel Noam kicked Mary 
John hopes Ethel thinks Mary hit Ethel 
Table 9.1. Data for English. 
S → NP VP Vs → thinks 
VP → ran Vs → hopes 
VP → screamed NP → John 
VP → Vt NP NP → Ethel 
VP → Vs S NP → Mary 
Vt → hit NP → Noam 
Vt → kicked  
Table 9.2 Grammar Describing English Data. 
The frequency, and hence probability, with which each symbol (including words) 
appeared in the grammar was specified, and so the amount of information required to 
specify each symbol in a grammar could be calculated. (Shannon’s (1948) 
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information theory defines the quantity of information conveyed by an event as the 
negative logarithm of its probability. It is conventional to take logarithms to base two, 
so that the units of information will be bits, which is the approach taken here.) A 
specification of a grammar would consist of a list of groups of three symbols, one for 
a rule’s left hand side, and two for its right hand side (a special null symbol being 
incorporated for use in non-branching rules). For example, to specify the rule in (9.1), 
firstly the symbol VP would be encoded, followed immediately by the V symbol and 
then the S symbol. To encode (9.2), we would first specify the VP symbol, then the 
screamed symbol, then the null symbol. If there were ten rules in the grammar, then 
there would be a total of 30 symbols to be specified. If 5 of these were VP, 3 were V, 
2 were S, only one was screamed, and there were 8 null symbols, then the coding 
length of these two rules (I) would be given by (9.3). (9.3) is simply a sum of the 
negative logarithms of the probabilities of each symbol needed to specify the two 
rules (each of which is included in the same order as it appears in the rules). 
(9.1) VP  V  S 
(9.2) VP  screamed 
(9.3) I = -log2 5/30 -log2 3/30 -log2 2/30 -log2 5/30 -log2 1/30 -log2 8/30 
As the grammar was statistical, it was also necessary to record how often each rule 
was used in parsing the corpus. It was assumed that a fixed amount of information 
could be used to specify these probabilities, and so 5 bits of information was added to 
the evaluation of the grammar per rule. (The assumption of 5 bits of information is 
fairly arbitrary, but sufficient for the purposes described here.) The total cost of the 
grammar was the amount of information needed to specify each symbol in the 
grammar, and each rule’s frequency. 
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Given such grammars, the data was then parsed left to right, bottom up, with only the 
first parse found for each sentence being considered, and an ordered list of rules 
needed to derive the sentence obtained. This list allows us to make a probabilistic 
encoding of the data in terms of the grammar. Given the probabilities of the rules, and 
always knowing the current non-terminal symbol being expanded (starting with S, and 
always expanding the left most unexpanded non-terminal), it is only necessary to 
specify which of the possible expansions of that symbol to make at each stage. Hence, 
if a grammar accounts well for regularities in the data, little information will be 
required to specify the data. If a symbol can only be expanded by a single rule (such 
as S in the grammar above), then no information is necessary to specify that that rule 
is used. 
For example, given the grammar of Table 9.2, we could encode the sentence Mary 
ran using the first rule, followed by the third of those rules which expand NP, and 
finally the first rule which expands VP. As we start with S, the first rule we choose 
must expand this symbol. As there is only one rule with S on its left hand side, we 
must use that rule. As this is the only rule which can be used, the probability of 
choosing it is one. Now we have the derivation NP VP to expand (as we have 
substituted for S what was on the right hand side of the rule expanding S). Firstly we 
must choose which of the rules with NP on their left hand sides to use. If these rules 
occur ten times in the parses of the data, but the third of them is only used once, then 
it will have a probability of 1/10. Application of this rule results in the derivation 
Mary VP. Mary does not need further expansion, so we now move to expanding the 
VP symbol. We need to use the first VP rule, which is used, say, 4 times, while overall 
the VP rules are used with a total frequency of, say, 20. Hence the probability of using 
this rule at this point in the derivation is 4/20. We can calculate the total coding length 
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of this sentence (I) by taking the sum of the negative logarithms of the probabilities of 
using each of the rules needed to code it, as shown in (9.4). (Note that the coding cost 
of using the first rule, which has a probability of one, evaluates to zero.) 
(9.4) I = -log2 1 -log2 1/10 -log2 4/20 
By summing the amount of information needed to specify the grammar rules, the 
frequencies of those rules, and the data given that grammar, we obtain an evaluation 
for each grammar, with lower evaluations corresponding to better grammars. 
However, in order to complete the model of acquisition, it is necessary to describe the 
search mechanism that was used for generating and testing grammars. 
The model started learning with a simple grammar of the form given in Table 9.3, 
with a rule introducing each word. This grammar is very simple, hence having a good 
evaluation itself, but it does not describe any regularities in the data, and so has a very 
bad evaluation in that respect, resulting in a poor overall evaluation.  
S → X S S → X 
X → John  X → Ethel 
X → Mary X → Noam 
X → ran X → screamed 
X → hit X → kicked 
X → thinks X → hopes 
Table 9.3. Form of Initial Grammars. 
The model would begin learning by making one of five changes to the grammar. The 
change to be made would be selected at random from one of the possibilities listed 
below, each of which is followed by the probability of that change being made. (The 
particular probabilities used were chosen by a process of trial and error, and hence are 
fairly arbitrary.) 
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• Adding a new rule (which would be the same as an old rule, but with one of 
the symbols in it changed at random). (1/6.) 
• Deleting a randomly chosen rule. (1/6.) 
• Changing one of the symbols in one of the rules. (17/48.) 
• Changing the order of the rules91. (7/48.) 
• Adding a pair of new rules. These new rules would be based on two existing 
rules, in which a non-terminal system occurring on the right hand side of the 
first also occurred on the left hand side of the second. The new rules would be 
created by changing that symbol to another non-terminal system, and then 
adding the two new rules to the grammar. The original rules would be left 
unchanged. (For example if there were rules X  Y and Y  Z, then two new 
rules might be added, X  A and A  Z) (1/6.) 
These changes were chosen largely because they are simple, but still enable any 
grammar specifiable within the grammar formalism to be reached, when a number of 
the rules are applied in the right combination. For example, starting with the grammar 
given in Table 9.3, the nouns could be placed in a separate class if the changes listed 
in Table 9.4 were made. The changes would probably have to be made in this order, 
as, after every change, the grammar must still be able to parse the whole corpus, so 
                                                 
91
 This could potentially affect the resulting evaluation, as the evaluations were always based on the 
first parse found by the parsing mechanism, which always tried to apply earlier rules before considering 
later ones. 
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we could not, for example, delete the original rule introducing Ethel, before adding 
the new one. (This probably would not in itself improve the evaluation of either the 
grammar, or the data specified in terms of the grammar, but such a change might 
happen by chance, and could eventually lead to a better overall grammar.)  
Add Y → Ethel 
Add Y → Noam 
Add S → Y S 
Add  S → Y 
Delete X → Ethel 
Delete X → Noam 
Table 9.4. Examples of Changes that Could be Made to an Initial Grammar. 
The last grammar edit rule in the list of rules given above, was introduced to help in 
cases where a single symbol is used in several rules, but where using two separate 
symbols would enable a better evaluation to be obtained. (For example, if both nouns 
and verbs were introduced with the same symbol, then this rule might help to produce 
a grammar in which nouns and verbs were both introduced by a different symbol.) 
Dowman (1998) used a slightly more complex system than this, but further 
investigations have revealed that this learning system works well. It was applied to the 
same data set used by Dowman (1998) (Table 9.1), and reproduced the results 
obtained with the more complex system which were reported by Dowman (1998). 
Hence, I will not repeat here the other rules used by Dowman (1998), as it was this 
simpler system which was used for deriving the new results presented in this chapter. 
However, the rest of the description of the model applies to both Dowman’s (1998) 
system, and the modified system developed for explaining the dative alternation. 
After each change the evaluation of the new grammar with respect to the data would 
be calculated. If the change improved the evaluation of the grammar then it would be 
kept, but if the new grammar was unable to parse the data, it would be rejected. If the 
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change made the evaluation of the grammar worse, then the probability that it would 
be kept would be inversely proportional to the amount by which it made the 
evaluation worse. Throughout learning, the probability that changes resulting in worse 
evaluations would be accepted, was gradually reduced. This is an implementation of 
annealing search (Aarts and Korst, 1989), which enables the system to learn despite 
finding locally optimal grammars in the search space. The program learned in two 
stages, in the first only taking account of the evaluation of the data in terms of the 
grammar (making it easier to find the grammatical constructions which best fitted the 
data), and in the second taking account of the overall evaluation (and so removing any 
parts of the grammar which could not be justified given the data). After a fixed 
number of changes had been considered (less than 18,000 in the case of the above 
data) learning would finish with the current grammar, no improvements usually 
having been found for a long time. For efficiency reasons, there were also limits 
placed on how deeply the parser could search for correct parses, and on the maximum 
number of rules which the grammar could contain at any stage of the search. Because 
the search strategy is stochastic, it is not guaranteed to always find the optimal 
grammar every time. Hence the learning mechanism would run the search several 
times, and select the grammar with the best overall evaluation. This discussion of the 
model should specify it in enough detail, both to enable its reproduction, and for a full 
understanding of how it works to be obtained, but it is, none the less, clearly very 
brief. A more detailed description can be found in Dowman (1998). 
9.2.2 Results 
When used to learn from the English data in Table 9.1, the system learned a grammar 
which corresponded exactly to that in Table 9.2 in structure. (As linguistic categories 
are not known a priori, the system simply used a different arbitrary symbol to 
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represent each learned category.) Table 9.5 shows that this grammar was preferred 
because, while the grammar itself is more complex than the initial one, and so 
receives a worse evaluation, it captures regularities in the data, and so improves the 
evaluation of the data with respect to the grammar by a greater amount. (We should 
note that the overall evaluation is equal to the sum of the evaluation for the grammar 
and data components. In the case of the learned grammar, the sum of the evaluations 
given for each component does not exactly equal that for the overall evaluation, but 
this is simply due to rounding error, as all the evaluations are given to an accuracy of 
one decimal place.) Dowman (1998) used this same learning system (without any 
modifications except to the maximum number of non-terminal symbols) to also learn 
aspects of French, Japanese, Finnish and Tigak. 
 Initial state of learning Learned Grammar 
Overall Evaluation 406.5 bits 329.5 bits 
Grammar 160.3 bits 199.3 bits 
Data 246.2 bits 130.3 bits 
Table 9.5. Evaluations for English Grammar. 
9.3 Learning Verb Subcategorizations 
Given Dowman’s (1998) success in learning simple syntactic systems, it was decided 
to investigate whether the same model could be used to learn some of the kinds of 
phenomena which it has been argued are especially problematic for theories of 
learning. In particular it was investigated whether the distinction between sub-classes 
of ditransitive verbs such as gave and donated could be learned. 
There were three key results which the model aimed to replicate. Firstly, children 
eventually learn a distinction between verbs which can appear in both the double 
object and prepositional dative constructions, and those which do not show this 
alternation. Secondly, when children encounter a previously unseen verb they use it 
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productively in both constructions. Finally, during learning, before children have seen 
many examples of an irregular verb which only occurs in a subset of the possible 
constructions of other verbs, they use that verb productively in constructions in which 
it is not grammatical92. 
9.3.1 Data Used for Learning 
The same model was used as in Dowman (1998), but this time the data consisted of 
two types of sentences, prepositional datives such as (9.2a) and (9.2b), containing one 
of the verbs gave, passed, lent, or donated, and double object datives such as (9.2c), 
containing gave, passed or lent, but not donated. Each of these four verbs occurred 
with roughly equal frequency, and the alternating verbs (gave, passed and lent) were 
just as likely to appear in either construction. In addition, the sentence (9.2d) was 
added, containing the only example of the verb sent. This was so that it would be 
possible to see if the model would place a newly seen verb in the regular or irregular 
class of verbs (assuming that it learned two such classes).  
Noun phrases consisted of either one of two proper nouns, or one of the two 
determiners a or the, followed by either painting or museum. There were no biases as 
                                                 
92
 Throughout this chapter donate is described as irregular, because it does not participate in the dative 
alternation, but it is one of several verbs for which this is the case. Hence its non-participation in the 
alternation might best be described as a sub-regularity, an analysis likely to be preferred by many 
theorists who have worked on the alternation, such as Mazurkewich and White (1984). However, 
whether or not that is in fact the case, the argument presented here is applicable to any situation in 
which a lexical exception prevents a word from being used in a regular construction. There is further 
discussion concerning the correct analysis of the alternation in section 9.4. 
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to which noun phrase was most likely to occur in which position. Clearly, this leads to 
a situation in which many of the sentences in the corpus, while syntactically correct, 
are semantically very strange. For example, (9.2b) is unusual, because John would 
normally refer to a person, which is not something which could typically be donated 
to a museum. Overall the data consisted of 150 sentences, and the full corpus is given 
in Appendix D. 
This data set was created completely artificially, and is in many ways unrealistic. 
However, it enables us to focus on the central question of whether the dative 
alternation can be learned. Crucially, Pinker’s (1989) arguments, concerning the 
learnability paradox created by the dative alternation, are equally applicable to this 
simple data set as to real languages. Whether the corpus is realistic, is not in itself 
important in resolving the issue of whether the non-occurrence of a particular 
construction could be used as evidence by children that that construction is not 
grammatical. Whether the model is capable of overcoming the learnability problem 
was tested by applying it to this data set, and investigating whether the resulting 
grammar accounted correctly for the subcategorizations of all the verbs. No 
modifications were made to the model used to learn the data in Table 9.1, except that 
in order to cope with the more complex data set the maximum number of non-
terminals was increased to 14, and the number of iterations in the search was also 
increased.  
(9.2) a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
John gave a painting to Sam. 
Sam donated John to the museum. 
The museum lent Sam a painting. 
The museum sent a painting to Sam. 
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9.3.2 Results 
The initial and final evaluations of the grammars are given in Table 9.6. (Again, the 
overall evaluation is not exactly equal to the sum of the grammar and data 
components for the learned grammar, due to rounding error.) This grammar was 
produced by running the model twenty times, and selecting the grammar which 
received the lowest overall evaluation on any of the runs. (Most of the runs produced 
different grammars, but each of those grammars had a worse overall evaluation). The 
model was implemented in SICSTUS PROLOG, and was run on two Sun UNIX 
workstations. It took approximately three weeks to obtain twenty complete runs of the 
program on these machines, but this overestimates the total execution time, as each 
run of the program was started manually, and hence there would be periods of time 
when the program was not running. Dowman (1998) showed that the program is 
likely to execute much more slowly when significantly more complex grammars need 
to be learned. Further details of the program, including all the source code, appear in 
Appendix E. 
 Initial state of learning Learned Grammar 
Overall Evaluation 3445.6 bits 1703.4 bits 
Grammar 190.3 bits  321.0 bits 
Data 3255.3 bits 1382.3 bits 
Table 9.6. Evaluations for Ditransitive Verbs Data. 
We can see from Table 9.6 that, as with the case of learning from the English data of 
Dowman (1998), a more complex grammar has been learned, and it accounts better 
for regularities in the data than the original grammar did. The grammar is shown in 
Table 9.7, where the arbitrary symbols have been replaced with more interpretable 
ones, and where the rules appear in a different order to improve clarity. (Vr is an 
abbreviation for regular verb, and Vi for irregular verb.) Examination of the learned 
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grammar showed that the verbs had been divided into two classes. (They have 
different symbols on the left hand sides of the rules producing them.) passed, gave, 
sent and lent have all been placed in one class, while donated appeared in a class of its 
own. The grammar is able to generate only grammatical sentences, so gave, passed, 
lent and sent may appear in both double object and prepositional dative constructions, 
while donated may occur only in the prepositional dative construction. This has been 
learned even though there was no data explicitly indicating that donated did not 
follow the regular pattern, and even though sent only occurred once, and in the 
prepositional dative structure. 
S → X NP 
X → NP Y 
Y → Vr NP 
Y → Vr Z 
Y → Vi Z 
Z → NP P 
P → to 
NP → DET N 
NP → John  
NP → Sam  
DET → a  
DET → the  
N → museum  
N → painting  
Vr → passed  
Vr → gave  
Vr → sent  
Vr → lent  
Vi → donated  
 
Table 9.7. Grammar Learned from Ditransitive Verbs Data. 
The structures which the grammar assigns to sentences are, however, clearly not 
correct, as can be seen from the parse shown in Figure 9.1 below. The model has 
identified a clear noun phrase category (NP), and has placed all the individual words 
into appropriate classes, but it has not correctly identified other phrasal constituents, 
such as verb phrases or prepositional phrases. Instead there are three phrasal 
constituents, X, Y and Z, which clearly do not correspond to any phrasal constituent in 
English. This analysis should not be surprising, as there was no information in the 
data presented to the model, to demonstrate that this type of structure is incorrect. For 
example, there was no evidence to show that the preposition forms a constituent with 
the following noun phrase, rather than the preceding one. Dowman (1998) showed 
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that the model can learn structures such as verb phrases when presented with data 
which contains evidence supporting the existence of such phrases, so we should 
expect that if the ditransitive verbs data were augmented with further appropriate data, 
the model would then learn a grammar which assigns correct structures to all the 
sentences, as well as learning the correct subcategorizations for the verbs. 
 
Figure 9.1. A Structure Assigned by the Learned Grammar 
It is interesting to investigate exactly why sent was placed in the class of regular verbs, 
rather than being grouped in the irregular class along with donate. There was no clear 
evidence showing in which of the two classes sent occurred, so it is not obvious why 
the model preferred placing it in the regular class. The grammar was changed so that 
sent was placed in the irregular class by changing the symbol on the left hand side of 
the rule introducing it to be the same as that which introduces donate. Table 9.8 
John                 gave                  a                   painting                   to                   Sam 
  NP                   Vr                 DET                     N                         P                     NP 
NP 
S 
Z 
 Y 
X 
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shows the evaluations for the new grammar (as well as those for the grammar learned 
by the system, for comparison), and we can see that the overall evaluation is very 
slightly worse, thus confirming that the model prefers the grammar which places sent 
in the regular class. (The model could have arrived at that classification simply by 
chance.) We might think that this result is surprising, however, because the learned 
grammar predicted that sent could be used in the double object dative construction, 
and so that sentences of types which were not observed in the training corpus were 
grammatical. The preferred grammar (shown in Table 9.7), therefore did not model 
the regularities in the training data as well as the one which classes sent as irregular, 
and this can be seen by comparing the evaluations given to the data, for which the 
preferred grammar was given a slightly worse evaluation. 
 Grammar with sent in 
Irregular Class 
Grammar with sent in 
Regular Class 
Overall Evaluation 1703.6 bits 1703.4 bits 
Grammar 322.2 bits 321.0 bits 
Data 1381.4 bits 1382.3 bits 
Table 9.8. Evaluations for Ditransitive Grammars with sent in Irregular Class or Regular Class. 
The reason that the model prefers to classify sent as regular, is because this results in 
a lower evaluation for the grammar component, and, as can be seen by comparing 
Table 9.6 and Table 9.8, the improvement in the evaluation of the grammar 
component is greater than the deterioration in the evaluation of the data component. 
The question that now arises is why does the grammar receive a lower evaluation 
when sent is regular as opposed to irregular? After all, both grammars contain exactly 
the same number of rules, and the only difference is the symbol on the left hand side 
of the rule introducing sent. The small difference in the evaluation of each grammar 
must therefore be due to this symbol. The key to understanding this issue is to 
remember that, not only is the data encoded probabilistically in terms of the grammar, 
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but that the grammar itself is also coded probabilistically. The frequency of each 
symbol is recorded, and these frequencies are used to determine the probability of 
using each symbol in constructing the grammar. Infrequent symbols thus have a 
higher coding cost than frequent ones. As can be seen in Table 9.7, other than the 
symbol on the left hand side of the rule introducing sent, there are five occurrences of 
the regular verb symbol (Vr) and only two occurrences of the irregular verb symbol 
(Vi). There is therefore a lower cost to placing sent in the regular class, which involves 
the addition of another Vr, rather than in the irregular class, which would involve the 
addition of another, more costly, Vi. Examination of this issue reveals that ensuring 
that the grammar itself was encoded statistically added to the generalization ability of 
the model, because it effectively added a bias to prefer regular (and hence more 
frequent) constructions over irregular (less frequent) ones. 
The results above account both for eventual learning of the distinction between 
syntactically distinct verbs such as gave and donated, and the productive use of novel 
verbs in regular constructions. The final phenomenon which I aimed to demonstrate 
was that, at earlier stages of learning, children overgeneralize, and use verbs such as 
donated productively in constructions in which they are ungrammatical. In order to 
investigate this phenomenon, the total amount of data was reduced, to simulate a stage 
of acquisition where children had not been exposed to so many examples of each kind 
of verb. When the model learned from this data it failed to maintain a distinction 
between sub-classes of verbs, allowing all verbs to occur in both constructions. This 
was because there were not enough examples of donated to justify making the 
grammar more complex by creating a separate syntactic class, and so it was simply 
placed in the regular class. 
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9.4 Discussion 
These results concerning the acquisition of regular and irregular verb 
subcategorizations show that an aspect of syntax which many other theories would 
have difficulty accounting for is learnable. Dowman (1998) compared the 
performance of the model described here to that of connectionist models of syntactic 
acquisition, such as Elman’s (1993) model, and argued that some of the generalization 
‘successes’ could, in the light of the results of the present model, be alternatively 
interpreted as a failure to learn exceptions. 
Elman’s network learned a language containing only 23 words, and yet 50,000 
sentences were used to train the network. (The training sentences were generated 
artificially using a grammar.) This means that every word could have been observed 
in every syntactic position may times over, greatly reducing the need to form 
generalizations. Christiansen and Chater (1994) investigated to what extent this kind 
of model was able to generalize to predict that a word observed in one syntactic 
position would also be grammatical in another position. In order to do this, they 
trained a similar connectionist network on a more complex language containing 34 
words, again using 50,000 sentences. In the training data they did not include girl and 
girls, in any genitive contexts, and, boy and boys in any noun phrase conjunctions. 
After training they found that the network was able to generalize so that it would 
allow boy and boys to appear in noun phrase conjunctions, but it did not generalize to 
allow girl and girls to occur in genitive contexts. Christiansen and Chater considered 
the learning to have been successful in the case of boy and boys, but not in the case of 
girl and girls.  
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However, the account of the acquisition of verb subcategorizations presented in this 
chapter relies on statistical properties of the data, and in particular the non-occurrence 
of certain forms. So, given 50,000 sentences of a language with only 34 words, in 
which two words did not appear in a given construction, it would seem that a learner 
would predict that this could not simply be due to chance. Given this perspective, it 
seems that Christiansen and Chater’s network has learned correctly in the case of girl 
and girls, but not in the case of boy and boys93. 
In order to account for distinctions between gave and donated, it seems that neural 
networks must be more sensitive to quantitative information in language. The degree 
to which recurrent neural networks generalize is partly dependent on the fixed 
architecture of the networks, and in particular on the number of hidden nodes. 
Bayesian learning methods for neural networks (MacKay, 1995) should be able to 
solve this problem, by placing a prior probability distribution on network structures 
and parameter values, although I am not aware of any applications of such networks 
to modelling language acquisition. 
Redington et al’s (1998) system for learning word classes is capable of making very 
fine distinctions between sub-classes of verbs, but unlike the system described here, it 
                                                 
93
 Clearly the number of times with which such neural networks are presented with each training 
example is unrealistically large, and may best be seen as representative of a much smaller number of 
examples, or of a much more diverse set of examples containing a larger number of different words, so 
Christiansen and Chater’s interpretation of their results is hardly unreasonable. However, a better way 
to have tested for generalization might have been to have inserted a novel verb in one, or perhaps a 
few, syntactic positions, and to have looked for generalization of that word to other positions. I suspect 
that such an experiment would not have been successful given the kind of neural network used. 
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is not able to decide when the distributions of two words are dissimilar enough that 
they should be placed into separate classes, and when the difference in distributions is 
simply due to chance variation within a class. However Boulton (1975) describes a 
program which does incorporate a Bayesian based metric into this kind of clustering 
system, and so demonstrates that it is possible to learn discrete classes automatically. 
Certainly evaluation procedures based on simplicity metrics are not new to linguistic 
theory. Chomsky’s (1965) theory of syntactic acquisition relied on such a measure to 
choose between alternative grammars. However, it is possible to identify some key 
differences which make Chomsky’s theory very different from the Bayesian approach 
suggested here. Firstly Chomsky considered syntax to be fundamentally non-
statistical. He had earlier argued that ‘Despite the undeniable interest and importance 
of semantic and statistical studies of language, they appear to have no direct relevance 
to the problem of determining or characterizing the set of grammatical 
utterances….[P]robabilistic models give no particular insight into some of the basic 
problems of syntactic structure.’ (Chomsky, 1957, p17). It seems hard to explain how 
any system which did not monitor the frequencies with which verbs such as donated 
and gave are used would be able to account for how the different subcategorizations 
of these verbs could be acquired.  
Probably an even more important difference between the kind of simplicity measure 
proposed in Chomsky (1965) and the kind used here, is that Chomsky did not 
incorporate a measure of goodness of fit to data into his simplicity metric. 
(Interestingly, as was discussed above, this was also true of Langley’s (1995) model 
of syntactic acquisition, though he added such a measure to his Langley and 
Stromsten (2000) model.) Chomsky’s metric simply looked for the grammar which 
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was shortest, in terms of the number of symbols which it contained. The theory relied 
on innate constraints on what forms grammar could take in order that ‘significant 
considerations of complexity and generality are converted into considerations of 
length, so that real generalizations shorten the grammar and spurious ones do not.’ 
(Chomsky, 1965, p. 42). Ultimately any notion of a simplicity metric was dropped 
from syntactic theory, because little progress seemed to be being made in 
understanding grammar selection in this way. 
Interestingly however, Chomsky’s (1965) theory shows that simplicity metrics are not 
necessarily incompatible with theories which postulate very strong innate constraints 
on grammar. It seems that even within a parameter setting model of language 
acquisition, statistical inferences would make the task of learning much easier, 
especially given the presence of noise in the data from which people learn (due 
primarily to grammatical errors, and exposure to data from children who have not 
mastered certain aspects of grammar). In fact, the use of minimum description length 
within a parameter setting framework was modelled by Briscoe (1999), who used it as 
part of a model of phylogenetic language evolution. However, in the light of the 
results reported here, the use of minimum description length together with Universal 
Grammar may seem odd, because it would seem that if minimum description length is 
used to learn languages, then there is no need for Universal Grammar. The arguments 
supporting the existence of Universal Grammar are primarily based on the claim that 
languages would not be learnable without it, so, if it can be shown that this is not the 
case, it removes the main piece of evidence supporting the theory of Universal 
Grammar. However, having said this, showing that Bayesian inference can be useful 
in explaining language acquisition does not necessarily mean that it is actually used. 
Essentially it allows us to return the degree to which language is determined by innate 
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principles of grammar to an empirical question, allowing the possibility that there is a 
much greater degree of learning in the process of syntactic acquisition than had 
previously been thought. 
However, postulating that a Bayesian mechanism is used in acquiring syntax, results 
in very different predictions about what form syntactic knowledge takes, than would 
be the case if we presume that language is largely determined by universal principles. 
Chomsky has argued that the language faculty of the mind should satisfy ‘general 
conditions of conceptual naturalness that have some independent plausibility, namely, 
simplicity, economy, symmetry, nonredundancy, and the like’ (Chomsky, 1995, p. 1). 
While Chomsky notes this is ‘a surprising property of a biological system’ (Chomsky, 
1995, p. 5) he argues that this view is justified because, throughout the history of 
syntactic research, systems conforming to this kind of principle have turned out to be 
the right ones. However, if language is learned with a Bayesian system we would not 
expect it to conform to such principles. Grammars could contain a lot of irregular 
rules if these accounted well for regularities in observed language. Even the principle 
of lexical minimization is not so clear cut within a Bayesian based account of learning, 
as Bayesian metrics will favour grammars which associate a lot of information with 
individual words if this allows them to account better for regularities in the data. 
Hence, one prediction of Bayesian theory is that the most commonly occurring words 
may be very idiosyncratic and irregular in their behaviour, while very rare ones must 
conform to regular patterns. 
It is interesting to compare the Bayesian account of acquisition of subcategorizations 
presented here to Pinker’s (1989) theory. Pinker’s theory predicts that universal innate 
principles relate the meaning of a word to its syntactic subcategorization. Instead of 
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the syntactic subcategorization of a verb being determined empirically by a learner 
based on observations of patterns of occurrence, it is determined by the meaning of 
that verb. Certainly Gropen et al (1989) have shown that children are sensitive to 
correlations between semantic and phonological characteristics of verbs, and which 
subcategorization frames they are most likely to occur in. Researchers including 
Mazurkewich and White (1984) had already proposed that children use these 
correlations to determine verbs’ subcategorizations. However, it is quite possible that 
these patterns were learned by the child in much the same way as we have proposed 
that syntactic subcategorizations may be learned.  
One way of resolving the question of how people actually do learn these verbs, and 
hence of evaluating more directly the correctness of the model, would be to perform 
psycholinguistic experiments in which participants were taught novel verbs. The 
participants could be introduced to novel, nonce, verbs, which would be incorporated 
into passages of text. The texts could either be presented to the participants orally, or 
given to them to read. As people continue to learn new vocabulary throughout their 
lives, it should be unproblematic to conduct such experiments with adult participants. 
The novel verbs could variously either occur a single time, in either the double object 
or the prepositional dative construction, or could appear multiple times, in either just 
one, or both of these conditions. Furthermore, the verbs could be chosen to provide 
the semantic and phonological cues that Mazurkewich and White (1984) and Pinker 
(1989) have identified as being indicative of verbs which either follow the alternation, 
or which do not alternate. The subjects would then be required to perform some 
exercise that would cue the production of the verbs, such as being asked questions 
that would normally be expected to produce an answer containing the verb. It would 
then be possible to see what subcategorizations the participants had learned for each 
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of the verbs, and to determine whether the participants had learned to alternate any of 
the verbs, so that they used them in both constructions.  
If some of the novel verbs were of the semantic and phonological type that normally 
alternates, but appeared only in the prepositional dative construction, it would be 
possible to determine which cues ultimately take precedence, at least if sufficient 
examples of the verb had been provided during the experiment. It would also be 
possible to determine whether participants would learn to use verbs in only the 
prepositional dative construction if they were presented in both constructions, but 
their semantic and phonological cues indicated that they should occur only in the 
prepositional construction. Such experiments ought to be able to determine 
conclusively whether the semantic and phonological cues are the ultimate determinant 
of the subcategorization of verbs, or whether they just provide probabilistic cues, that 
can be overridden given sufficient distributional data. It could even be possible to 
investigate whether subjects could be cued to learn new rules relating semantic and 
phonological cues to verb subcategorizations. This might be possible if examples 
were given of a sufficient number of verbs for which there was a correlation between 
semantic and phonological properties, and subcategorization.  
The main limitation of the computational model described here is that it can only 
learn from small artificial data sets. There is no reason in principle why it cannot 
operate on naturally occurring language; it is simply that it would take an extremely 
long time to run on this kind of corpus. This is clearly a limitation that is shared with 
connectionist approaches, though Redington et al (1998) and Grünwald (1994) 
demonstrated impressive results learning from real language corpora. This is probably 
the main criticism that is likely to made of this approach, especially by researchers 
275 
aiming to defend the universal grammar hypothesis. However, the primary evidence 
in support of the universal grammar hypothesis has been that languages are not 
learnable, due to the poverty of the stimulus. This is a different issue to whether or not 
a search mechanism can be found that will be able to identify the correct grammar. As 
the amount of data increases, it becomes necessary to consider larger and more 
complex grammars, and so there is a combinatorial explosion in the number of 
possible candidate grammars. In these circumstances, a universal grammar could 
certainly help to reduce the size of the search space.  
It seems that there are really two separate learnability problems. Firstly, it is unclear 
whether there is sufficient information in the input data available to language learners 
for them to identify the correct grammar without strong innate constraints being 
available to them to rule out some of the candidate grammars. Secondly, it is unclear 
whether it is possible to complete a search through sufficient of the candidate 
grammars for a correct (or nearly correct) one to be identified in the amount of time 
that children take to acquire language, without strong innate constraints being 
available to them to constrain the search. The work of this chapter has gone some way 
to showing that there is sufficient information in language to enable acquisition 
(although it has only shown this as regards the acquisition of one very small aspect of 
language, so there could well be others which such a method is not able to acquire). 
However, this chapter has done relatively little to address the second learnability 
problem, that of combinatorial explosion94. In order to show that that problem can be 
overcome by such a method, it would be necessary to demonstrate that a much more 
                                                 
94
 This problem is, however, discussed at more length in Dowman, 1998. 
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complex grammar could be learned, covering a much larger range of language than 
that investigated in this chapter. 
A task for further research will be to investigate ways in which the search procedure 
could be made more efficient, so that learning from more realistic corpora becomes 
possible. It seems worth acknowledging, however, that we are modelling a process 
which takes place over many years, and that the human brain, while operating in a 
very different way from man-made computers, probably has a much greater overall 
processing capacity. This suggests that it may not be possible to learn the syntactic 
systems of real languages in their full complexity on a present day computer. 
The work described here has not been the only research which has investigated the 
use of minimum description length as a psychological model for learning verb 
subcategorizations. Onnis et al (2002) used minimum description length to try to 
account for the way in which we learn regular linguistic rules, whilst also learning 
that there are exceptions to those rules. He looked at a similar verb alternation to that 
investigated in this chapter, the alternation in English between intransitive verbs, 
transitive verbs which must take an object, and verbs which can appear in either of 
these forms. An example of the first type of verb would be arrive. We can say The 
train arrived but not *John arrived the train. However this contrasts with verbs of the 
second type which must take an object, such as cut. We can say John cut the string 
but not *The string cut or *John cut. These two types of verb both contrast with verbs 
of the third type, such as bounce. We can say both John bounced the ball and The ball 
bounced.  
Onnis et al simulated this pattern by creating a very simple artificial language which 
contained only two word classes, nouns (N) and verbs (V). Sentences in this language 
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could then take one of two forms, either NV or VN. (NN and VV were both 
disallowed.) They created 36 verbs and 36 nouns. 16 of the verbs could occur in either 
the NV or the VN construction, but 10 of them could only occur in the NV 
construction, and another 10 in only the VN one. This simulates the situation in 
English as regards transitivity, in which some verbs can occur in both transitive and 
intransitive constructions, but in which others are restricted to occurring in only one 
of these forms. The actual number of verbs of each type in the artificial language was 
based on statistics extracted from the CHILDES English corpora (MacWhinney, 
2000), and reflected the number of verbs used exclusively in an intransitive or 
transitive context, or in both contexts, in adult speech in the corpus. 
Onnis et al devised a coding scheme, which could code sentences in this language, but 
which could optionally record that some verbs were ‘exceptional’ and so could not 
occur in one of the two constructions. Recording these exceptions had a cost in terms 
of coding length, and so including this information would only result in a lower 
overall coding length if the corpus contained a sufficient number of occurrences of 
these exceptional verbs that a significant gain in terms of reduced coding length 
would result from the knowledge that they can only occur in one of the two 
constructions. Onnis et al showed that when less than 16,000 sentences had been 
observed, a shorter coding length was achieved when no distinction was made 
between the verbs which could occur in both constructions and those which were 
restricted to only occurring in one construction. However, when a slightly greater 
number of sentences had been observed, recording the restrictions on exceptional 
verbs did result in shorter overall coding lengths. In common with the research 
reported here, Onnis et al argued that their model explained why children at first over-
generalize alternations, extending their scope to verbs to which the alternation does 
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not apply, yet later are able to recover from this overgeneralization, once they have 
observed a greater number of verbs. 
Onnis et al’s model is very similar to the one presented here in that both models aim 
to explain the acquisition of verb alternations from positive evidence, and thus resolve 
the problem of how children know that some verbs cannot occur in particular 
constructions. Both models use minimum description length as their learning 
mechanisms, and both explain early overgeneralization followed by later learning of 
exceptions in the same way; that is that with only a few examples of a verb, there is 
insufficient benefit in terms of shorter coding length to justify recording the 
exceptions. However the way in which the models represent grammars is completely 
different. The model described here is much more general, in that it uses context free 
phrase structure grammars, and so can learn a wide variety of linguistic structures. 
Onnis et al’s model is restricted to coding two word languages, and the differences 
between the grammars in his model consisted only of lists of which words fitted into 
each of the two exceptional categories.  
While the model described here includes a search mechanism for finding grammars as 
well as a coding scheme, Onnis et al did not provide a search mechanism which 
would determine which verbs were exceptional and which were not, but instead 
simply compared the case where no exceptions were recorded to the one in which all 
the exceptions were recorded. Hence Onnis et al’s model was not able to learn as 
such, but instead simply evaluated two grammars, and decided which was best. It 
would of course be possible to add a search strategy to Onnis et al’s model, and 
perhaps the lack of one should not be thought of as a deficiency, especially when 
compared to the model presented here, because no claim is made that the search 
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strategy of the present model closely reflects the mechanism which children use to 
find possible grammars. There does, however, remain the problem with Onnis et al’s 
model that it has only compared two possible grammars, and so it is not possible to be 
certain that another grammar would not have received a better evaluation than either 
of the two considered for any particular corpus. Because the range of allowable 
grammars is so restricted, this is probably not the case, but this kind of phenomenon 
commonly occurred in experiments using the model presented in this chapter. (For 
example there is a grammar which both specifies the verb subcategorizations 
correctly, and assigns correct structures, but this grammar has a worse evaluation than 
the one actually learned. However, if a comparison had simply been made between 
this grammar, a similar one which classed sent as irregular, and the initial grammar, 
the correct grammar would probably have received the lowest evaluation, and so we 
could have been tempted to argue that the model had shown that it could learn not 
only the subcategorizations correctly, but also the correct structures, which is clearly 
not the case.) 
That Onnis et al’s model is simpler than the one presented here could in itself be 
considered an advantage. If two models explain the same data then it would seem that 
the simpler one would be preferable. However, the model presented here is able to 
learn a lot more generally than Onnis et al’s model, as it can learn aspects of syntax 
besides subcategorizations, so this direct comparison is not completely applicable. 
However, a clear advantage of Onnis et al’s work is that the artificial language used 
there is modelled closely on empirical data derived from a corpus, so the actual 
frequencies of each type of verb would be more realistic. Onnis et al also used a much 
larger number of verbs than were used in the research presented in this chapter, so, in 
this way, their model more closely reflects the real process of language acquisition. 
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The model presented here could not cope with such a large number of verbs because 
the search mechanism used is very slow, even when learning on only the four verb 
corpus. However there should be no difficulty in simply evaluating grammars able to 
parse languages containing significantly greater numbers of verbs, as the time needed 
to evaluate a grammar for a corpus is much much less than that needed to learn a 
grammar from a corpus. It would seem that if the model described here were 
presented with Onnis et al’s corpus, then it would make a similar prediction, in that 
with only a small corpus it would predict that all verbs followed the alternation, but 
that with a bigger corpus it would learn the exceptional cases of verbs which do not 
alternate. However, it would be interesting to investigate just how large a corpus was 
needed to achieve such a result. While Onnis et al’s model did not prefer grammars 
which accounted for the exceptional verbs until it had observed over 16,000 
sentences, it would seem likely that the model described here would do so when it had 
seen many fewer sentences, because it was able to learn the distinction between verbs 
which can appear in the double object dative construction and those which do not 
from a corpus of only 150 sentences.  
It is worth noting that, in common with the model described here, Onnis et al’s model 
made no attempt to use non-distributional cues, such as semantic or phonological 
evidence, to determine the correct subcategory for each verb, despite there being 
evidence which suggests that people do make use of such evidence (Gropen et al, 
1989). However Allen (1997) showed how semantic cues could play a part in 
acquisition of the rules governing the mapping of verb arguments to semantic roles, 
using a neural network model. The architecture of his model is shown in Figure 9.2.  
281 
 
Figure 9.2. Architecture of Allen’s Model.  
(The numbers in brackets show the number of each type of node.) 
The network was trained based on child-directed speech occurring in the CHILDES 
corpora (MacWhinney, 2000). The utterances containing the 110 most frequent main 
verbs were found, and the verbs together with any associated preposition were then 
presented to the network together with semantic representations of their nominal 
arguments, an overall semantic representation of each utterance, and a representation 
of the thematic roles filled by the nominal arguments. Verbs and prepositions were 
represented with a localist scheme, so that there was one specific node corresponding 
to each verb, and one for each of the 21 prepositions found in the corpus. The nominal 
arguments were represented as a pattern of activations across all 390 nodes. The 
nodes corresponded to WordNet features (Miller et al, 1990; Miller, 1990), so they 
coded elements such as +human, +male, and –vehicle. The coding referred to the 
semantics of the words, not the words themselves, so two different words which had 
similar meanings might receive the same encoding. For example, the two proper 
Clean up units (50) 
Overall semantics and argument roles units (360, distributed representation) 
Hidden units (100) 
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(110, local representation) 
Preposition identifiers 
(21, local representation) 
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 (390, distributed representation) 
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nouns John and Peter would have identical feature assignments. The overall 
semantics of the sentence were coded in a similar way, but the features used mainly 
related to the verb’s meaning. For example, an utterance including the verb eat would 
include the features +act, +cause and –communicate. Finally, the argument roles 
fulfilled by the nominal arguments corresponded to traditional thematic roles (such as 
patient, experiencer, and instrument), supplemented with nodes for features 
specifying more specific aspects of the role concerned. 
Only one nominal argument and its corresponding thematic role could be presented to 
the network at one time, so if an utterance contained more than one nominal 
argument, each was presented in turn, in the order in which they occurred in the 
utterance, and this sequence was then repeated two more times. The verb, preposition, 
and overall semantic arguments were presented continuously throughout this period. 
The network was trained using back-propagation, with 1,200 distinct utterances, for 
100,000 iterations. 
Testing of the model involved presenting it with novel grammatical and 
ungrammatical utterances, and comparing the results. The network was judged to 
have ‘accepted a novel sentence if it computes a role for all and only the number of 
arguments in the novel sentence.’ (p. 303). Allen was able to demonstrate that the 
model was able to generalize to use verbs such as kick in the double object dative 
construction, even though it had not been presented with kick in a double object dative 
sentence in the training data. The model was also able to reject as ungrammatical the 
sentence John put the book, because this resulted in the model assigning three 
thematic roles, even though the original sentence contained only two noun phrases. 
However the model rejected John carried Mary the basket, even though this sentence 
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would be grammatical for at least some speakers of English. Allen explained that the 
model allowed kick, but not carry to appear in the double object dative construction 
because ‘kick is closer [to other verbs which show the alternation] along semantic 
dimensions which are relevant to getting this set of argument role assignments’ 
(Allen, 1997, p303). More specifically, Allen states that the alternation is activated by 
verbs for which the +instantaneous force feature is activated, which would clearly 
include kick but not carry. We should note, however, that in attempts to replicate 
Allen’s model, Smith (1999) concluded that the rules which the model learns are 
complex, and in many cases very idiosyncratic, and so cannot generally be given a 
concise explanation in terms of, for example, the presence or absence of a single 
semantic feature. This suggests that there may be no coherent grammar underlying 
languages at all, and that a coherent explanation of languages at a level above the 
neural one may not be possible. 
It is interesting to make a more specific comparison between Allen’s model and the 
one presented here. The program of this chapter relied purely on distributional cues to 
learn verb subcategorizations, and, while it clearly showed how learning can be 
achieved using distributional cues alone, it did not demonstrate that children do not 
make use of other available cues, in particular the semantic and phonological cues 
identified by Mazurkewich and White (1984) and Pinker (1989). Allen’s model did 
not make use of phonological cues either, but semantic cues were central to its 
learning mechanism. However, this did not mean that Allen’s model did not make use 
of distributional cues; it had to use these cues as well, because it did not have any a 
priori knowledge of how semantics related to subcategorizations. The rules it used to 
determine subcategorizations from verb semantics were learned based on correlations 
between semantics and syntax in the example utterances.  
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This way of learning actually has a lot of similarities to Pinker’s (1989) proposal, in 
that Pinker also proposed that children learn correlations between verbs’ semantics 
and their subcategorizations, and that they then use these correlations as the basis of 
general rules which predict the allowable subcategorizations for individual verbs. The 
key difference is that Pinker proposed that children learn formal rules, and that the 
general form of those rules is determined innately. However, he did not provide an 
explanation of how those rules were learned. In contrast, in Allen’s model, all such 
rules are implicit in the connection strengths in the neural network, and the model 
learns the rules linking semantics and subcategorizations at the same time as learning 
which semantic features are relevant for placing verbs in particular categories. The 
model does not just use semantic bootstrapping (where semantic cues are used to 
learn syntax, as Pinker (1989) proposed), but can also perform syntactic bootstrapping 
(where syntax can be used to help predict word meaning, as Landau and Gleitman 
(1985) proposed). It can use the correlations between syntax and semantics which it 
has learned so that if it is given a nonce verb, it is able to guess appropriate verbal 
semantic features for the verb, and thematic roles for its arguments. 
However, Allen did not address one of the basic questions addressed in this chapter – 
namely why do children overgeneralize verb alternations, and then subsequently 
recover from those overgeneralizations. Allen did not report any investigations 
concerning the predictions of his model as regards the course of learning, and hence 
there is no indication of whether his model replicates the pattern of early 
overgeneralization followed by later acquisition of correct subcategorizations. Allen 
did demonstrate correct acquisition of the rule which allows generalizations to be 
made concerning which verbs can appear in the double object dative construction, and 
he showed how multiple cues to syntactic structures could be integrated. However, he 
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did not report whether his model was able to reliably infer that verbs appearing in the 
prepositional dative construction can also appear in the double object dative 
construction. 
Another approach to computational modelling of the acquisition of verb 
subcategorizations was that of Brent (1994). The task attempted by his system was in 
many ways more complex than that attempted here and by Onnis et al’s (2002) 
system, because Brent’s model learned from transcriptions of child directed speech 
obtained from the CHILDES corpora (MacWhinney, 2000), instead of learning from 
artificially created data sets. Central to Brent’s model is the hypothesis that children 
learn a considerable number of function morphemes and proper names at a very 
young age, and then use these morphemes to aid in the acquisition of verb 
subcategorizations. This hypothesis seems reasonable, because in all languages there 
exist a small number of function morphemes that occur with very high frequency, and 
so it would seem likely that children learn these morphemes early. It is widely 
reported that function morphemes are often absent from the speech of young children, 
but research has shown that children learn to recognise many of these words from a 
young age, even thought they might not initially use them productively (Hirsh-Pasek 
and Golinkoff, 1996). Children will also be exposed to a limited number of proper 
names, each of which they will observe with a fairly high frequency, so again it seems 
likely that these words would be acquired at a young age.  
A problem remains, however, which is that children cannot learn verb 
subcategorizations until they have first identified the verbs. Brent’s model identified 
verbs as those words which occurred in plain form and with an –ing suffix, except that 
he excluded these words when they immediately followed a preposition or determiner. 
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He then looked at all the instances of each verb found, and tried to identify phrases 
which were complements to the verb, and to determine which kind of phrase they 
were. In general, if a proper noun, pronoun or determiner followed immediately after 
a verb, this would be taken to be a potential noun phrase complement, while if a 
preposition and then one of these elements followed a verb this would be taken as a 
potential prepositional phrase complement. Using this kind of rule, Brent’s model 
classified each of the candidate verbs according to whether it occurred in one of 
several types of subcategorization frames used with English verbs, such as those 
requiring just a single noun phrase complement, a finite clause complement, or the 
double object or prepositional dative subcategorizations discussed above. 
The model now had a list of verbs, and for each would have a table which recorded 
both the frequency of the verb, and how often it seemed to have occurred in each of 
the subcategorization frames. This table would be expected to contain some errors, 
primarily because the cues used to identify subcategorizations were only clues, and 
could not be relied upon to always identify the underlying linguistic structure 
correctly. (For example, prepositional phrases following verbs in English are 
frequently adjuncts, which are not subcategorized for by the verb.) For each verb, a 
statistical rule was then used to decide in which subcategorization frames it could 
reliably be said to occur. If a verb occurred in a particular subcategorization frame 
only rarely, relative to the verb’s overall frequency, then that was not considered to 
provide sufficient evidence to establish that that was an allowable subcategorization 
for that verb.  
Using this procedure, Brent’s model was able to assign one or more subcategorization 
frame to 76 of the 126 verbs found, and it generally did so with a high degree of 
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accuracy. There were seven verbs which show the dative alternation, give, show, 
bring, feed, roll, throw and read, but the alternation was only learned for the first two 
of these. (That is, only those verbs were classified as taking both the double object 
and prepositional dative subcategorizations.) This is presumably because of the fairly 
limited amount of data available. The prepositional dative structure was, however, 
learned for bring, roll and throw, and the double object dative structure for read. 
A key result of the model reported in this chapter is that it was able to demonstrate 
generalization of the dative alternation from one verb to others, but Brent’s system 
was unable to make any such generalization, because it treated each verb individually. 
It is clear that children do sometimes make such generalizations, so ideally Brent’s 
system would be extended so that it too could do so.  
Another problem with Brent’s system is that it is specific to English, and would be 
completely unable to learn verb subcategorizations in any other language. The a 
priori incorporation of some aspects of English, such as knowledge of functional 
morphemes, can be justified by arguing that these are acquired at a stage of learning 
which must take place before the stage simulated by the model, but the justification 
for other parts of the model is less clear. The model had a priori knowledge of the 
types of element for which English verbs subcategorize, even though it was the 
acquisition of subcategorization frames for which the model aimed to account. 
Furthermore, much knowledge of English is implicit in the various tests for 
complement phrases, so it seems that the model is provided with a considerable 
amount of knowledge concerning English verb subcategorizations prior to its 
exposure to the data. This is a problem, because a computer model of acquisition must 
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learn from only those information sources which are available to children, if it to 
accurately account for the acquisition process.  
Ideally a computer model of language should be equally able to learn any human 
language, as all normal children are able to do this, and it is they that such computer 
models are supposed to mimic. Clearly Brent’s model gives an insight into the kind of 
cues that children might use to learn verb subcategorizations, but it leaves unanswered 
what may be a more difficult question – that of how children learn to identify the 
relevant cues and the appropriate rules for applying them. Given the wide cross-
linguistic diversity in the ways in which verbal arguments are expressed, it would 
seem that this is likely to be a very difficult task. 
Brent’s (1994) system had many similarities to a system developed by Manning 
(1993) which could produce a verb subcategorization dictionary by analysing text 
corpora. Manning’s system also incorporated considerable a priori knowledge of 
English, in the form of a finite state parser and stochastic tagger used by the system. 
Such factors would make Manning’s system a poor psychological model of language 
acquisition, but this is hardly surprising, because Manning’s system did not aim to 
model language acquisition. Its aim was simply to provide a tool which could be 
useful in the development and maintenance of language technology systems. 
There has been a limited amount of work which has combined the minimum 
description length approach to grammar learning with the expression-induction 
methodology described above. In particular, the work of Kirby (2002) discussed in 
section 2.4 above has served as the basis for work which has replaced the simple 
learning mechanism used there with a more sophisticated one based on minimum 
description length. Teal and Taylor (2000) created a system which could represent 
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languages, whose sentences consisted of strings of six letters, using finite state 
automata95. The system would then produce a random sample of sentences to pass on 
to the next generation. Another automaton would then be constructed by incorporating 
those sentences into an initially empty automaton, so that that automaton would allow 
all and only the observed sentences. Nodes in the new automaton were then merged if 
that made an improvement to the automaton according to a minimum description 
length evaluation measure. The resulting automaton was then used to produce a 
sample of sentences from which the automaton in the next generation could learn. 
They showed how their system could model change in language over several 
generations, and concluded that simpler languages change more slowly than more 
complex ones (at least within the bounds of their simulation). 
Brighton and Kirby (2001) and Brighton (2002) created a similar model which also 
used finite state automata and learned in a very similar way, again by merging nodes 
under the guidance of a minimum description length evaluation measure. Their 
system was more sophisticated however, because, like Kirby’s (2002) system, it could 
express meanings using the languages it learned, and did not just reproduce syntactic 
patterns like Teal and Taylor’s system did. The system incorporated a meaning space, 
defining the range of possible meanings which the system could express. A range of 
meanings would be expressed using one of the languages under investigation, and the 
resulting sentence-meaning pairs would be observed, and incorporated into a new 
                                                 
95
 Finite state automata are a simpler kind of grammar than context free phrase structure grammars. 
They consist of a number of nodes linked by arcs which are labelled with words or symbols, and they 
define allowable sentences as those which lie along a series of arcs starting at a particular start node. 
See Chomsky (1957) for a discussion of their use in linguistic theory. 
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automaton, which would then be generalized using a minimum description length 
evaluation measure, in a similar way to that in which this was done in Teal and 
Taylor’s system. However, in contrast to Teal and Taylor’s and Kirby’s approaches, 
the new automaton did not express a range of meanings to a new generation, because 
no attempt was made to simulate evolution over several generations. Instead a 
calculation was made to determine the proportion of the meanings expressible in the 
original language that the new automaton could express. This provided a measure of 
‘language stability’, because it corresponded to how accurately the language had been 
passed on to the next generation. Brighton and Kirby calculated these values for both 
compositional and non-compositional languages under a range of conditions, so that 
they could determine in which situations there would be a selective advantage for 
compositional languages. They concluded that compositional languages are more 
stable than non-compositional ones when there is a sufficiently large meaning space, 
and only a small proportion of the meanings expressible in a language are ever heard 
by people learning the language. These are the conditions under which human 
languages evolve, and Brighton and Kirby’s model hence supports the hypothesis that 
syntax emerges due to communicative pressures acting over several generations. 
9.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that Bayesian inference (in the form of minimum description 
length inference) is able to provide a simple and plausible account of how a number 
of aspects of syntax could be learned. In particular the computational model described 
here can learn verb subcategorizations where one verb is grammatical in only a subset 
of the structures in which another can appear, and yet predicts that newly encountered 
verbs are used productively in regular patterns. The model also accounts for 
overgeneralization, and hence the use of irregular items in regular constructions 
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during early stages of acquisition. While it is not logically necessary that children 
must make use of Bayesian inference in learning language, there is potential to 
incorporate Bayesian inference into theories as diverse as recurrent neural networks 
and Universal Grammar. 
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Chapter 10  
The Nature of Language 
This thesis has so far attempted to address specific issues within linguistics, relating to 
colour terms and to syntactic acquisition. However, a further contribution of the thesis 
is that it has examined several different ways of accounting for linguistic phenomena, 
which should help to address the issue of what is the best way to understand language. 
This relates closely to the question of what concepts of language are appropriate for 
use in linguistic research. 
The part of the thesis on colour terms has suggested that we may not be able to 
explain linguistic typology if we simply view language as a psychological 
phenomenon. The typological patterns that were apparent in the colour term systems 
which emerged in the simulations cannot be explained just in terms of which kinds of 
system are learnable by the artificial people, and which are not. They are, however, 
clearly a product of the nature of the artificial people’s conceptual colour spaces and 
the learning mechanism which they use. This contrasts with the view that colour term 
typology is the product of the uses to which language is put. (For example, it could be 
proposed that the types of colour term evolving cross-linguistically are those which 
are most useful to people communicatively.)  
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An interesting property of the evolutionary colour terms model is that it does not take 
any account of communicative success. The model could be regarded as incorporating 
functional pressures, because it required the artificial people to name colours, and a 
correlation between frequency of colour naming and complexity of colour language 
was demonstrable. Hence the results of the simulation were affected by how often 
people needed to use colour words, which is a kind of functional pressure. However, 
the function of language would have had a more direct effect on the simulations if 
people had been rewarded when they were able to communicate successfully, and 
penalised when they failed to do so. In the colour terms models, no attempt was ever 
made to see if the hearer of any utterance would be able to deduce the colour being 
referred to, or whether they would be able to discriminate it from any other colour96. 
Hence, clearly the emergent languages were not shaped by feedback coming from the 
people who heard the utterances. Therefore it seems that, while the languages 
emerging in the simulations were shaped by their function, they would not be adapted 
in such a way as to maximise their potential for achieving effective communication. 
This seems to place the model of colour term evolution somewhere in between the 
functionalist and formalist extremes of the functionalist-formalist debate (Newmeyer, 
1998).  
The typological patterns arise when many successive generations of artificial people 
attempt to learn the colour term systems used by the previous generations. This 
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 Interestingly, Belpaeme (2002) incorporated a discriminability test into his model, in which it was 
investigated whether or not the term that had been used had allowed the hearer to distinguish between 
the target colour and a neighbouring context colour. The hearer’s colour lexicon would then be 
modified, based on whether communication had been successful (see section 2.4. for more details). 
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suggests that the concept of meme, which was proposed by Dawkins (1976), may be 
useful in understanding the simulations, and, by analogy, language in general. 
Dawkins proposed that we can think of any information which is transmitted between 
people as a meme (named on analogy to gene in genetics). The memes which come to 
be known by people will be those which are passed on from generation to generation. 
Dawkins noted that whether memes are useful to the people who learn them will 
influence whether they are passed on, but that memes which are not useful might well 
be passed on as well, simply because of some property they might have which aids in 
their transmission. For example, Dawkins suggested that the idea of blind faith, that is 
that religious beliefs should be held unquestioningly, and not justified by rational 
inquiry, is self-perpetuating (as it itself forms a part of some religious belief systems). 
Hence, perhaps the reason for its continued existence is that it encourages people to 
go on believing that it is true, and discourages them from questioning it. This would 
tend to result in it surviving in the belief systems of individual people, therefore 
increasing the chances that they would pass the idea on to other people. We should 
note that this argument is valid, regardless of whether the idea of blind faith itself is 
beneficial or detrimental to the person who believes in it. 
The colour words and their denotations within the colour model can also be viewed as 
memes, and this generalisation may be extended to other aspects of language which 
are learned based on input from other people. While the simulations do not take 
account of whether colour terms are useful to people, if colour words were not useful 
to people, then they would never use them, and so the colour words would never be 
transmitted to the next generation of learners, and so they would be lost from the 
language. Hence, it would seem that colour term systems will only exist in languages 
if the speakers of those languages have cause to refer to colours. However, showing 
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that it is necessary for people to have reason to use colour terms, in order for them to 
exist in a language, does not necessitate that the colour terms which emerge will be 
those that are most useful. 
The evolutionary colour terms model might be best understood in terms of a proposal 
made by Kirby (2000), which is closely related to Dawkins’ concept of memes. Kirby 
suggested that it may be best to view languages as independently evolving adaptive 
systems, which use people to aid their transmission. We can then consider languages 
to be collections of memes which exist in an environment which consists of a chain of 
human hosts97, and languages will come to adapt so as to maximise their potential for 
survival in this environment. Given this perspective, it would seem that languages 
may exist simply because there is a suitable medium available in which they can 
survive (human hosts), and a replication mechanism through which they can 
propagate themselves (transmission via E-language98 and an acquisition mechanism). 
Languages would, however, appear to be beneficial to their hosts, and so they should 
probably be viewed as symbionts99.  
However, the model of colour term evolution does in fact suggest that some aspects of 
language may not be useful to their hosts, because the absence of any measure of 
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 Of course languages can also exist in some other forms, for example on paper (in the form of 
writing), or on audio tapes, but people are probably the most important kind of host for languages. 
98
 E-language was defined in section 2.2. 
99
 A symbiont is an organism involved in a symbiotic relationship (a relationship in which two or more 
organisms live together or interact, and from which they both benefit). 
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communicative success within the model shows that the evolution of particular 
language forms need not be dependent on their usefulness. This leaves open the 
possibility of completely useless words or constructions entering the language, simply 
because they tend to be learned and passed on between generations. Any such aspects 
of language should be regarded as parasites, and not symbionts. Clearly, in the 
evolutionary model of colour terms, the colour term systems only existed because the 
people used colour terms, which would imply that the colour terms fulfilled some 
purpose for those people. However, there is no reason to suppose that all the emergent 
colour words would be useful to a real user of the language. It is quite possible that 
people might in reality be better off with fewer colour terms, in which case the terms 
which are not beneficial would be parasites. This suggests that many aspects of 
language, such as irregular constructions, may well be parasitic, as they would appear 
to make language needlessly complex 100 . Viewing languages as partly parasitic 
phenomena, would help to explain why they seem to be needlessly complex, and why 
they contain so many irregularities which seem to complicate the task of 
communicating, without having any benefit for language users. 
It does, however, seem sensible to point out some problems with the concept of 
memes, at least in so far as it is applied to language. Firstly, people are not simply 
passive repositories through which language may pass, but are quite capable of 
modifying language, and creating entirely new expressions, both consciously and 
                                                 
100
 We should note that there can also be benefits arising from irregularity. If, for example, a particular 
complex meaning is expressed very frequently, we might expect it to be lexicalized (Hurford, 2000), 
which would reduce the overall number of morphemes needed in communication, which would be 
beneficial for both speakers and hearers. 
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unconsciously. The artificial people in the evolutionary simulation simply tried to 
mimic other speakers, which is probably what real people do most of the time, but 
they need not always do so. However, Pinker (1997) has argued that complex memes 
arise ‘because some person knuckles down, racks his brain, musters his ingenuity, and 
composes or writes or paints or invents something’ (p209), and not as a result of an 
evolutionary process involving cumulative copying errors, and the differential 
survival of memes. Certainly Pinker is to some extent right, as many kinds of idea 
could presumably only be created as a result of rational thinking and the application 
of foresight. (Think, for example, of the design of an aeroplane. It would seem that it 
would only be possible to design a working aeroplane by understanding the principles 
by which aeroplanes work. A working design for an aeroplane could never arise 
simply as the result of a memetic process.) However, I think that Pinker is incorrect 
when he dismisses the idea of memetic evolution so completely, especially in relation 
to language. Languages are shared systems of conventions, and so words and 
constructions can only become established if they are adopted by large numbers of 
speakers. Pinker argued that ‘when ideas are passed around, they aren’t merely copied 
with occasional typographical errors; they are evaluated, discussed, improved on, or 
rejected.’ (p210). This is probably true for some kinds of idea, but it would seem 
likely that language is transmitted largely as a result of mimicry, rather than as a result 
of any more directed cognitive process. This is exactly the kind of process to which 
meme theory is applicable. 
A further problem with the concept of memes, is that they are not passed on intact to 
the next generation in the same way that genes are, because the copy of a meme may 
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not be exactly the same as the original from which it was learned101. (While genes do 
occasionally mutate, in the vast majority of cases, an identical copy is passed on to the 
next generation (Dawkins, 1976).) In the simulations, the representations of the colour 
terms themselves were passed on unchanged, which probably reflects the situation in 
real languages, as usually a child would use exactly the same phonemes to represent a 
word as the person who they learned it from did102. However, the same cannot be said 
about the words’ denotations, as each artificial person would normally learn a slightly 
different denotation for each word, depending on exactly what examples of its 
denotation they had observed. This is probably also what happens when real people 
learn colour terms, and most other kinds of word. Some words, however, have a 
precise meaning, and so we might argue that the memes corresponding to their 
meanings are replicated perfectly when those words are acquired. Examples of such 
words might include determiners such as both, or nouns such as Tuesday. When a 
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 It should be noted that Dawkins (1976) did acknowledge and discuss this problem. 
102
 This is not to say that they would pronounce the word identically, as even if two people pronounced 
a word in very similar ways, we could still expect that there would be some difference between the 
pronunciations of each person, no matter how small. However, phonemes are not speech sounds, but 
more abstract representations, which code the underlying distinctions between sounds. (We can view 
phonology as a digital system, in contrast to the speech sounds themselves which are analogue.) For 
example, English has both /l/ and /r/ phonemes, each of which has a distinct pronunciation. We would 
expect a child learning English to maintain this distinction, so that he or she would pronounce /l/ 
differently to /r/, and hence a word such as lob would be distinguishable from rob. This distinction 
would be maintained even if the child’s exact pronunciation of each phoneme differed slightly from 
that of other people. It is the representation of words at this level of distinctive contrasts that we would 
expect to be passed on unchanged, rather than the speech sounds themselves. 
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meaning is passed on unchanged between generations, it is unproblematic to consider 
it to be a meme, but whether the meanings of words such as colour terms should 
really be thought of as memes is somewhat questionable. Perhaps a modified version 
of meme theory is needed to cope with situations like this, in which there is fuzzy 
transmission of ideas, but it seems that the concept of meme is never-the-less useful in 
understanding many aspects of language. 
While meme theory may be useful in explaining the properties of colour term 
systems, it is largely inconsistent with Chomsky’s view of language. Meme theory 
only applies in situations in which there is some sort of learning device which can 
learn concepts, or which can learn to reproduce some form of behaviour. However, 
Chomsky’s theory, which proposes that the language people acquire is determined 
largely by Universal Grammar, leaves little room for learning. Language forms appear 
in successive generations primarily because they are specified by Universal Grammar, 
and learning plays only a relatively minor role in choosing which of a limited range of 
devices is used to express particular meanings. We could still regard language as 
being memetic, but only in those aspects which are determined based on exposure to 
the E-language produced by other speakers. Hence it would seem that the meme 
concept will be of relatively little help in explaining linguistic phenomena, if the 
Universal Grammar hypothesis is correct. 
If people are born possessing an innate Universal Grammar, then we should be able to 
explain most syntactic phenomena simply in terms of individual psychology, because 
it would be individual people’s versions of Universal Grammar which are largely 
responsible for determining the syntactic system which they acquire. Hence, if 
Chomsky is correct about the mechanism by which syntax is learned, the focus on I-
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language will be well justified. However, the model of syntactic acquisition described 
in Chapter 9, suggested that learning, and not Universal Grammar, could be the 
primary determinant of the syntactic systems which people acquire. Hence, if the 
model is accurate, and people do learn syntax with Bayesian inference (or with any 
other mechanism in which learning is more important than innate structure), then the 
concept of memes would be much more applicable, and I-language would appear to 
be too narrow a concept to explain linguistic phenomena. The syntactic systems of 
languages would be determined to a large extent by the nature of the arena of 
language use, and by cultural evolutionary processes taking place over several 
generations. 
If syntactic structure is largely learned, and not determined by innate structure, then 
syntactic phenomena may be best explained as the products of evolutionary processes 
(Ellefson and Christiansen, 2000), in much the same way as the properties of colour 
terms were. If this is the case, typological patterns may reveal little about the 
underlying I-languages of individual people, because they may be due largely to 
process which operate above the level of individuals, and over longer time spans than 
an individual person’s lifespan. Only some aspects of language may be explainable by 
reference to ontogenetic processes, while others may require a diachronic explanation, 
or one in terms of whole populations of speakers, not just individuals. For example, 
while the model explains how verb subcategorizations can be learned, it does not 
explain why we have two different subcategorizations for some verbs, but only a 
single one in other cases. It would seem that such phenomena cannot be explained 
with a program which just models individual people, because the determinant of 
whether a verb has one or two subcategorizations is the input that is received by the 
model. In reality this input would be produced by other people, and so the 
301 
subcategorizations of the verbs are determined based on input received from other 
speakers, and not as a result of any property of individuals (although clearly such 
phenomena can only exist in languages if people are capable of learning them). 
However, this suggests that the correlation between syntax and semantics evident in 
English verb subcategorizations may not have a simple psychological explanation, but 
may be a result of social processes involving whole communities of speakers103 . 
Hence, we should be wary of approaches to this problem in which an attempt is made 
to explain all of the data within a purely psychological account. 
Chomsky has proposed that we can make inferences about Universal Grammar based 
on typological regularities. However, if we had applied this methodology to the 
results of the simulations of colour term systems, then we would have had to postulate 
many principles of Universal Grammar which simply do not exist. (In the case of the 
simulations, we can be sure of this, because we know exactly how the artificial people 
were constructed.) For example, there is no aspect of the Bayesian learning 
mechanism which prevents the acquisition of blue-red-yellow colour terms. However, 
the results of the simulations would appear to suggest that this is the case, because no 
such term had been learned by the artificial people alive at the end of any of the 
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 This would appear to be likely, as most of the verbs which do not alternate are Latinate (originating 
from a romance language) and multisyllabic, while most of those which do alternate are phonologically 
native, and monosyllabic (Mazurkewich and White, 1984). This suggests that the distinction between 
non-alternating and alternating verbs originated when verbs were borrowed from romance languages, a 
process which clearly involves social interaction, and which is therefore not explainable at the level of 
individual psychology.  
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simulations104. Hence, if we were only able to observe the emergent colour term 
systems, and did not have knowledge of the mechanism which produced them, we 
might postulate that there is a principle of Universal Grammar which prevents blue-
red-yellow colour terms from being acquired, which is clearly not the case (at least as 
far as the artificial people in the simulations are concerned). We should therefore be 
suspicious of the large body of work which makes claims about Universal Grammar 
based on language typology, as many processes not related to Universal Grammar 
could be responsible for the creation of typological patterns. 
Overall, I think that it can be said that this thesis highlights how important it is to 
consider the theoretical status of regularities apparent in E-language. Most approaches 
to explaining colour term typology (including Berlin and Kay, 1969 and Kay and 
Maffi, 1999) have proposed an evolutionary account, but in general these accounts 
have been somewhat vague as to the exact details of the evolutionary process. By 
modelling communities of people using artificial people who learn from one another, 
we can create a model which incorporates both E-language and I-language, and which 
makes both the processes of language acquisition and language evolution explicit. If 
learning plays an important part in language acquisition, then it is not appropriate to 
neglect diachronic processes, but neither can we have an adequate model of language 
evolution which neglects the process through which children construct an I-language 
based on E-language input obtained from other speakers. It would seem that language 
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 Or at least no such term was learned by a majority of the people alive at the end of any of the 
simulations. Because the results presented above were based on analyses of communities overall, we 
cannot be sure that no individual artificial person had learned such a term. 
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function is likely to play an important role in shaping the form of languages, but that 
the mechanism through which this is achieved is somewhat indirect. We should be 
cautious about attributing properties of particular languages to either innate 
knowledge or to functional pressures, as they may in reality be a product of an 
interaction between both of these factors, or they may simply exist because they have 
an inherent survival value, and so are good memes. 
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Appendix A 
Source Code for Model with 
Continuous Colour Space 
The source code is contained in three files, community.cpp, person.cpp and person.h, 
which are on the accompanying CD. The compiler used was Borland C++, so the files 
should conform to the ANSI standard, and hence be compatible with any ANSI C++ 
compiler. The file to be compiled is community.cpp, which will in turn compile the 
other two files. The programs are menu driven, and documentation is included as part 
of the source code. A number of parameters at the beginning of the file 
community.cpp can be adjusted, but most of these can also be adjusted while the 
program is running, using the menu system. The model can output graph data, which 
is saved in a simple ASCII format suitable for loading into Microsoft Word’s graph 
drawing component. (These files have a .gra suffix.) 
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Appendix B 
Source Code for Model with 
Discrete Colour Space 
This appendix also appears on the accompanying CD. The source code for the model 
is contained in three files, conservative.cpp, dcperson.cpp, and dcperson.h. Of these, 
the first should be compiled, as this will in turn compile the other two. Most of the 
observations made in Appendix A concerning the source code for the first model also 
apply here. In addition, there is a number of programs which were used in automating 
the analysis of data output by conservative.cpp, and which were used to obtain some 
of the results presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
conservative.cpp has an option which allows a summary of the colour term 
denotations known by all the speakers to be output to a file. (These files have a .sum 
suffix.) The output files are in a format similar to Figure 6.3, as it shows which 
colours are denoted by each colour term, and each line corresponds to a separate 
speaker. collator.cpp can then read in a collection of these files, and output them in a 
format which can be analysed by the other program. (These files have the filename 
collation.txt.) balanced.cpp is for investigating whether the unique hue points are 
evenly distributed between colour terms. focicentrality.cpp calculates how central the 
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prototypes of colour terms are to the category as a whole, while 
fociuniquedistance.cpp investigates whether category prototypes tend to be at the 
same locations as unique hue points. focilocations.cpp simply counts the number of 
colour terms with their prototypes at each colour. mean.cpp and meannoisy.cpp were 
used to calculate the mean number of colour terms in systems which had been run 
with varying life expectancies for the artificial people, and either with or without the 
presence of random noise (see Chapter 7). Finally, typology.cpp outputs files listing 
the number of colour terms of each type, and the number of overall colour term 
systems of each different type. There is also a compiled Windows executable for each 
of these programs, although some parameters can only be changed if the programs are 
recompiled. Further documentation can be found in the source code itself. 
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Appendix C 
Results Obtained with Discrete 
Colour Model 
This appendix also appears primarily on the CD. It contains files output by the 
discrete colour model, and some of the files output by the analysis programs. Most of 
the files are summaries of whole communities (in the form of .sum files), but there are 
also some .gra files, which give more detailed representations of the colour terms 
known by individual people, .comm files which list all the colour term examples 
observed by each person in a community, and .txt files which are output by the 
analysis programs, and which summarise various aspects of the emergent languages. 
The files are divided into five subdirectories. The first of these contains data from 
which the Urdu colour terms graph of Figure 5.1 was plotted. The second directory 
contains the data which was used to plot the graphs of Figure 6.1, which show a cross 
section of the colour terms known by different speakers in a single community. Table 
C.1 below lists the number of examples which had been observed by each person in 
that community, and Figure C.1 contains graphs showing the denotations of the colour 
terms learned by each person. The graphs in Figure 6.1 are for people 1, 9, 5 and 7 
(and they appear in that order in Figure 6.1).  
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Artificial Person Number of Examples Remembered 
1 68 
2 38 
3 2 
4 29 
5 113 
6 75 
7 32 
8 100 
9 71 
10 24 
Table C.1. The Number of Examples Remembered by Each Artificial People in the Simulation 
Reported in Section 6.2. (The numbers of each person correspond to those in Figure C.1 below.) 
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Figure C.1. The Basic Colour Term Systems of all the Artificial People from the Simulation 
Reported in Section 6.2. 
(+’s mark unique hue locations, p=0.5, and people are creative one time in a thousand. Only 
colour terms for which people had remembered at least four examples are shown. Graph 3 is 
blank because person 3 had not seen four examples of any colour term.) 
The final three directories contain summaries of the colour terms known by the 
artificial people present at the end of the evolutionary simulations, together with files 
containing analyses of this data. Each directory contains data for either the condition 
in which no unique hues were simulated, the unique hues were simulated but there 
was no random noise, or when both unique hues and random noise were simulated. 
330 
Appendix D 
Ditransitive Verb Corpus 
Below is the full corpus of data used for learning the dative alternation with the model 
described in Chapter 9. There are 55 sentences containing the double object dative 
structure, 55 containing the prepositional dative structure with gave, lent, passed or 
sent and 40 sentences containing the donated in the prepositional dative construction. 
 
John gave a museum to the painting  
Sam passed Sam to a painting  
John passed John to Sam  
the painting gave Sam Sam  
John gave John a museum  
Sam gave Sam to Sam  
the painting lent Sam to John  
Sam passed Sam John  
John donated a painting to the museum  
a painting donated the painting to Sam  
a painting lent Sam a museum  
Sam lent Sam a museum  
Sam gave John Sam  
a museum donated John to Sam  
a painting lent John the painting  
the museum donated John to Sam  
John gave John to Sam  
Sam lent a painting the museum  
Sam lent John Sam  
Sam gave a painting a museum  
a museum gave John Sam  
Sam donated Sam to Sam  
a painting donated John to John  
John gave John to John  
John gave a museum to the painting  
John passed Sam John  
Sam lent John Sam  
a painting passed John to John  
John gave John John  
John passed Sam to John  
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a museum lent John to John  
Sam gave a museum to John  
John lent John John  
a painting passed the painting John  
the museum lent John to Sam  
Sam gave Sam the museum  
Sam donated Sam to John  
John passed John to Sam  
John lent the painting to a painting  
John gave Sam to Sam  
John gave Sam Sam  
John lent Sam to John  
Sam passed Sam John  
John passed Sam Sam  
John lent Sam Sam  
John passed John to a painting  
John gave a painting a painting  
the painting gave John the museum  
Sam lent John Sam  
a painting donated John to Sam  
John donated John to Sam  
John passed Sam Sam  
John lent Sam to Sam  
John lent John Sam  
Sam donated John to Sam  
John lent the museum Sam  
John lent John Sam  
Sam gave Sam the painting  
Sam donated Sam to Sam  
a museum donated Sam to a museum  
Sam lent the museum the museum  
John donated John to the painting  
John lent the painting to the painting  
John lent John Sam  
John passed Sam a painting  
Sam gave a museum to John  
a painting donated Sam to Sam  
a painting passed Sam to a painting  
Sam gave Sam Sam  
a museum gave the museum to the painting  
the museum gave the painting to Sam  
John gave a museum Sam  
John lent John John  
the museum lent the painting John  
Sam lent a painting to Sam  
Sam passed John John  
Sam lent Sam to John  
Sam passed John to Sam  
John gave a painting the museum  
John lent Sam Sam  
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John passed John to John  
John passed Sam Sam  
Sam passed Sam a painting  
Sam gave Sam the museum  
a painting passed John to John  
a museum passed John to John  
John donated John to the painting  
John gave the museum to Sam  
the painting donated John to John  
Sam donated Sam to Sam  
John donated Sam to John  
a painting lent a painting to a museum  
John passed the painting to Sam  
the museum donated the museum to Sam  
John gave Sam to Sam  
Sam lent Sam to John  
Sam gave a museum to John  
John donated John to Sam  
Sam donated Sam to Sam  
Sam passed Sam to Sam  
John lent John to John  
the painting lent the museum to Sam  
the museum donated Sam to the painting  
Sam donated John to John  
Sam donated John to a museum  
the museum donated a painting to John  
John passed John to Sam  
John passed John to John  
John donated the painting to a painting  
Sam donated Sam to the painting  
John passed Sam to John  
Sam donated John to the painting  
a painting donated a museum to the painting  
John gave a painting to Sam  
a painting lent Sam to John  
John lent John to John  
a painting donated Sam to Sam  
the museum gave a museum to Sam  
John passed John to John  
the painting donated John to John  
John donated John to the painting  
a painting donated Sam to Sam  
John donated John to the painting  
a museum donated Sam to a museum  
Sam donated Sam to Sam  
Sam donated John to Sam  
John donated John to Sam  
a painting donated John to Sam  
Sam donated Sam to John  
Sam passed Sam Sam  
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John passed a painting John  
Sam passed the painting a painting  
John lent John the painting  
the painting lent Sam Sam  
Sam lent a painting Sam  
the museum lent Sam a painting  
Sam gave Sam the painting  
the museum lent John the painting  
a painting lent the painting John  
the painting passed a museum to the painting  
John lent Sam to a painting  
Sam lent Sam to a painting  
a painting gave Sam to Sam  
John gave John to John  
Sam gave the painting to a painting  
Sam lent Sam to Sam  
a painting passed John to Sam  
John passed John to John  
the museum gave a museum to Sam  
the museum sent a painting to Sam 
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Appendix E 
Source Code for the Syntax Model 
This appendix appears on the accompanying CD, and contains program source code 
for the syntax learning model (written in SICSTUS PROLOG). It consists of four files, 
searcher.pl, evaluator.pl, parser.pl and corpus.pl. This program was originally 
written for research reported in Dowman (1998), and so does not form part of the 
work submitted for the PhD, but it is included here because it was used in the research 
reported in Chapter 9. 
In order to run the programs, SICSTUS should be started in a directory where the files 
have been saved. Next, enter compile(searcher). , which will load in and compile all 
four files. Learning is initiated using learn(LanguageName). , where the name of a 
language, as given in the file corpus.pl, is substituted for LanguageName. (The corpus 
used to obtain the results reported in Chapter 9, and which is reproduced in Appendix 
D, is named dative3 in corpus.pl.) Each language must be set up as exemplified in 
corpus.pl, with a list of the words, the non-terminal symbols (which must include root 
and s1), and all the sentences to be learned from. Most of the parameters which can be 
adjusted are at the beginning of searcher.pl, though the one concerning depth of 
parsing is hidden in parser.pl. To adjust which search moves are used with what 
probability, it is necessary to adjust the [1,2,4,4,4,5] in the rule below, which can be 
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found in the file searcher.pl. (The rule as given below is1/6 chance of adding, 
deleting or separating rules, and 1/2 chance of altering a rule, which is the setting 
which was used to obtain the results concerning the dative alternation.) Further 
documentation can be found in the code itself, or in Dowman (1998). A fifth file, 
finalcorrectdative3grammarandevalutaion.txt, gives the final grammar which was 
output by the program, and which was reproduced in an edited form in Table 9.7, 
together with its evaluation and the parses it assigns to sentences. 
% 1=delete rule, 2=add rule, 3=merge rule, 4=alter rule, 5=separate rule.  
learn(Language, GrammarNo, Temperature, Evaluation, Phase):-  
random_choice([1, 2, 4, 4, 4, 5], Random123456), % Decide whether to remove a rule or 
add a new one, merge rules, or alter a rule, or split a symbol.  
 
 
